Prem Sikka has an excellent article in the Guardian in which he argues:
The long-awaited report by the Competition Commission on the UK auditing market is a disappointment. The market is dominated by just four accounting firms — PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst & Young — who collectively audit more than 95% of the FTSE 350 companies.
Why? This is his shortened litany:
The audit report on company accounts is addressed to shareholders, but they have no means of assessing the quality of the audit work. They do not have any sight of the audit contract, audit files, audit tender, assurances given by management, or suspicious items investigated by auditors. The audit files are available to regulators who continue to produce anodyne reports. Any complaints against errant auditors take year to investigate. The Farepak scandal unfolded in 2006, but the disciplinary action against auditors Ernst & Young is still not finalised. The eventual fines are puny compared to the size of the oversights and fees collected by auditors.
In the absence of effective competition and regulation, auditors continue to reduce the time they devote to an audit assignment. Academic research has consistently shown that bored and hard-pressed staff routinely resort to falsification of audit files — that is, they claim that work has been done which in fact has never been done. The Competition Commission is oblivious to the culture of auditing firms.
In market economies, manufacturers of goods and services frequently provide warranties for their products. Disgruntled customers can ask for refunds, and can even sue negligent producers. The likelihood of liability may spur producers to improve the quality of their products and services, but the auditing pressure points are weak.
It is almost impossible to sue auditors for negligence, as in general they owe a "duty of care" to the company only, rather than to any individual shareholder, creditor, employee or any other stakeholder. Court cases such as MAN Nutzfahrzeuge AG & Anor v Freightliner Ltd & Anor [2007] EWCA Civ 910 show that auditors can easily escape any penalties. Despite major scandals, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has never prosecuted any UK auditing firm for negligence.
Prem's right. This is a public monopoly that is being exploited for private gain at cost to us all.
The power these firms are given is also being used via such bodies as the International Accounting Standards Board, which they dominate, to block essential reforms such as country-by-country reporting, which would reveal the ful extent of profit shifting to tax havens which is at the heart of the current corporate tax crisis, as I argue in 'Over here and under-taxed'.
And as KPMG showed last week, they are key defenders of tax haven abuse. They're even now taking over H M Revenue & Customs where their influence is wholly inappropriate.
They've even been exempted from the new rules on procurement and tax abuse.
Real reform is required. And we're not going to get it. And that's a disaster for markets, for transparency, accountability, good governance, auditing, and the accounting profession itself.
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CalamityJane123 in her comments on Prem’s article draws attention to the Auditors: Market concentration and their role – Economic Affairs Committee Contents at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldeconaf/119/11909.htm
This does not show the Big 4 in a very good light. Paragraphs 140 to 144 show where the Big 4 at work. They are no friends of democracy and seem to have chosen the path of wealth extraction rather than wealth creation.
It seems to me that the auditor of an enterprise ought to be responsible to the beneficial owners of that enterprise. That cannot be the managers themselves (the auditors are there to audit the managers and management). It cannot be the directors (they are all part of the management/director club marking each others cards). It cannot be the formal shareholders (they are too diffused). So the benficial owners need some agency whose interests are directly-aligned to the interests of the formal shareholders. How about H M Revenue & Customs?
Because of the existence of Corporation Tax (currently at 23%), the citizenship of each nation is the beneficial owner of 23% of the net profits of every enterprise operating in that nation, and H M Revenue & Customs is (or ought to be) the guardian of that 23% on behalf of the citizenship. H M Revenue & Customs ought to have 23% of the general voting power on every board of directors, sole oversight of the senior management remuneration committe, sole oversight of the appointment of the auditors, and the right to a prominent section of the annual report to ‘objectively mark the cards’ of the directors and management).
We are not looking for entrepreneurial insights, instincts, experience, and expertise here; just ‘due diligence’ (on behalf of the beneficial owners). In particular, H M Revenue & Customs should ‘audit the auditors’ for due diligence.
Isn’t this just another example of the intellectual and moral, if not yet (proven) financial corruption that is at the heart of the financial system in this country now?
These firms are complicit in the financial crash by their failure to properly audit the banks, and, as anyone like myself who works for HMRC knows, they are the devisors and active marketers of virtually all tax avoidance schemes used by corporates.
You make it sound like HMRC have no powers to combat the avoidance and are resigned to defeat. Hardly the approach we need.
The public needs faith in HMRC but there’s little to suggest they’re capable of fighting back.