I think this might be one of the most important videos I have ever made. I know the issue is complicated, but it's worth taking the time to watch it or read this post.
Most people think accounting records what has already happened: profits earned, cash received, assets owned, and liabilities owed. But that is no longer how much of modern accounting works.
In this video, I explain how accounting has been transformed from a system based on prudence and evidence into one that increasingly relies on expectations about the future. Using a simple example, I show how an investment purchased for £10,000 can be valued at £20,000 almost immediately, even though no additional cash has been received and no profit has actually been earned.
The key to understanding this process is discounting. Future cash flows are brought back into the present using an assumed discount rate, creating a present value that accounting often treats as if it were real wealth today.
As a result, expected future gains can be recognised now, long before they have actually occurred.
In effect, accounting creates a financial time machine, importing the future into the present and treating estimates and assumptions as if they were facts.
I explain how this logic underpins mark-to-market accounting, why it became embedded in global accounting standards, and why it represents a profound break with the traditional accounting principle of prudence, under which profits could not be anticipated, but losses had to be recognised as soon as they became likely.
But this, as I explain, is about far more than accounting rules.
The same logic shapes financial markets, share prices, pension funds, investment decisions and corporate behaviour. Tomorrow's income becomes today's wealth, and future possibilities become present-day profits.
I argue that this process inflates reported wealth, reinforces inequality, redistributes power towards those who own financial assets, and even affects how we think about issues such as climate change, where future costs can be discounted until they appear almost insignificant.
The result is a financial system that often presents uncertainty as certainty and speculation as fact.
So is modern accounting providing a true and fair view of economic reality? Or has it become a mechanism for claiming ownership of a future that does not yet exist?
That is the question at the heart of this video.
This is the audio version:
The Debate Ammunition for this video is available here.
This is the transcript:
I have a confession to make. I became an accountant in 1982. But the fact is that most people do not understand accounting, or at least accounting as it now is.
They imagine it looks backwards and records profits already earned and assets in ownership.
But modern accounting does something completely different to that. It reaches into the future, takes values that do not yet exist and brings them back into the present as if they exist now. In a very real sense, it creates a time machine and that time machine is dangerous.
To understand modern finance, we need to understand how that trickery works. An example will help. I made these numbers up. They are purely for demonstration purposes, but accept them on that basis.
Imagine I am offered an investment today, and I'm asked to pay £10,000 for it. I'm buying some form of bond, or investment, or share; it doesn't really matter which. What I'm told is that this investment will pay me £2,000 a year for the next three years. And then I'm led to believe that I will be able to sell it in three years' time for £20,000 because, in the meantime, proof of concept of this idea will have been established, and so its value will double from what it appears to be today.
The question is a simple one. If I'm running a company, what is this investment worth today, and how do I display it on my accounts?
The answer that accounting gives is not the answer that most people would expect, and that reveals the trickery within modern accounting.
Most people would start by adding up the money. In this case, there are going to be three payments of £2,000 coming in, and we're going to expect sale proceeds of £20,000. So the investment appears likely to generate at least £26,000 in cash, but that is not the number that accounting uses for the valuation of this asset.
Why does accounting refuse to use that figure? That is an important question, and the answer is that accounting says that money received in the future is worth less than money received today is worth. A discount rate is therefore chosen to adjust future values, and that word discount is important. We do discount the future.
Now, an example will help. Assume that the discount rate we use is 10%. I stress, again, this is just an assumption to make the numbers easier to see. Every future cash flow is then reduced in value by 10% for each year it's delayed by. That is the point of discounting. It reduces the value of future income streams by a set percentage to allow for the fact that they aren't being received today, but are being received sometime in the future. But we assume that there is a current worth at this moment to that money that will be received sometime, not now, but at some time in the future.
The future is literally translated then, or discounted, into present values.
The £2,000 due in one year becomes £1,818 today. That's because the £2,000 is divided by 1.1, which is 100% plus the 10% discount rate.
And then the £2,000 due in two years' time becomes worth £1,653 today. That's £2,000 divided by 1.1 squared to allow for the fact that we're receiving this in two years time, and on the same basis, the £2,000 due in three years time becomes worth £1,503 today, and the £20,000 sale price shrinks to just over £15,000. Accounting is steadily pulling back the future into the present.
Add all those numbers up, and by pure chance, they come to almost exactly £20,000. Now, I'll be honest, I made these numbers up, and I had no idea I would create such a perfect round number outcome. I'm good with numbers, but not that good. But what I've shown is that in current terms, using these accounting conventions, I have got a figure that is double my initial investment of £10,000. That income stream that we have discounted from the future produces an outcome which is supposedly worth £20,000 now compared to an investment that only cost £10,000.
Now, here's the key thing. Accounting says I can use that £20,000 valuation now in my accounts. This is the logic of what is called mark-to-market accounting, and that has been included in all the accounts of all the world's major companies since 2005.
In other words, it is said that there is a gain on this investment now of £10,000. We brought back from the future into the present, the value of the cash flows we expect to receive, not the value of the cash flows that we know we will receive, using a discount rate that we decided upon, and we've created a situation where we claim that we have got a result
a gain of £10,000.
And that gain accounting says exists today. It's the reward for being so clever that we bought this asset, which is going to make a future profit for us. The profit is not going to arise now because we know it's going to arise in the future, but nonetheless, accounting lets us claim it at the present point of time, and that is the time machine trickery that I'm talking about.
And this is where the story becomes fascinating.
No cash has been received as yet.
No income has actually been earned, and the future of payments remains uncertain.
I'm told I'm going to get £2,000 a year.
I'm told I'm going to sell this asset for £20,000, but no one can actually guarantee these cash flows, all of which I stress are estimated.
But accounting still says that a gain can be recorded as if it exists, and that can be recognised in our accounts. And supposedly reliable auditors will certify the accounts as true and fair, even though they include this wholly made-up number.
And let's not pretend otherwise, this is a wholly made-up number. It's based upon estimates. It's based upon an assumed rate of return, not a real one. And it is based upon a mathematical calculation, which looks spuriously accurate, but in practice is just a load of gobbledygook. It takes assumptions and turns them into what looks like a reality, and then supposedly clever people, otherwise called auditors, say they are true and fair. But are they? I don't think so. You'll have to make your own mind up on that.
This, though, is what modern accounting does. Modern accounting is not only interested in cash. It's also interested in the expected economic benefits of current actions. So it can claim that an asset, which I've only just bought for £10,000, is actually worth £20,000. And the claim that accounting recognises is that wealth has been created as a consequence of my wisdom in buying this asset, even though that wisdom is all based on guesswork. And the bizarre claim is that the gain arises at the moment of purchase.
Future cash flows merely confirm what accounting already believes to be true, in other words.
Future accounting will recognise additional income. Let's be clear about that. The difference between the £20,000 that we recognise now and the £26,000 of cash flows earned will be recognised in future accounts, but as if they are the unwinding of the discounted interest implicit in the calculation that gave rise to the £20,000 valuation now. And so they will be much reduced from the actual cash flows received at that time.
And this, I stress, is the total opposite of prudence. Prudence was once the defining characteristic of accounts. They were cautious, and profit was never anticipated, come what may.
You were required to anticipate losses because that was prudent. In other words, if you could see that a debt you had outstanding was not going to be paid, you wrote it off now and not when it actually failed. And if you could see that the value of an investment was going to fall or had fallen, you would allow for that fact in your accounts as well. But if the value of an asset had gone up, but you had not yet proved that by selling it, you could not anticipate the profit. That was the old rule. But that's not the rule now.
In 2005, there was a neoliberal revolution in accounting, which let it claim the future as if it existed in the present, and that is not true, but that is how much of modern accounting portrays itself. It claims certainty about the future, when no such thing exists.
And it is this make-believe world that is the supposed intellectual foundation of much of modern finance. Financial markets are built on expectations about the future. Shares, bonds, derivatives, and other property are all valued in this way, and future possibilities are turned into present prices.
The financial world is, as a result, a world constructed from forecasts and assumptions and not from truth. This means that something deeper is going on here, though, and that is really important.
Income that has not yet been earned becomes wealth today. Tomorrow's gains become today's profits. Future opportunities are incorporated into present valuations, and in effect, finance appropriates the future into current wealth and brings it into the present. And that is done for one reason, and one reason alone. It is done to increase the statement of current wealth, and that is being used to increase stated inequality. Power is being redistributed by accounting as a consequence.
And none of this is merely a technical accounting exercise.
Discounting shapes investment decisions throughout society.
It influences stock markets, pension funds, and government policy.
It even affects how we think about climate change in future generations. We don't worry about climate change because we can discount it. The costs of climate change are so far in the future, they become almost worthless in this accounting methodology.
The discount rate apparently becomes a statement about how much we value the future itself, and in far too many cases, we don't value it enough.
And, staggeringly, uncertainty is removed from view by this method of accounting. Apparently, certain figures based on what might be very dubious assumptions become reality when they are printed in accounts as profit or on balance sheets as wealth. But they're all just made up, never forget it.
The fact is, modern finance depends upon this accounting view of time. It assumes that future benefits can be measured and valued today. Entire markets are built upon that assumption.
But perhaps we should be asking whether the future is really something that could be bought, sold, and consumed in advance, because once we understand discounting, we begin to understand how finance has come to dominate our thinking about that future, and it's not for the better.
This time machine is just a fiction of somebody's imagination, a spuriously accurate mathematical formulation of data, highly likely to be wrong. But dividends, directors' bonuses, although not always taxed, are paid on the basis of these made-up numbers that are used to overstate current wealth by borrowing it from the future.
Remember, we have to pay to borrow and repay it in the future. The wealthy are doing something very different. They're borrowing the future and rewarding themselves today for doing so, and they're doing that in plain sight. And the future they're taking, well, that's ours, of course.
Our future is being stolen by accountants who claim it is in the ownership of the wealthy. It isn't. It's ours to enjoy, and that's why this method of accounting is so fundamentally dangerous and has created so many distortions in our society over the last two decades.
That's my opinion. You may not share it. There's a poll down below. Please leave us your comments, and if you like this video, please indicate that fact. Please do subscribe to our channel as well. And if you're so inclined and want to buy us a coffee to encourage us to keep on making videos like this, we'd be very grateful because this member of the team, at least, is a bit of a coffee addict. Thank you.
Poll
Thanks for reading this post.
You can share this post on social media of your choice by clicking these icons:
There are links to this blog's glossary in the above post that explain technical terms used in it. Follow them for more explanations.
You can subscribe to this blog's daily email here.
And if you would like to support this blog you can, here:

Buy me a coffee!

[…] The video this Debate Ammunition relates to is here. […]
As Victor Meldrew puts it so well
‘I dont believe it!’
You only have to look at what happened to Greensill Capital to realise that this is a load of ‘odure’
Clearly accountants may well get asked questions about the future eg will my business idea work / make money and have to find some ways of answering these questions but to volunteer it in this way is madness
My pithy take on this is:
Net Present Value discounts the future into oblivion.
One Word,
Enron.
Yes – ‘Enron’ is correct – mark to market is what killed them dead in the end. Watch the documentary ‘The Smartest Guys in the Room’ (2006). What a joke. They literally made their ‘profits’ up.
Richard – I like your concept but the labeling is far too nice. We should be calling it ‘Time Banditry’ – these operators are literally bringing forward hypothetical profits from hypothetically perfect markets and banking the money now, leaving many innocents with no money at all. For example, Enron’s ordinary workers’ 401Ks were totally wiped out by the fall of the company. It’s more like ‘Thieving the Future’.
I am too nice
I remember this from the Enron (and Worldcom) failures, EBITDA – Earnings Before I Tricked The Dumb Auditor
“a spuriously accurate mathematical formulation of data, highly likely to be wrong”
As good a definition of modern economics as you could wish to find. Perhaps spuriously precise rather than accurate.
OK, and thank you
The phrase that jumped out at me as a description of Modern Economics was “It takes assumptions and turns them into what looks like a reality, and then supposedly clever people…. say they are true.”
What could possibly go wrong? I think we are going to find out shortly as I doubt anyone has “modern accounted” the losses from the looming crash. One question, does private credit follow this practice in addition to making up its own valuations, leading them to account for future profits even when they already know that all their assets will be taking a haircut, or falling to worthless. All this sounds so much like the 2008 GFC, which I note is after 2005, any coincidence in that?
The rules on loss recognition have supposedly changed since 2008 (I was one of those lobbying for that change) so these haircuts should be happening.
There is no sign of them as yet.
Back in the early 90s, I read Terry Smith’s book “Accounting for Growth”, which covered a lot of the tricks and slight of hand used at the time to inflate value in accounts. Sadly not much has changed.
Ed Zitron recently wrote a post about the similar magic accounting being increasingly used by the AI con artists in a desperate attempt to show profitability whilst moving the same money around between the key players:
https://www.wheresyoured.at/anthropics-profitability-swindle/
What’s that old saying, “Turnover is vanity, profit is sanity and cash is reality”!
Richard, I worry that you may be turning schizophrenic. Your brilliant blog is entitled “Funding the Future”, which implies that the future has a value. You are quite right to criticise the arbitrary methods used to estimate its value, but at least it is a start. I suspect that we both agree that overall the future is grossly underconsidered. We have to find a better way of identifying and estimating its uncertainties. Market value would be a start, but your earlier post on oil prices suggests that would be little improvement. As a scientist, I would have given standard errors on my data, maybe accounts should do something similar.
Politely, don’t call me schizophrenic and use discounting as a justification for doing so when it literally dismisses the future.
The term schizophrenic should always be used wisely. You have not done so. I suggest you look hard at yourself before using it again.
And if you think the future is all about finance, why are you here? You have profoundly misunderstood me, but that is your problem, and that of your so-called scientific method, but not mine.
Adn whilst you are at it, explain your supposed p values and other such measures. Who decided they were the right standards?
Ok, so if you don’t like present value accounting how would you value something with defined future cash flows?
For example, what is £1m of a 10y Gilt with 5% annual coupons worth I’m your view?
Go on you tell me
Include all externalities and opprtunity costs
As the market yield on 10-year gilts is currently around 4.83%, I’d suggest a value of slightly less than £1m.
The DMO’s 2026 10-year gilt also has a coupon of 4⅞%per annum, not 5%.
The answer – and trolls never come back – is what you paid for it, less any foreseeable loss. That takes opportunity cost and maybe externalities into account. Nothing else does.
But if this asset were a pension asset the accountants would mark it down to £10,000 in your stylised example, Richard.
Value-in-use could be considered, but mark-to-market logic is that it doesn’t matter if the £10,000 buys a bond (which may have predictable outcomes, subject default risk) or an equity or some other real asset (with far less predictable outcomes). It’s to be carried at current MV.
If the pensions obligations were the same as your cash flow assumptions the accountants would record a liability of £20k versus an asset of £10k.
Poor understanding of cash flows and investment opportunities by said accountants.
You appear unaware that internal modelling can be used for MV determination.
Not for pension scheme asset values, which are generally based on MV under IAS19, FRS102, etc.
I agree modelling may be used for unlisted assets, but other rules mean those should be a minority among total pension assets.
But I referred to accounts not pension funds. You seem to know what you are talking about. So why did you ask a stupid question?
It wasn’t intended as a stupid question, and I’m sorry if it came across that way to you.
I was simply attempting to demonstrate an inconsistency in MTM, how the sponsor’s accounts for DB pension schemes generally include assets at MV but liabilities at discounted cash flows.
More justifiable if the pension scheme is being bought out or otherwise wound up, but not if it’s a “going concern” where the value-in-use for assets would seem to me to be more relevant.
OK
Accepted
But not the issue I was talking about
Might you also explain how someone could embezzle nearly half a million pounds without the auditors noticing? Mentioning no names but follow my eyes in the direction of Edinburgh.
Easy
You pick your audtors
You browbeat them as CEO
If the future value of an asset is 100% guaranteed, then it makes sense, if the future value is based on speculation then i would describe it as a form of fraud
So, only applicable to gilts then
Accounting is difficult but biases can be introduced if you create a system that taxes income and capital gains differently.
I asked Claude what the average rate of taxation of the top 1% of income earners was , and then asked what was the average taxation rates on the 1% of wealth owners.
There is a huge difference wherever you live.
This gives an incentive to minimise incomes and maximise wealth. Once you have wealth you can live off loans and escape taxes.
Companies do the same . They big up future income flows in order to take out loans which deflates profits but maintains cash flows in the meantime.
A day of reckoning comes but canny investors will have recovered their funds and moved on .
That is the model for private equity.
I sense the future may be arriving sooner than many expected.
But we could speed it up by equalising tax rates on income and income from capital.
What was the data (to save me asking again)
the data is complicated:
we looked at the usa , uk , france and germany
usa has the top 1 % paying 38%of income tax revenues , 24%of total tax revenues, receiving 20% of total income .
the uk 29% of income tax revenues paid by the top 1%, but only 10-12% of total tax revenues, and 10% of income.
germany could not produce reliable statistics for income tax paid by the top 1% but it was said to be much lower than in the usa and uk, it was probably 7-10 % of all taxes with the top 1% receiving 13% of income
similarly france cannot quantify taxes paid by the top 1% but it was said to be much lower than in the usa and the uk. it was estimated the top 1% paid 6-9% of all taxes and recived11% of total income.
on wealth the top 1% in the usa was said to have 31% of wealth but wealth taxes were only 0.2%
in the uk 20-23% of wealth is owned by the top !% who pay a similar rate of tax as in the USA.
in the EU figures are 22-26% and negligible rates of capital taxes. only norway , spain and switzerland had any form of capital taxation.
https://claude.ai/share/c37b5eeb-d0b9-4e22-9a1a-6f312bf561ea
The answers are meaningless – they seem only to refer to income taxes and even then look wrong.
More concerning is the flip side of this rosy spectacles view of future profit ie the ability to discount away future costs which minimise the real cost when it finally arises ie everything climate related where the can keeps being kicked down the road.