I’ve already mentioned the derisory fine dished out to PWC that’s in the news this morning. Then I noticed this in the FT:

The £1.4m ($2.2m) fine that an accounting industry tribunal has levied on PwC is doubly notable. First, because it is the largest ever of its kind. Second, because it is disgracefully small. PwC, auditor to JPMorgan Securities, failed to tell City watchdogs that the broker was riskily lumping billions of clients’ money with its own. This represented “very serious” misconduct, according to the tribunal. But the three worthies, led by Richard de Lacy QC, lacked the backbone to impose an appropriate fine.

Do you want evidence that ‘chums’ can’t regulate ’chums’? Then this is it.

This type of cosy regulation is a neoliberal, market based conceit. It’s time for it to go.

 

PWC have been found guilty of massive negligence by the Accountancy and Actuarial Discipline Board. They persistently failed to protect clients of J P Morgan from loss as required by FSA regulation and law over a period of seven years, and signed reports that were blatantly wrong in the process. £5 billion of potential loss was at stake.

They have been ‘severely reprimanded’.

And the penalty? Just £1.4 million.

Let’s put that in context. There are 815 members of PWC in the UK according to their accounts. So that’s £1,717 each. Their average earnings were £763,000. So that’s a fine of 0.2% of earnings each. Relate that to UK average earnings of £25,000 to get a sense of perspective on that and the fine for being a partner in a firm so massively negligent would be £56 each. That’s just a bit more, pro rata, than a parking fine then.

If you wanted evidence that there was one rule for the rich and another for the rest then this is it.

 

It’s depressing to note the ongoing incompetence of my own profession. As the Guardian reports:

Auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers admitted to years of mistakes relating to the failure of investment bank JP Morgan to ensure that billions of pounds of its clients’ assets had been properly ring-fenced.

PwC is now expected to face a heavy fine over its role in the client asset scandal which could have wrought unnecessary mayhem had the bank collapsed at the height of the financial crisis in October 2008. At that point, JP Morgan’s futures and options desk held $23bn (£14bn) of client money, largely belonging to hedge funds, which was not segregated from the bank’s own funds.

This is basic stuff. It’s not, as PWC implies, a small slip. It’s an absolutely fundamental failure to audit. It’s incompetence on a gross scale. And incredibly easy to spot.

But PWC did not do it.

So threee questions:

1) Why not?

2) Why are they allowed to continue in operation in that cae?

3) When will auditing be totally reformed?

The answer is, in all cases ‘conflicts of interest’ do in differing ways explain a) why it happened b) why it will continue to happen c) why reform is blocked.

And if ministers won’t tackle this then you can be sure they won’t tackle other deep problems in society either.

 

The Tax Justice Network has just published a blog on a new EU report on transfer pricing and developing countries.

As they point out, from the outset the report is covered in warning signs about its likely failure to be impartial since the title page carries the following logo:

Why the problem? TJN explains in depth, and I warmly recommend their blog. But I’ll add these issues:

a) PWC are emphatically opposed to country-by-country reporting which has greatest prospect of providing developing countries with the risk assessment data they need to determine which transfer pricing cases to pick. You can’t promote good transfer pricing practice and oppose the availability of data to make it possible.

b) PWC act for the corporates doing much of the abuse.

c) PWC are found in all the world’s major tax havens – where much of the ill gotten gains of abuse are likely to be stashed.

To put it another way – PWC are completely conflicted on this issue meaning anything they write lacks any objective credibility. And given that this issue is so big that’s a disaster when the resources dedicated to this issue are so limited.

 

Floyd Norris, the chief financial correspondent of The New York Times and The International Herald Tribune, covers the world of finance and economics.

He wrote about a new report on taxes supposedly paid by US corporations for the New York Times on Friday.

It was prepared by PWC using their utterly misleading Total Tax Contribution method which provides no meaningful data but does deliver vast amounts of duff misinformnation for Fox News at considerably greater cost then country-by-country reporting would possibly impose.

He said of it:

These are the largest and most successful companies in the country — the Roundtable says that its members collectively have $6 trillion in revenues and 13 million employees. Is there not one member of the Roundtable that finds it objectionable to present something so blatantly misleading as this study?

He’s right to do so.

This is the accounting profession at its worst – deliberately seeking to pass tax liability from the richest and most able to pay onto the poorest in Amercia and elsewhere.

PWC should be ashamed of themselves. But it seems they are not.

Perhaps it’s average partners remuneration in the UK of well over half a million each that makes them so thick skinned.

 

Michel Barnier, the EU Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services was in London on Friday.

He met Vince Cable. I gather Vince confirmed the UK’s commitment to country-by-country reporting for the extractive industries.

Then Barnier met the International Accounting Standards Board and is reported to have said:

We would be particularly interested in continuing and improving the work of the [accounting] standards for the extractives and forestry industries – country by country reporting. In the EU we are taking action, as the United States has.

The IASB is dragging its feet on this issue, fuelled by the big firms – all of whom object to country-by-country reporting.

But I’ll quote a conversation I had with Michael Izza of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales last week, who told me with regard to country-by-country reporting:

We’re not opposed to that.

How can you be opposed to transparency?

I pointed out the International Accounting Standards Board, PWC, Ernst & Young and the rest appeared to be. He shrugged, but said give them time.

There isn’t time. People are dying while they drag their feet. That’s why Christian Aid are, for example, pushing the issue so strongly, and Action Aid too.

For PWC this might be about accounting. For people not getting the healthcare they need in developing countries because their state revenues are being lost through transfer misplacing this is about life and death.

At least the EU get that. Good for them.

But it would be better still if they made the demand universal.

 

From the FT this morning:

From Henry Banyenzaki MP.

Sir, News that the European Union is to pass legally binding measures on country by country reporting for extractive companies has given a lift to transparency campaigners here (“EU closer to adopting financial reform similar to US”, March 4). The committee I chair in parliament soon will have much of the information on oil revenue that we need to hold our executive accountable.

The recent oil finds in Uganda, estimated at 2bn barrels, have the potential to transform our country, reducing poverty and pushing us to middle-income status. However, our neighbours in Congo have shown that natural resources do not always lead to development. Swift implementation of these reforms, and assurances that payments will be broken down project by project, will give us the best chance possible to avoid the resource curse and allow all Ugandans to benefit from our oil.

Henry Banyenzaki,

National Resistance Movement, Uganda

Chair, Uganda Parliamentary Forum on Oil and Gas

That’s why country-by-country reporting is important.

That’s why the EU must adopt it.

This is about relieving poverty.

And yet big business – like Shell, big firms of accountants – like PWC and Deloitte, and the accountancy profession in the shape of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and the International Accounting Standards Board all oppose it.
Why are they opposed to the relief of poverty in developing countries?
If they’d like to explain I’ll give them the space to do so.

 

I am posting this here with the permission of the Progressive Tax Blog, which I strongly recommend.

The matte referred to is vital. As I an my co-autors explain in our book Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works, this relief was at the heart of maiming the City of London a tax haven. And it still is. That’s why this issue is so important. And the OTS decided to ignore it. That, I suggest,. Was a political act. Also one in breach of money laundering obligations as the UK has no idea to whom these funds are paid. Why is that. In that context, please read this:

Anybody who has attempted to read the 191 report by the Office of Tax Simplification on simplifying tax reliefsshould be congratulated; it’s not exactly the most interesting document, and mainly deals with obscure tax reliefs that most people will not have heard of.

There is more interesting discussion over whether the income tax and national insurance regimes should be combined into a single tax (although no real conclusion), and the report recommends abolishing the £8,500 threshold for more generous treatment of employee benefits for low paid workers. However, to give you a taste for some of the other content, of the 191 pages, two deal with the duty treatment of angostura bitters and a specific black beer drunk only in Yorkshire. This is hardly the sort of complexity in the tax system that people complain of.

Nevertheless, there is one relief mentioned deep on page 179 related to relief from withholding tax for interest paid on so-called ‚ÄòEurobonds’ over which there is remarkably little discussion in arriving at the report’s conclusion:

Eurobond interest

P.79 This relief exempts interest paid on Eurobonds from deduction of tax so that the holder of the Eurobond receives interest gross rather than net of tax.

P.80 A quoted Eurobond is a security, including shares (in particular any permanent interest bearing share), listed on a recognised stock exchange, and carries a right to interest. Some of the major issuers are supranational organisations (such as the World Bank or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development).

Is the policy rationale still valid, does the relief achieve it and what might be the impact of repeal?

P.81 The original policy rationale is to encourage the growth of the UK Eurobond market, as London is one of the centres of the worldwide Eurobond market.

P.82 If it were repealed, it could reduce investment in this area, and also reduce investment in the UK.

Taxpayer take up and awareness

P.83 This relief is targeted at any holder of Eurobonds.

P.84 In the year to November 2010, funds raised through Eurobonds issued on the main UK market totalled £393billion in over 3,300 issues.

Complexity, compliance costs and administrative burden

P.85 The relief is a simplification to the taxpayer as it removes the need to account for withholding tax.

Summary

P.86 The policy rationale remains valid and it is a simplification for the holders.

P.87 We recommend that this relief be retained.

The description of the relief from the OTS is brief and it is useful to put it in broader context.

In general, if a UK resident company borrows money from a non-resident company, it will obtain a tax deduction for the interest payable but under UK tax law is required to withhold UK income tax at 20% on interest paid to the non-UK company. The UK has entered into a number of tax treaties and is also obliged to follow the EU Interest and Royalties Directive which means that in many cases interest payable to an EU member state or another country which has a tax treaty with the UK (e.g. US) will in practice not be subject to UK withholding tax. However, interest paid to companies or individuals resident in tax havens will generally be subject to 20% withholding tax as no treaty will apply.

The relief referred to by the OTS is a specific exemption from withholding tax on interest if the debt on which the interest arises is a ‚Äòquoted Eurobond’. This may sound like a complex financial instrument but in practice this can include any loan agreement which is listed on a ‚Äòrecognised stock exchange’, even if the lender is a related party. The term ‚Äòrecognised stock exchange’ can appear to give the exemption legitimacy but in fact this includes the Channel Islands and Cayman Islands, among other exchanges.

Take the following example:

Eurobond illustrationIn this case, the UK subsidiary of a multinational group borrows significant debt from a group company resident in the Cayman Islands. The UK company decides to list the debt on the Cayman Islands stock exchange despite the fact that the lender is a group company and always will be (there is no prospect of a third party buying the debt). As a result of the listing, the UK company is still able to obtain a tax deduction for interest (reducing its UK taxable profits) but is not required to withhold any tax on interest paid. Meanwhile the Cayman Islands lender pays no tax whatsoever. The result is a significant UK tax saving all for the relatively insignificant listing fees and related legal costs associated with listing on the Cayman Islands stock exchange.

The OTS claims that the policy rationale is to promote investment in the UK, and that the relief is a “simplification to the taxpayer as it removes the need to account for withholding tax”. This is either naive or disingenuous. The relief is not a “simplification” but a complete exemption from UK tax for interest paid on these instruments, including to tax havens. The OTS only refers to the Eurobonds issued on the main UK market but neglects to mention that the exemption also applies for listings in tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions.

However, even in these secrecy jurisdictions the listing is public (just ‚Äòpublic’ enough); anybody can visit the websites of the Channel Islands or Cayman Islands stock exchanges and view the listings for themselves. While we cannot definitively say that all of the listings of debt issued by UK companies on these exchanges are purely for UK tax avoidance purposes, it is difficult to avoid this presumption in many cases.

We thought it would be interesting to highlight some of the companies that have debt listed on these exchanges. Unfortunately the sham of these sorts of instruments being publicly traded securities means that information on holders is not made public – although some borrowers do disclose in their own statutory accounts.

Issuer Exchange Holder Debt amount Interest rate UK WHT saved p.a. (estimate)
British Telecommunications plc* Channel Islands Group company – unknown £3,611m LIBOR plus 10 bps (e.g. 2%) £14m
Everything Everywhere Ltd
(formerly T Mobile (UK) Ltd)
Channel Islands Unknown £1,250m Floating (assume 5%) £12m
Ineos Holdings Ltd* Channel Islands Ineos US Finance LLC (group company)
(Note: LLCs are typically non-taxable entities under US tax law)
$1,785m Floating (assume 5%) $18m
Taveta Investments (No. 2) Ltd*
(parent of Arcadia / BHS)
Channel Islands Group company – unknown £180m 8% £3m
BlackRock Finco UK Ltd Cayman Islands Group company – unknown $3,450m 7.43% to 8.90% $55m
Hewlett-Packard Holdings Ltd Cayman Islands Hewlett-Packard Marigalante Ltd
(Cayman Islands)
£3,721m 6.5% to 8.3% £50m
Transocean Drilling U.K. Limited Cayman Islands GlobalSanteFe Services (BVI) Inc
(British Virgin Islands)
$1,075m 5.54% $12m
Transocean Drilling U.K. Limited Cayman Islands Transocean Inc
(Cayman Islands)
$750m LIBOR plus 500 bps (e.g. 6%) $9m

These are just a few examples from only two offshore exchanges but is enough to illustrate the point. We would be interested to hear from the above companies to understand what the commercial reason for listing on these exchanges is if it is not to avoid UK withholding tax.

Unfortunately the fact that the OTS has glossed over the Eurobond exemption in its report means it is unlikely to be subject to any further scrutiny (at least until this blog post). One has to question whether the fact that the committee is comprised at least partially by ‚ÄòBig 4‚Ä? accounting professionals, and led by a former PwC tax partner (John Whiting) has anything to do with this. For good measure we have highlighted the PwC audit clients with a “*” in the table above.

Why has the Office of Tax Simplification given its approval to a tax relief which encourages multinationals to locate finance companies in tax havens and pay no UK withholding tax?

I would be willing of course to pass on comments from the companies in question.

I stress: these actions are legal, of course. The question is about avoidance. But that is of itself important. And given the interest in tax haven issues and tax avoidance in the UK, justified, I think.

 

Larry Elliott has a good article under the title “The new scramble for Africa must have the courage to curb corruption” this morning. It does, of course, support country-by-country reporting in the extractive industries, to which George Osborne and Vince Cable lent their support yesterday. The idea originated long ago in a publication I wrote called Extracting Transparency.

Larry notes in the article that:

Vince Cable, the business secretary, says he is in favour of the initiative and the Treasury has made similar noises. Ministers are expected to voice their support at an experts’ conference Sarkozy has organised in Paris to discuss the issue next week.

Cable says that so far he has had no push back from UK companies, which is somewhat surprising.

It’s also wrong. There is massive opposition to this transparency in business. The call for country-by-country reporting has just been subject to a consultation by the European Union. As the submissions show the massed rank of opposition to this proposal, whose aim is to ensure the end of corruption and the increase in shareholder value as well as the beating of tax abuse, is enormous. Those bodies who oppose disclosure and so support the continuation of corruption (one follows the other – since none of them suggest an alternative mechanism for tackling the issue) include:

The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales

PricewaterhouseCoopers

Shell

European Banking Federation

Societe General

International Association of Oil and Gas Producers

Deloitte

Deutsche Bank

UK 100 Group of FTSE Finance Diectors

Federation of European Accountants

Glaxo Smith Kline

Repsol

The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants

UK Accounting Standards Board

Belgian Accounting Standards Board

Association of British Insurers

Each and every one of them needs to be held to account for supporting corruption.

Each and every one of them could have said they wanted disclosure to help stop corruption. But they refused to do so. Thy put their own self interest first.

And for that they deserve all the blame they get.

And in due course special mention will go to PWC – watch this space.