The conflict in Ukraine has left me musing on many things, one of which is how we understand things.
The standard journalistic approach to any story is to answer six questions:
- Who?
- What?
- Where?
- When?
- How?
- Why?
The first five such questions supposedly supply us with the facts. The last is, apparently, explanation.
However, the world is not that simple. Even when it comes to the simplest of events the facts are usually incomplete, whether by choice or because what is reported reflects the chosen (conscious, or unconscious) bias of the commentator. What is not noted, but which nonetheless also happened, is often as important as what is reported.
What that means is that the answer to the question ‘why?' is always a matter of interpretation. That is hardly news these days, and yet it would seem that vast numbers of people do, day in, day out, read the opinion of the Daily Mail that is laced through all its content and presume it to be true. As a matter of fact it is not: it is just another opinion.
So why note this? It's because the events of the last week have made it so clear that the six questions journalists supposedly answer are so inadequate as a basis for forming opinion.
What we know is that what is happening in Ukraine is confusing, to everyone. Precisely what the Russians are doing, where, when, how and why is very largely a matter of speculation and guesswork. So far the range of known answers is so wide, ranging from leadership indecision, to logistical failure, to lack of will in many of the armed forces, to some form of deliberate holding back for tactical reasons as yet unknown, that why the Russian advance once the offensive began has been so limited cannot be explained based on any reasonable observation of Russian behaviour.
In contrast we have witnessed an extraordinary tale of leadership, conviction and courage from Ukrainians from their politicians downwards. Ministers and MPs have not fled. People are defiant. Their military has had some successes. An extraordinary cohesion that Moscow could never have anticipated has emerged.
Based on this what emerges is a narrative. Narrative is where I think the dividing line between economics and political economy is to be found.
Economics deals, at most, with the first five journalistic questions, doing so without ever seeking an answer to the question ‘why?', about which prior assumptions are presumed to suffice.
Political economy seeks to determine how relationships of power alter the allocation of resources within and between societies. And when power is in play it's not just the ‘why?' that has to be answered. In addition the stories that are told that underpin that explanation have to be understood because they are at least as important as the supposed facts.
After all, a great deal of power is not related to facts. Use factual logic and Putin could obviously oppress Ukraine. The arithmetic all stacks in his favour. Tell the stories that support the invasion and the equation changes.
That must be true on the ground. That Russian troops probably have significant doubts about why they are in Ukraine seems very likely, especially when what they are facing are people who are telling them in their own language (which is so much harder to handle) to clear off back across the border because they are most definitely not welcome. No wonder that they stop their tanks.
The Russian story is that the people of Ukraine need liberating. The Ukrainian story is that they do not. The relative power of the two stories is apparent. The Russian story has failed, certainly around the world, and probably in Russia itself. The Ukrainian story has already won, and will be almost impossible for the Russians to dislodge now.
And whatever Putin tries he cannot prevent the Russian people knowing this. They will know about the cancellation of football and other cultural links, whatever the Kremlin says. Even the cancellation of involvement in the Eurovision Song Contest matters. And sanctions are clearly going to hurt when interest rates have already doubled.
The stories that underpin the relationships of power have proven the most powerful issue in this war, so far.
I am not saying that will necessarily remain the case. The risk is that such a massive defeat for Putin - because that is what he has suffered - may produce a catastrophic nuclear reaction from him. I cannot dismiss the possibility. But if it does it will be because the narrative that he believed in has failed. The reaction would be to that failure.
In that case the question to be asked is how can narrative be built in the coming days that keeps the world safe despite Putin's failure? What stories can be told to ensure we survive his anger at being shown to have failed?
It's not weaponry that can save us from catastrophe now. But new stories might. However, they need to be told with care. Right now we are dealing with the most sensitive of tales, and they have to be exceptionally carefully woven. Do we have the ability to do that?
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‘How can a narrative be built.’…indeed. ‘We’ – ‘the West’ have also mishandled the build up. Knowing what we do of Putin, we should have been much cleverer and more positive in responding to his request for talks about security in Europe. about NATO, about missiles in Europe etc.
Just saying ‘no’ – offering nothing to talk about was more or less challenging him to do his worst – which he has done. We could have offered talks without conceding any of his demands.
Now we have to offer him a carrot to cease fire to match the stick of the economic sanctions – so we still should offer to talk about security in Europe to try to persuade him to stop killing Ukrainians. We should not be encouraging Ukrainians to committ suicide.
https://twitter.com/JeremyAndrew11/status/1498773030687977479
We gave Putin plenty of opportunities for negociation and diplomacy Andrew. The demands he made re NATO membership of former parts of the Soviet bloc and his preposturous claims that Russa was threatened by Western forces were never credible. It is now apparent that he always intended to attack Ukraine, and the talks were just a convenient way to get enough time to build up his troop concentrations. And it confirmed him in his assessment of Western weakness in opposing his willingness to use force.
As have our actions for years now over his behaviour in Georgia, Syria, the assassination of his opponents in foreign countries, and in annexing Ukraine in 2014 when the consequences of his aggression were next to nothing. And our willingness to take oligarch’s money when they bought up football clubs, and used London to launder their ill gotten gains for years, as Richard has pointed out.
Putin has no credible narrative to excuse his actions since this is being done because, as he’s stated many times, he doesn’t regard Ukraine, or other countries in Eastern Europe, as having the right to exist outside Russian control. That’s it. Imperialism and use of brute force, pure and simple. The Ukranians have a convincing narrative, which is that they are acting as a shield for us in the face of naked aggression.
The question for the West is, what is now our narrative? If it is that we will not actively intervene militarily to defend Ukraine, but expect the Ukranians to fight to the death with (some) military assistance in the form of weapons supplies against an opponent who will use ever greater brutality and force then it’s not very convincing. Like Hitler, Putin is beyond reasoning now, if indeed he ever was amenable to it.
He couldn’t care less about war crimes investigations or sanctions. Especially given that the Chinese have just said they won’t impose financial sanctions on Russia, which I’m guessing will enable a great degree of evasion of them to occur.
Putin respects only force, so that has to be our narrative. We will intervene if you continue with this invasion is the only credible narrative now. As will become apparent in the coming days as Ukranian cities are blasted into rubble and illegal weapons like cluster bombs are deployed indiscrimanately against civilians.
Well said SofTD.
We hear a lot about Russia’s ‘security concerns’ and NATO. Much less about those countries on its borders that have been repeatedly and brutally subjugated by Russia. For 40-50 years under the banner of socialism which has given socialism a bad name in many people’s minds. They have known about the threat from the East for a long time and it was why they rushed to join NATO. Nobody forced them – they could not wait. Russia has been actively interfering and trying to undermine them for 20 years. People are sadly ignorant of what has been happening or choose to ignore it.
It does not help Labour to have anyone associated with them promoting ever more convoluted excuses for Putin’s Russia and its brutality.
IF the West intervenes militarily, and there is a direct conflict between Russia and NATO (as I think you are suggesting), then where will that end? IF Putin and his regime feels an existential threat (which I think they already do), what will be their response?
It is true that Putin has gotten himself into a pickle. He needs an ‘off ramp’ that salves his pride.
We pay diplomats to find such solutions – empathy is their core skill.
Putin still has 6,000 nukes to play with.
You think he’s bluffing?
I don’t.
Lots of mistakes have been made. Clearly.
But answering calls for support from the wronged party is surely correct as long as we are clear about what we will and will not do and do not raise false hopes…. and, by and large, we have been clear.
Ukrainians have chosen to resist and to suggest that they are only doing this because we have “egged them on” is wrong.
Clive, I think the West has definitely encouraged the situation where Ukraine looks towards the West, and wants, and expects to be able to join things like NATO and the EU. I think we all heard the Nuland call that was leaked back in 2014, (excerpt below taken from the BBC news site), which did show, at the very least an active meddling by the USA in the situation in Ukraine to try and mould it in their interests. This has been going on, whilst at the same time we’ve never really been prepared to defend Ukraine when push comes to shove. It’s never been one of our red lines.
But clearly, Ukraine remaining under the Kremlin’s control is a red-line for Putin. I’m not talking about the morality of the situation, more the strategic power politics behind it. Ukraine escaping the Kremlin’s control upsets the balance of power in that region, and whenever that happens the imperial powers tend to fight the change one way or another. We should not for a minute kid ourselves that the USA does not take similar action on neighbouring countries which attempt to exit their sphere of control, or to adopt a political direction which does not suit their agenda any more. You only have to look at central and south america to see how many socialist governments have been toppled by US backed coups, insurgencies etc to see this; it has been bloody and extensive. This is not whataboutery, more a realistic appraisal of the situation.
There is generally very little morality, or at least consistency in morality, in international relations and foreign policy. It’s power politics, realpolitik, and it’s dirty. Both the West and Putin can be labelled hypocrites in that sense. But of course, the point that Richard raises about narrative is a crucially important one to ponder here, as it seems to have crystallised and united international public sentiment in a way which transcends normal political divides – it is about the narrative and the historical context.
The Ukrainians have inspired and united the West (and far beyond) in a way that I did not see coming, at least in terms of the extent of unity. I thought that Putin’s manipulation and interference in the West, which brought us things like corrupt Russian-backed politicians, networks of oligarchs, corrupt media ownership, Brexit, Trump, weaponising of the anti vax movement etc, had done permanent damage. But suddenly, almost overnight, the mask has slipped. The Russian propaganda mouthpieces and apologists are exposed, clear as day. The politicians with ties to Russia are being highlighted. I can even see a feintly feasible route back into the EU for the UK arising from this, (if there’s not a nuclear war) whereas before I could not envisage it happening in the next 15-20 years, if at all.
European countries are suddenly uniting in a way that may have seen inconceiveable until a few days ago. Not just that but pretty much the entire world is united in their disgust at what is going on.
Why then is this uniting people so much? Partly how clearly unnecessary it is. Ukraine is not posing a threat to anybody except to Russia’s status and power. Would it be completely ridiculous to try and draw a comparison between the UK leaving the EU and the EU losing status and power, and Ukraine moving away from Russian control? I’m not for a minute comparing the EU with Putin’s Russia, just trying to find an example where a political divorce has an implication in terms of loss of power for the larger one. One, in democratic circustances, happened peacefully, albeit with some animosity and much regret. Though I suppose the UK leaving the EU was more in the sense of financial implications than the significant territorial/military advantage that Putin stands to lose from a Ukraine outside of his control.
Nor is it about a toxic regime being toppled, where the people are oppressed and a struggle is ongoing. Putin has tried to make that narrative stick but it’s hopeless; it’s not only demonstrably not true, it’s not passing the most basic of sniff tests with anyone. And that is not because of Western propaganda. It is abundantly clear. The Ukrainian regime may not be perfect and may have unsavoury elements, but it’s not threatening anyone. It appears then very clearly to be crystalizing the fight between imperalism versus democracy and self-determination.
It has reminded the West about the values that we are about (at least that we tell ourselves we are about)- our narratives. Borne of historical struggles. It reminds us very clearly of what happened in the second world war and subsequent decades.
Even if our leaders do not espouse those values consistently, if at all on an international level. They’ve ignored those values and narratives and corrupted them to launch illegal wars like in Iraq. Despite all of that, they are the values we as people think we are about and believe in. And it reminds us, especially seeing how brave the Ukranians are being, that the power is with the people to stand up for and defend these values in the face of violent oppression. It scares us, but also gives us hope that we can change things.
Seeing a seemingly mad, out of control dictator, reminds us of history’s failings, and reopens wounds for many, not least those in Eastern Europe, who have suffered amongst the most from such dictators in the past hundred years and continue to feel extremely vulnerable to it happening again.
I do think the West does have some degree of responsibility for at the very least, encouraging, if not at times trying to manipulate Ukraine’s pivot towards the West, whilst never actually being prepared to make it a redline and defend it, despite knowing it would be a red-line for Putin, which he would likely be prepared to fight. This was likely a coming fight which perhaps had a sense of inevitability about it given what we know about Putin and how this type of strategic power politics tends to play out. That’s just my analysis of the strategic power politics at play; it’s not a comment on the morality of the situation.
But I’m also not sure what the alternative would have been. Should we have just avoided interfering in affairs in Ukraine to encourage a Western pivot? If so – should we avoid doing that any time there is a question of a country pivoting to Western democracy? Would that reduce wars and suffering, or would it abandon oppressed peoples to their fate? Would that have meant Putin grows stronger and more dangerous, like Hitler?
Should we have done all of this but guarantee Ukraine’s defence?
I don’t know the answers. I’m not sure if anyone does. Maybe the answer about the narrative here is to reaffirm the importance of self-determination, democratic freedoms, anti corruption (corruption of politics especially), and to say that it’s all wrong, regardless of who the wrongdoer is. To fight for better. To defeat apathy. And when this is done, if we’re still around, to fight for better standards at home and abroad. To forget apathy and culture wars, and remember what we actually stand for when there’s a heavily armed nutter waiting to kill us and take our freedoms away. Slava Ukraini!
Excerpt from the Nuland transcript:
Pyatt: Yeah. I guess… in terms of him not going into the government, just let him stay out and do his political homework and stuff. I’m just thinking in terms of sort of the process moving ahead we want to keep the moderate democrats together. The problem is going to be Tyahnybok [Oleh Tyahnybok, the other opposition leader] and his guys and I’m sure that’s part of what [President Viktor] Yanukovych is calculating on all this.
Nuland: [Breaks in] I think Yats is the guy who’s got the economic experience, the governing experience. He’s the… what he needs is Klitsch and Tyahnybok on the outside. He needs to be talking to them four times a week, you know. I just think Klitsch going in… he’s going to be at that level working for Yatseniuk, it’s just not going to work.
Pyatt: Yeah, no, I think that’s right. OK. Good. Do you want us to set up a call with him as the next step?
Nuland: My understanding from that call – but you tell me – was that the big three were going into their own meeting and that Yats was going to offer in that context a… three-plus-one conversation or three-plus-two with you. Is that not how you understood it?
Pyatt: No. I think… I mean that’s what he proposed but I think, just knowing the dynamic that’s been with them where Klitschko has been the top dog, he’s going to take a while to show up for whatever meeting they’ve got and he’s probably talking to his guys at this point, so I think you reaching out directly to him helps with the personality management among the three and it gives you also a chance to move fast on all this stuff and put us behind it before they all sit down and he explains why he doesn’t like it.
Nuland: OK, good. I’m happy. Why don’t you reach out to him and see if he wants to talk before or after.
Pyatt: OK, will do. Thanks.
Nuland: OK… one more wrinkle for you Geoff. [A click can be heard] I can’t remember if I told you this, or if I only told Washington this, that when I talked to Jeff Feltman [United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs] this morning, he had a new name for the UN guy Robert Serry did I write you that this morning?
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957
Throughout human history we have understood who we are through stories, you are right to recognise their power in shaping events.
In western Europe the tale of “brave underdog resisting powerful bully” has captured the imaginations of many and pushed (shamed) our governments into action.
However, what stories do Putin and the Russian armed forces need to hear to prevent further catastrophe? That is tough but it is likely that the stories we are currently telling to galvanise ourselves in to action will not be the stories that halt the Russian Army. At a micro level, these stories are developing (civilians blocking military vehicles and not being run over etc.) but at a macro level it needs to be about a “higher duty” to nation than obedience to the current commander in chief.
What story does Putin need to hear? I have no idea.
Putin may well win the ground and the battles, but in many ways he has already lost.
The EU has come together in a way that impressed Katya Adler, who has been reporting on the EU for years. NATO has responded. Even neutral Sweden and Switzerland have joined the protest.
I read some of the alternative opinion and one analyst thought Putin wanted to make a quick sortie and destroy military infrastructure, then withdraw as in Georgia. The assumed aim was to humiliate NATO, showing its powerlessness. The resistance, the incompetence of the logistical planning and the (reported) lack of enthusiasm by the Russian soldiers, have had the opposite effect.
Few have mentioned the elections in Belarus where the population did not accept the result and turned out on the streets, often carrying another flag ( a sure sign that the structure , not just a passing government or policy, is being rejected). It was crushed by force while the west imposed economic sanctions. Putin turned up to offer Lukashenko his support.
But both know there is deep opposition which is unexpressed as it is too dangerous. It is also unmeasurable. The alternative narratives claim the 2014 change of government was CIA organised and Neo-Nazis were at the heart of it. There is some evidence of that but subsequent elections have shown little support for the Far Right . The people voted for pro European parties. For all the shortcomings of the continent , it does offer democracy, more prosperity and a move away from narrow nationalism. These ideas cannot be kept out by tanks and censorship. I am coming to think that this was really what worried Putin, not a vague military threat.
I disagree standing up to Putin or any dictator requires you ultimately to be militarily stronger. Without that threat you get steamrolled. The nuclear option is Armageddon but without that balance of power you have no negotiation or leverage when facing Putin. Words to him are meaningless unless backed up by something is fearful of. That is his language. To suggest otherwise is naive and perilous.
With respect, if you think nuclear threats are justified than you have utterly lost the plot
So you wished the West had no nuclear capability?
And it is Putin making all the threats.
I said wishing its use is insanity
Do you disagree?
Why?
I have been reading 3 books by Colin Thuberon covering Russia. In the first he record his travels in 1983 (western Russia). Then Siberia (circa 1997) and finally down the Amur river (2018). The impression gained certainly 1997 & 2018 is country gradually hollowing out. Russia ain’t poor and some of the places he travels through are beautiful – but – the overwhleming impression was: nothing to do, no where to go – a total failure of what amounts to a Moscow-orientated elite. But it does not have to be like that – the narrative to Russia could & should be: don’t you want your country to be a nice place to live – with happy people etc etc. We can help you do that. Build a functioning civil society. One would have to be a bit “strange” not to want such a thing.
Other recent books (there was one on the ‘stans) show similar failures in ex-SovU states. The chosen route (the easiest?) for Russia when facing problems seems to have been conflict – (Chechnya etc). Amongst other things – that’s a failure of imagination – & we are witnessing a total failure in Ukraine.
No I don’t think we have the ability to be balanced or nuanced in our story telling.
Already we’ve been treating Ukraine like a dyed in the wool European nation – the language has been one of claiming it as our own in the face of a ruler who has never accepted it as anything but part of the the ‘Soviet Union’. Almost rubbing his nose in it – and if not that, somewhat irritating him/them.
By claiming that Ukraine is European, we are also ramping up the emotion of these awful as they are events and that can only end in tears. It makes the whole thing seem worse – and make no mistake, it’s already bad and Putin is in the wrong no doubt about it. I think Putin has over-reacted to be honest. It seems that people are going to die over differing ideas about what Ukraine should be as a state. What a tragedy.
But if we valued life more over posturing, we’d be talking more and reassuring Russia and Ukraine wouldn’t we?
If we misread the situation it was because of too much certainty about our own position in the West. We probably thought that because Moscow and St. Petersburg for example look like ‘western capitalist’ successes, that Russians had swallowed the Western version of life whole. In the end this was a false impression. So the stories will not allude to our failures that’s for sure – we’ll have to leave the historians to do that.
So what worries me now are the stories that are yet to come from Ukraine – a bit like Aleppo (Syria) and God knows where in Yemen (which is criminally under-reported in the West if not everywhere for some very dodgy reasons). This could drag on for a long time.
I’ve watched enough documentaries about Syria’s ‘White Helmets’ and seen enough babies pulled dead like rag dolls from the rubble to last me a life time.
Phew – it’s got really dark all of a sudden hasn’t it? Really dark. I just hope that the West keeps trying to have dialogue with Russia – that’s the story I want to hear.
Marshall Ganz, the Harvard academic, has some solid theory around the power of public narrative for driving social change through leaders telling stories of Self, Us and Now.
https://changemakerspodcast.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Ganz-WhatIsPublicNarrative08.pdf
Western leaders could deploy some of this thinking to make Putin and the Russian populous (eg via social media campaigns) feel unthreatened in defeat and that there is a way out for Russia that doesn’t involve a century of national humiliation. Maybe then Putin might not resort to the nuclear option.
Such thinking will be necessary
The thing is this – does the West realise that that Russia has already been humiliated?
This is a Russia looking for status – and going about it the wrong way. Or should we say, ‘the old way’.
The thing that Reagan and Thatcher should have done, way back when…
…instead of their version of Versailles 1919.
\probably the wisest comment here. The historical comparisons between Versailles, the end of WW2 and the end of the Cold War are stark. At the end of WW2 Keynes knowledge of the Versailles mistake probably saved the world and brought in economic growth, the welfare state and modern economics. We didnt learn that lesson and the end of the Cold War and structural adjustment in Eastern Europe and Russia confirmed the West as their enemy without missiles. Now we just move the missiles closer whilst openly agitating for regime change. The Euromaidan events were a coup and the pressure has been built since then. It is the old saying “those you wish to destroy, you first drive mad”
Between 2000 and 2004, Putin apparently engaged in a power struggle with some oligarchs. A “grand bargain” was struck. The oligarchs maintained their powers, in exchange for their explicit support of Putin’s govern.
A 2017 study of Russian oligarchs published by the U.S.-based National Economic Bureau estimated that as much as $800 billion is held by wealthy Russians in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Cyprus, and other offshore banking centers. Its estimated a few hundred ultra-rich individuals hold a wealth approaching that of the entire rest of the Russian population. (144 million people.)
The World Bank ranks the Russian Federation 83rd in per capita gross domestic product, at a little under $11,000 per person. That’s less than a third of the average for the European Union and about one-sixth of per-capita GDP for the United States. Such wealth disparity must be a problem for any Russian leader.
London has a small industry which as helped Oligarchs bring ‘their’ wealth out of Russia. A much larger and often well connected set of enterprises from luxury property to private schools service this community. That wealth will now need to be placed beyond sanctions. Big business for a set of enablers and favours will now be called in. Those favours will reach far and wide and doubtless extend deep into parts of our political system.
Today the United States announced a special task force dubbed “Task Force KleptoCapture” . This is a team put together to specifically target oligarchs. It’s made up of officials from FBI, Marshals Service, IRS, Postal Inspection, Homeland Security Investigations and Secret Service. I’ll not hold my breath of a similar announcement here…….at least now just yet.
Dual citizenship in Britain and other Western countries will add legal complications to attempts to unilaterally seize their assets.
Most readers of this blog will agree that some new narratives are overdue. At this time it’s easier to see the old ones collapse. As that happens the links holding them together will be revealled.
http://www.icij.org/inside-icij/2022/03/how-a-network-of-enablers-have-helped-russias-oligarchs-hide-their-wealth-abroad/
Stories are indeed crucial. Our understanding of the invasion is shaped by our hidden model of how the world works. We each carry around with us our own version. We probably have images we can easily recall that represent Russia or Ukraine. We can all flip up portraits of Lenin, Stalin, Putin and now Zelensky. Our view of them is conditioned by the stories we have been told.
We are also storytellers. We explain our world to the people we know and beyond. And these stories are not random. They follow hidden rules that make them explicable. They conform to certain ideas we assume must be true, that we take for granted. In telling our stories we replicate these ideas. Taken as a whole our stories represent our world view. They specify who we are and who our enemies are, and in the case of a war, who we will kill and who we will fight for.
Stories are power. Their manipulation is paramount. Putin has apparently succumbed to the lure of a Russian myth. Nazi Germany was convinced of its racial superiority. In the west we became neoliberals. Stories are the only way these things can happen.
It is worth reading this regarding Putin’s attitude to nuclear weapons:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/02/russia-ukraine-putin-nuclear-taboo.
The fundamental question is, are we prepared to stand by and watch another country and it’s population be brutalised by the Putin regime? And this time, a country that is seeking to be part of the EU and the Western liberal democratic order (imperfect though that is) and one that does not want to be in some Russian ‘sphere of influence’?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=JrMiSQAGOS4&cbrd=1
I was sent this presentation yesterday from Professor Mearsheimer on Ukraine.
It seems to be a serious attempt at an explanation.
This is his latest update on Ukraine:
https://attackthesystem.com/2022/02/26/professor-john-mearsheimer-the-situation-in-russia-and-ukraine/
I await his update post invasion.
The story seems to be that Russia thought it was part of a multi polar world where there was mutual respect between the poles. The US /EU on the other hand saw Ukraine as an opportunity to weaken Russia and expand their sphere of influence- but without wanting to directly threaten Russia. This has fanned the flames of this conflict.
Listen from minute 57 on the second video on Russophobia.