Thought for the day (or at least, from Norwich Quaker meeting, this morning):
From its earliest days our Society has laid great stress on honesty and the payment in full of debts justly incurred. Though social conditions have undergone great changes over the years of our Society's history, so that much of the advice given in the past may seem out of date, it is well to remind ourselves that the principles underlying the advice have not changed. Since we believe that all people are the children of God, we cannot take advantage of others by any form of dishonesty, whether in buying or selling goods, in business or privately, or as employees by failing to give an honest return in labour for the pay we receive. When we have received goods or services, we shall be punctual in making payment of the price agreed on, and we shall not attempt to evade our proper obligations to the community by way of taxation.
1959; 1994
This comes from Quaker Faith and Practice, and I am rather pleased to note that it dates from 1959 and was renewed in 1994. I am a member of the Quakers, bit happen to think this sound social thinking based on a strong wisdom tradition whether you are of any faith or none at all.
Why did it come to me during meeting this morning? I think in response to the many challenges that a couple of blogs here (and here) this week raised, including the challenge as to whose morality was to apply if morality is to have any impact on tax. My answer to that is that Quakers, with others, bring centuries of thinking on such issues to the matter of tax and morality - and represent strong wisdom traditions that cross cultures on such issues. Those who deny the role of morality in tax seek to ignore those traditions, and something more fundamental too, which is the ethical code they embrace. Those cross cultural traditions, which are also reflected in the philosophy of Kant and Rawls for those who do not wish to go near a faith based answer to such questions, are based on a simple but highly effective philosophy that demands that we treat others as we would expect to be treated ourselves,which is reinforced when it comes to tax by asking what the outcome would be if everyone behaved in the way we thought suited us best. If the answer to that question is clearly of detriment to society at large then the imperative is not to act in that way.
I condemned a judgement for suggesting accountants had to make tax abuse available to their clients, either themselves or by referral to others (and still maintain that is exactly what the case requires, although others deny it). But let me be equally clear; I think the taxpayer who brought the case made a serious error of judgement with regard to his original motive, and in bringing the case against the accountant. What would happen if everyone did as he did? Would there be the society of which he so clearly wanted to be a part that he applied for asylum to live in it? The answer is clearly not. In that case he failed to consider others as much as he considered himself and he failed to consider the consequences for all of his actions. On that basis his action was, I think, morally wrong.
It's unsurprising that the Quaker tradition says that: it's based on consideration and respect for others that is absent in tax abuse. And in the process it makes the case for morality being a key consideration not just in creating tax law but in deciding how it should be applied.
The judge got his decision wrong: his judgement failed the test of enlightened, liberal jurisprudence in my opinion.
But the case should never have reached him in the first place in my view. The taxpayer should have realised hos inappropriate his claim was and should never have undertaken it, in my opinion. The outcome of his doing so is harmful to society at large. And that's precisely why it will need to be reversed in due course.
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I ought to remind you that back in the Accountancy Age debate you dismissed morality as a matter of individual opinion when I talked to you about it. You argued in favour of a highly subjective moral theory and I’ve since assumed that you were quite the relativist.
Most of the above is incompatible with what you said at that time. Most of what you talk about supports objective moral theories.
Kant’s moral theory, for example, is very objective. I think that some of its defining characteristics, such as the categorical imperative, are actually synthetic a priori in their formulation and not necessarily pure reason, but Kant nonetheless argued that moral rules were binding in all circumstances.
This means that it is morally unacceptable to fail in a duty of care you have undertaken (such as in a engagement letter or contract), even if the outcome of fulfilling that duty of care would result in an undesireable outcome for you personally.
Morality is often only cited when it aligns to people’s own interests and I think that it should be considered that effectively making decisions on behalf of a client, whether for moral reasons or through neglect, is not morally defensible. The actions of the claimant in Mehjoo case might be considered immoral, but it doesn’t affect the worth of the actions of the defendant.
Which is rather the point of the case, I feel. Rule of law is not arbitrary and we shouldn’t overlook transgressions of law, or morality, merely because they happen to individuals we might not care to see receive justice.
Your use of Kant is to highlight the weaknesses in what he said and which many have sought to overcome since
Morality has to be relative. If it is not it is not morality.
So you aren’t really using Kant as an example then, just one aspect of his philosophy? Seems odd to cite him generally then.
Far from being a weakness, Kant draws strength from his deontological approach because it necessarily applies to all individuals. It allows him to talk about morality whereas with relativism people might not even be able to create the language to talk about morality as it is purely a personal concept.
If you are indeed embracing moral relativism it rather undermines your argument on morality in taxation. Your opinion is no more valid than any other’s. If all that matters is weight of numbers, there are significant problems where a majority can “morally” do what they will to a minority. I’m sure we can all think of examples of persecution.
And we all know opinion is partially determined by self-interest. How do we know that somebody is not citing morality for purely selfish purposes?
So, if morality is relative, how can you judge what another person regards as moral? If I decide that my moral duty to shareholders is more important than my moral duty as a taxpayers, how can you criticise without a full knowledge of my moral values and judgments? The problem of other minds and the lack of existence of a perfect observer are two problems that spring to mind.
On the basis of your own moral theory, it seems rather immoral to criticise anybody for immoral behaviour. Which you won’t be able to get upset about because my moral judgement is as valid as yours.
You make your position veyr clear. You are an absolutist 0 and people in this world – the vast majority of wise people in this world – have come to realise that this is the position of the fool
Aristotle realised that there was a Golden Mean – a wisdom tradition – a balanced perspective
The absolutist does not
Neoliberalism is an absolutist fantasy not based on any reality
That’s why wise people realise it is promoted to harm the common good
And they use the wisdom tradition of caring for others as they care for themselves – as sound a base for morality as there has ever been – as the basis for seeing that is the case
That is not at all my position Richard. And I’m not the one arguing the absolute position that morality is purely subjective.
Just because I am questioning your moral relativism, it does not mean I adopt the polar opposite.
It appeared you were
Many do
I am just asking you questions on your position Richard so as to better understand.
As a point of fact, I doubt that if I were an absolutist I would describe Kant’s categorical imperative as synthetic a priori as it would undermine the absolute nature of its logic. That is a subjective element right then and there.
On a different note, I just wanted to ask you about how the morality you describe squares with your beliefs. I hope you don’t mind me questioning you on religion, but you do mention it above.
I understand that Quakers do not necessarily believe in God in the pure philosophical sense. You quoted the Bible to Mike Truman a while back, so I don’t think you fall into this category.
Anyway, what I was wondering is whether you believe that God’s moral judgement is absolute? As an omnipotent omniscient being he can be used as a perfect observer, and would often be considered to be a source of objectivity in morality. Obviously it is unknown to other individuals, but it provides an objective morality, which is often a good value to aspire to, even though it is unattainable.
I have always thought that adoption of relativism alongside a belief in God to be a fairly uncomfortable position.
I clearly do not believe – as many Quakers do not believe – in an omnipotent omniscient being of the simplistic, absolutist, sort you imply
I candidly do not see how anyone can claim to know enough about God to ascribe such knowledge to themselves
The human must live in doubt – and a mature relationship with God would clearly recognise that fact
Which does not mean there aren’t instances of clear and relevant insight in the Bible. Thankfully, spiritual awareness allows one to discern through the doubt – which is in part what the Quaker spiritual journey is all about – but that does not mean the uncertainty will ever be resolved, in my opinion. I never expect that revelation.
I didn’t suggest that it was possible to know what the absolutes are. Just that it is possible to know that there is an objective morality given the existence of God.
It isn’t an absolutist definition of God, by the way, those are generally necessary factors for God in the philosophical sense – an omniscient, omnipotent benevolent being.
But since you don’t believe in God, that explains how you can reconcile your religion with your moral relativism.
I do believe in God
I have quite a strong faith
But you can’t circumscribe it by your narrow definition of what you consider God to be – which is knowledge God would deny to you
I should point out that I was not being literal, which is how you took it. You do not believe in God in the philosophical definition I’d described, which I thought was reasonably clear.
I am a moral absolutist too. I would suggest that everybody is, despite the siren song of relativism, because morality is always normative
What I mean is that it is not the kind of thing on which one can agree to differ. Say a society thinks that it is absolutely morally required to sacrifice the first born child in every family in order to ensure the sun rises every day. This is a moral position. If the sun does not rise then everyone starves. So they do it with a heavy heart and they mourn their dead just as you would: but there are no exceptions in this society. Every first born child is sacrificed. The practice is generalisable, and anyone who attempts to circumvent it is necessarily sanctioned: because they are harming everyone in the most profound way if they do not do what is required. The individual may not agree but it is not a matter of individual choice in this case. Such a people will take the child by force and sacrifice it: because they must. In other areas of life they have a prohibition against murder, as all societies do, I think. The law against murder is also predicated on a moral position, I would argue. But this is not murder, for murder is not only a moral characterisation: it is a matter of law. This does not fall within the legal definition of murder within that society.
Then imagine there comes into contact with that society another, which does not think that the sun will not rise if the first born live. This culture does think that such sacrifice is murder. Because the prohibition against murder is a moral position, not just a matter of law, the members of this culture are constrained to do something about it if they can. It is not possible to agree to disagree on matters of morality: they enjoin us to action.
The second culture can believe anything they like about the source of the moral difference: it makes no matter so far as the response is concerned. If they think they are descriptive relativists, they still think they are right and the others are wrong: which legitimises interference. If they are normative relativists they are also legitimised on the basis of Napier’s argument about suttee:
“”You say that it is your custom to burn widows. Very well. We also have a custom: when men burn a woman alive, we tie a rope around their necks and we hang them. Build your funeral pyre; beside it, my carpenters will build a gallows. You may follow your custom. And then we will follow ours.”
And if they believe in absolute morality they are also constrained to act
In circumstances where there is agreement to disagree there is no moral content. If I come to your house for dinner and you eat with your fingers while I am used to a knife and fork we will not kill each other over the difference: it is a matter of manners, or taste, or custom. Sometimes we confuse the two and there is an issue of cultural hegemony: and there are grey areas. But I think there are central tenets which are truly moral. And I do not think there is any place or possibility for relativism there
Normative absolutism?
I agree with that. I take the view that when people talk about morality, they are normally trying to say something about the world, not about their own opinions. It defeats the purpose to then reduce morality to a statement of opinion.
With relativism, saying “x is moral” is the essentially same as saying “I believe that x is moral”. In that sense, the individual is not assigning the statement any epistemic value as knowledge. Which makes the statement completely empty.
When people say “x is moral” they mean something more than that.
But absolutes are not possible. We all know occasions when morally we must lie
Is morality not possible then?
Is that what you are saying?
Surely you’re not a logical positivist?
A logical positivist? I don’t think so. I don’t think it’s compatible with an acceptance of synthetic a priori knowledge. I am probably leaning towards some form of moral pluralism, I’d guess. Though it doesn’t really matter if you are simply trying to defend relativism.
I was just saying that epistemologically speaking, I think relativism shoots itself in the foot when it comes to statements about the real world. Removing the ability to be morally true means that moral statements will invariably fall short of the conditions laid down in the tripartite theory of knowledge. So you either need to reject that or find a way around that.
With regards your first question, I’d say that we also all know actions that are definitely not moral, regardless of the circumstance. And that form of moral absolutism isn’t rejected by most people. For example, there isn’t a golden mean on the scale somewhere between “murdering for pleasure” and “not murdering for pleasure”.
Aristotle focused on attributes of the individual rather than actions, I believe. I don’t think it is really applicable to a criticism of deontological ethics.
I’d love to take the point – but with a crushing work load to get out this week regret I can’t
But I do think you made a valid criticism of the way I used Kant flippantly – and accept that
There is an intuitive sense of justice that we possess. Many lose this sense as self-interest and power dominates, probably exciting the brain and causing a serotonin reuptake inhibiting force to arise. The early Quakers saw the Cross of Christ as the ‘cross to the self’ but you don’t need to use that terminolgy as Richard points out. There are aspects of all faith traditions that point to self-knowledge and emptying the self of self-interestedness, it is particularly strong in some Christian traditions . The problem with Kant’s formulation is that it does not give us an insight into the profoundly unsettling and challenging journey that this requires. If we are to use money sensibly then the philosophy of self interestedness needs to be questioned – using dodgy evolutionary arguments that fuel a neo-liberal stance will not do as the issues are more cultural than hard-wired. krishnamurti had a great insight into this when he desribed the prevailing psychology as: ‘I don’t care if the world goes bust as long as I’ve got my corner.’ He was right.
It may be useful to distinguish two conceptions of ethics. Under the first, it is the job of an ethical system to give us a way to decide what to do in given circumstances. Both Kantian deontology and utilitarianism come under that head. Under the second, it is the job of ethics to say what kinds of people we should be, so that when we find ourselves in ethically demanding situations, we will react appropriately, even though the ethical system does not tell us directly what to do. Virtue ethics tends, on the whole, to come under that head. My immediate reaction to the Quaker text that Richard quotes, is that it is better regarded as part of the virtue ethics tradition, than as part of either deontology or utilitarianism.
The boundaries are not sharp. For example, Christine Korsgaard’s broadly Kantian approach, in her book Self-Constitution, argues that our actions constitute ourselves as agents with our identities. It is a short step from that, to saying that our actions make us into certain types of person. And it is perfectly possible that a virtue ethic would produce the same results in practice as a deontological or utilitarian position that was softened by a qualification along the lines of “do what the system says unless there are exceptional circumstances”. Nonetheless, I think that the distinction between the two conceptions is appropriate.
Why is it helpful here? It offers a route past the opposition between absolutism and relativism. That opposition arises under the first conception of ethics. Do you always do what the system says, or do you allow for exceptions? (It is, by the way, worth noting that there are gradations between absolutism and anything goes. You may say that you will allow for exceptions in special circumstances, justified by considerations that are seen to be particularly weighty by reference to defined standards, without saying that you will accept any set of rules as equally legitimate.)
If the second conception, focused on the kind of person you are, is adopted, you can stand for certain virtues, without taking a position on whether the detailed habits that you adopt in order to live out those virtues, should be the required of everyone. You would exclude, as unacceptable, some habits, because adopting them would manifestly go against your virtues. And I happen to think that any respectable set of virtues would exclude taking advantage of opportunities to get your effective tax rate down to well below the rates that are set out in the legislation (the 20, 40, 45 or whatever is appropriate). But you can be absolute about the virtues, and say that it is disgraceful for a human being not to live by virtues such as honesty, without needing to be either absolutist or relativist about any particular detailed rule of conduct. (You become absolutist when you see that any violation of a given rule would have to contradict one of the virtues on your list – although you do need some let-out for when virtues conflict.)
Have we just shifted the absolutist v relativist debate up a level, from detailed rules of conduct to virtues? In a sense, we have, but our position is still improved, for two reasons. First, the move up has built in a little flexibility, but not too much, at the level of detailed rules. Second, there comes a point at which the possession of certain virtues is closely associated with the idea of being accepted as a human being. We speak of some extreme criminals as being “inhuman”. That is biologically inaccurate, but there is something to it. You are not one of us without the possession of some virtues. That fact may allow us to say that some virtues should be regarded as absolute. Unless you are Kant, it is easier to say that virtues which do not prescribe specific rules are absolute, than that specific rules are absolute.
Well, I at least much appreciated that
Thank you
@Richard.It seems to me that there are things which are known to be wrong. But we are clever: and we are good at self deception as well. Things are not simple in reality. For example, if it is wrong to take human life then we must decide what to do about someone who does that. It is an easy step to think we must kill such a person, if we honestly believe that his or her action is a threat to us all, as individuals or as a society. If we are nomadic jail is not an option. But there is an immediate constraint on the simple idea that taking the life of another is wrong, is there not? Yet the solution to that dilemma does not undermine the basic idea. Not all who kill are the same, either. A serial killer in the midst of a nomadic society allows of few responses. And so it may come about that we decide how we deal with that problem in different ways. Thus there is a cultural element to the legal or societal reaction, and thus “murder” comes into being: a moral principle, modified by what will eventually become a legal framework, if you like. But still the absolute wrongness of taking someone’s life is intact, and I think it does exist in all cultures.
If that can be accepted, then the same processes apply to other circumstances too.
I do not think it is necessary to be naive in order to believe in moral absolutes. It is not a slogan. As I see it the fundamental principle creates a presumption when it comes to dealing with the problem: but the presumption can be overturned; and that is because there are competing principles. Thus it is not normally considered to be wrong to kill in self defence, nor in defence of another. But in each instance the presumption is that it is wrong to take another’s life, and there must be a case made to rebut that. That case must rest on one of a few things: mostly on other principles, or on unalterable practicalities, I think.
Having said that, I think they are few. Much which masquerades as moral principle is nothing of the sort.
If your absolutism embraces relativism as it appears to do then that’s fine by me
It has to do so
I think we are perhaps getting muddled by the words themselves, Richard. I have already said, I am not a moral relativist as that term is normally understood but perhaps that is the problem.
Relativism seems to me to be shorthand for a number of different positions, which I have briefly mentioned above when I talked of normative relativism and of descriptive relativism. There may be other versions as well. So we have to sort out what we mean, and very often when people use the term they are talking of normative relativism: that is the proposition that all moral schemes are equally valid and that one has no right to impose one’s own scheme on another culture. There is some truth in that, I think, but I only think so because I am an absolutist: I honestly believe that the majority of persistent moral regimes have much in common at the core. I do not subscribe to the evolutionary biologist type of explanation for that, but neither do I reject it. I do not know the source and frankly I do not care. It might be evolution, in that we are social animals and it is hard wired for that reason: for some religious people it is their god who makes the template, and though I am not religious in any way that is as useful as the evolutionary tale. IE not very useful at all. What is helpful is to think about this in terms of acceptable behaviour: what should we do and how should we live. So far as I can see the default moral positions are shared across cultures modified by the practicalities I mentioned and by the tales we tell ourselves about who we are and who has authority. There has to be some authority because we do not have time and experience enough to work out everything for ourselves and so that is where your “wisdom tradition” comes in: and also where systems of professional ethics fits. But the authority is not absolute for it goes with power and power corrupts: there is a place for individual positions necessarily.
That is where the problem arises: because from a position of moral relativism many move to what is better described as emotivism: the notion that because there are persistent differences there is no moral absolute at all. When that happens there is no longer any place for a “wisdom tradition” nor for any moral sense whatsoever as a shared social and cultural phenomenon. That is when it comes down to what Ben Saunders is talking about; the notion that everyone is just expressing opinion and every view is as valid as every other. It denies the possibility of moral knowledge and to me it is an aspect of “scientism”:which I see as the denial of all knowledge which does not come down to stuff which can be measured like medium sized dry goods. It is easy to see the attraction of such a position for the neoliberal: certainty appeals, and self serving certainty appeals even more. I seem to perceive great support for such views at present and I think it no accident that those views accompany a view of human nature which is reductive, and essentially proposes we have said all we can when we have described the getting and spending. Homo economicus, in short.
There is a difference in showing respect for moral systems tied to culture and modified as I have described: and showing respect for every individual opinion and action substituting law for our moral sense as if they were the same thing. From what I have read of your work I think you agree with that and I am surprised you see yourself as a relativist because I think you are mistaken in that: and that is probably the most arrogant thing you have ever read. Yet I think there is evidence for it.
I was not sure what you were getting at when you made the comment “normative absolutism” but that is my position and I venture to suggest it is also yours. I do not think you uphold a laissez faires version of ethics and it seems to me that you are in fact wedded to normative morality: if not I cannot see how you can argue for the introduction of ethical positions, as you do. That is what normative means, at least in the sense I am using it: perhaps generalisable is a better term but whichever you use there is no scope for agreeing to disagree. Note that when I say a moral position constrains us to action it does not follow that it constrains us to murder or torture or the more extreme impositions sometimes justified in the name of the state or of religion: what action we are prepared to take is also a matter of morality and of competing principles. But you do act, Richard. You argue cogently for ethical behaviour in the world of finance and accountancy and taxation. You do not take the relativist position and get on with your own practice according to your values and allow others to do the same. You name what you consider immoral and you argue against it. I put it to you that is an absolutist position, and that is the common one. As I said, I think we are all absolutists at heart. We live and let live on matters of taste and custom etc: not on matters of morality. We can’t.
I get your logic now
John Woolman the 18th Century American Quaker thought it was wrong to expect others to Labour in a manor that you would not be prepared to do yourself – he felt mining was exploitative and cruel and regarded the dying industry as polluting so always wore undyed cotton and today we have minerals like cobalt and gold mined in appalling conditions to service our wealth. Economic relationships are a statement about how we value others. This is something to be continually worked out day by day rather than repeating abstract ethical formulae. The Quakers believed that all relationships based on power were fundamentally flawed. Now, as Elias Cannetti put it, we live in a culture ‘choking on power.’
So where do we locate “honour” killings? Or those motivated by a view of religious faith or obligations? Or political assassination?