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Archive for the ‘Big 4’ Category

This time the need is to review limited liability from top to bottom

March 16th, 2010

It’s been a hectic couple of days – hence low volume blogging.

That’s been an opportunity missed regarding Ernst & Young (E&Y) and Lehman. It’s also been an opportunity for reflection.

The reality is that there is nothing surprising about what E & Y have done. It seems that a senior partner from an audit form joined a client, devised an off-balance sheet accounting ruse, cleared it with his former colleagues, who then signed it off for audit purposes, and it was used thereafter without further question arising to deliberately misrepresent the true nature of the balance sheet of the entity.

That sounds shocking expect for one thing – this is what happens day in, day out, the whole world over.

This is what securitisation was about.

This is what a lot of offshore is about.

Derivative trading is often intended to achieve such goals – and most finance directors have no clue what they’re doing when engaging in them, and nor do their auditors.

In issues as straightforward as deferred taxation the balance sheet is knowingly and deliberately misstated by companies and auditors with the connivance of auditing and accounting regulators – in this case to overstate a liability that will in most cases never be settled – all to achieve a political objective of conning the world into believing that more tax is being paid than is ever settled..

In the case of fair value accounting myths were created that there were markets in assets for which there was no effective trading.

The E & Y / Lehman case is not an isolated incident. It is indicative of a pandemic of abuse by the accounting profession.

It’s an abuse that starts at the very top. The International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation – the body ultimately responsible for ensuring that accounts showing a true and fair view are prepared says in its constitution that its main objective is

to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable and enforceable global accounting standards that require high quality, transparency and comparable information in financial statements and other financial reporting to help participants in the world’s capital markets and other users make economic decisions;

Note the “and other users” – something that is then blatantly ignored by the International Accounting Standards Board when it says that the main users of financial statements are “present and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions in their capacity as capital providers”. They then conclude that because investors are providers of risk capital to the entity, financial statements that meet their needs will also meet most of the general financial information needs of other users.

And despite this extraordinary claim, and attention on one small group of users alone, the Big 4 have also engineered that they have almost no liability to providers of capital in the exercise of their duties.

The consequence was always going to be a disaster: it’s a disaster that is unfolding.

Treating that disaster as specific would however compound the error: the problem is systemic. It has to be tackled that way.

The key issues are, I suggest, in no particular order:

1. Why we gave up control of accounting disclosure to the accounting profession

2. Why we gave up control of auditing regulation to the auditing profession

3. Why we allowed the definition of an audit to be limited to confirmation of compliance with an accounting framework and abandoned the true and fair override

4. Why we allowed the users of financial statements to be considered the providers of capital alone

5. Why we don’t demand financial statements that meet the needs of other major user groups including:

   a. Employees

   b. Suppliers

   c. Customers

   d. Regulators

   e. Tax authorities

   f. Civil society groups

   g. People at large

6. Why we limited auditor liability so much

7. Why we allowed the concept of limited liability to be porous when it comes to failure and yet so restrictive when it comes to sharing information and reward

8. Why we allow limited liability within limited liability i.e. subsidiaries have limited liability distinct from parent companies

9. Why we consider group accounts the only useful perspective on corporate activity

10. Why we allow off balance sheet accounting

11. Why we still allow auditors to undertake other commercial activities

12. Why we don’t increase company registration fees to ensure auditors can always be fairly remunerated from a communally managed purse

13. Why we allow companies to not file accounts on public record

14. Why we accept a lack of transparency on group structures

15. Why we don’t demand full accounts on public record from all entities created under law wherever they are in the world, whether they be companies, partnerships, all variations on these, trusts, charities, foundations and other such entities. Such information to include full information on ownership, entitlement to assets, establishment, constitutions, management and accounts.

16. Why we allow companies to be struck off public registers without questions being asked and substantial fees being paid in lieu of accounts.

17. Why fit and proper tests aren’t conducted for all persons incorporating and owning companies.

Of course the list goes on, and on. So it should.

Now is the time for the most fundamental review of what the limited liability entity is, why we allow it, what its rights and obligations are and how we regulate it.

Surely this time we appreciate the need to do this?

Don’t we?

Richard Murphy Auditing, Big 4

What’s exceptional about Ernst & Young?

March 15th, 2010

FT.com / Companies / Financial Services - Lehman report casts auditors in poor light.

As the FT notes:

Claims about Ernst & Young’s part in the collapse of Lehman Brothers look set to open a wider debate on what has until now been one of the least dissected aspects of the financial crisis – the role played by auditors.

Anton Valukas’s report on the biggest bankruptcy in US history has sent shockwaves through the accounting fraternity in its heavy criticism of Lehman’s auditor E&Y, one of the Big Four firms.

It goes on to say:

The claims against E&Y, although exceptional, give grist to a growing lobby questioning the purpose of auditors in providing investors with a true picture of the financial health of a company.

This is where I part company with the report. What’s exceptional about E & Y’s performance. They:

- alloweed window dressing

- put fornm over substance

- ignore the true and fair over-ride

- box ticked to confirm compliance with an accounting framework they helped create and which is itself misleading

That’s what auditors do. There’s nothing exceptional about this. The only odd thing is no one has appreciated it - bar the likes of Prem Sikka, Dennis Howlett, Francine McKenna and me.

This is not chance. This has been the collective turning of a blind eye.

Of course that could carry on. But society will pay the price.

Richard Murphy Accountancy, Auditing, Big 4

For GAAP read CRAP

March 14th, 2010

There’s much discussion today about whether the alleged professional negligence by Ernst & Young with regard to the audit of Lehman Brothers – where it appears they turned a blind eye to the rigging of the balance sheet – might be their Enron and lead to the demise of the firm.

I’m on record as saying I think the end of at least one of the Big 4 is nigh – and with it the whole audit market.

But let’s be clear – Ernst & Youngs’ defence – that their audit complied with US GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles - pronounced ’gap’) may be true. But that’s not the point. The point is US GAAP is crap and the Big 4 engineered that their audits do not need to report either truth  or fairness.

As the rules of the IAASB (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board), which sets auditing standards  says, an audit is:

The purpose of an audit is to enhance the degree of confidence of intended users in the financial statements. This is achieved by the expression of an opinion by the auditor on whether the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an applicable financial reporting framework. In the case of most general purpose frameworks, that opinion is on whether the financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, or give a true and fair view in accordance with the framework. An audit conducted in accordance with ISAs and relevant ethical requirements enables the auditor to form that opinion.

The wording is not a chance: the emphasis is on compliance with the financial reporting framework first; the consequence of being true and fair is assumed to follow, but is consequential, not the goal.

So, E & Y influence the International Accounting Standards Board that sets the framework.

And they influence the IAASB which limits the scope of the audit to the point it’s useless.

And although financial statements are meant to be produced for the benefit of the providers of capital to a business (in itself far too narrow a requirement) the auditors in the UK (by reason of the Caparo decision) and in the US under Delaware law basically can’t be sued by those providers of capital.

In other words the auditors charge a lot for doing a job badly for which they know they have almost no liability. It’s not surprising they don’t really care.

It’s not E & Y who have erred here – it’s all those who let this situation develop that have erred. The accounting structures we use are rotten to the core and so is auditing. Unless both are reformed we are heading for collapse after collapse after collapse as the prevailing mood of society to promote expedient short term greed will destroy entity after entity without any check or balance in place to stop it happening.

This can be tackled.

It needs to be tackled.

Without the political will to tackle it just watch society collapse like a pack of dominos as big business begins to fail all round us.

And I think I’m underselling the melodrama in saying that.

Richard Murphy Accounting, Auditing, Big 4, Ernst & Young, Ethics, IASB

All but PWC in the Big 4 give up on country-by-country reporting

February 4th, 2010

Only one Big Four firm produces UK annual report - Accountancy Age.

The Age asks:

Should the UK’s biggest firms set an example to their clients by producing a UK focused annual report?

The question arises after Deloitte said it will no longer produce a UK report. Instead the Big Four firm will focus on its audit transparency report and corporate social responsibility document, as well as flag up UK performance in Deloitte’s global annual report.

Dropping the UK annual report has become the thing to do among the biggest firms, as Deloitte joins Ernst & Young, which now only includes figures in a global annual report; and KPMG, which provides a European and global report.

This leaves PwC as the only Big Four firm to continue producing a UK-only annual report

Those driopping the report say this is becasue their legal structure has changed. So what? Has their accountability?

At a time when country-by-country reporting is on the agenda as never before the profession shows just where it stands - as far way from transparency as possible.

I seriously wonder when the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and similar bodies will be renamed the Institute of Chartered Opacitors in England and Wales.

NB I claim opacitors as a new word!

Richard Murphy Accountancy, Big 4, Country-by-country

Precious little prudence in Forbes

January 19th, 2010

My latest Forbes column is out. Entitled ‘Precious Little Prudence’ it asks ‘When is a debt a bad thing–do accountants really even know?’

As I conclude:

[L]et’s never forget that both the IASB and IAASB are dominated and even significantly financed by the Big 4 firms of accountants and auditors - PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, KPMG and Ernst & Young.

According to popular myth these firms have had a ‘good recession’ – little blame attaching to them for what has happened. But that’s just a myth, because the truth is they carry a great deal of responsibility for what has gone wrong – and should bear the consequences.

Which is something I firmly believe.

Richard Murphy Accounting, Auditing, Big 4

Also ran

December 30th, 2009

Quotes of the year must have some essential qualities. They must be routed in reality. They must encapsulate a moment. They must have inherent in tem a demand for action. Hopefully they’re elegant, pithy, pertinent and prescient all at the same time.

The following from Steve Hadrill, new head of the UK’s Financial reporting Council responsible for regulating auditors fails on elegance. It also needs contextual setting so it is not pithy. But it’s good on the other two. In December 2009 he said, when speaking about whether a fifth large firm of auditors was needed:

[T]he priority for us has to be that we are prepared for the worst and that is where I will put my focus

Blow creating a fifth firm in other words, making sure we keep four is going to be tough enough in his view, and mine.

The prescience? Threefold, I suggest: first, failure of one of the Big 4 is inevitable; second, he has no idea what will happen if they do and third we’re setting ourselves up for another ‘too big to fail’ scenario. As the pillars of our current version of capitalism collapse all around us all we seem able to do is prop them up until like dominoes they’ll fall again.

It’s not encouraging. And it shows, time and again, that the wrong people are in  the regulatory jobs.

Richard Murphy Accounting, Big 4

Another mess for PWC

December 16th, 2009

FT.com / Companies / Financial Services - Shareholders ponder Cattles legal action.

Some of us have been warning one or more of the Big 4 auditors will fail. It seems likely regulators now agree.

So it’s timely to note that PWC are in more trouble:

Cattles plc has admitted to a breakdown in internal controls, which resulted in its impairment policies being incorrectly applied. Its shares were suspended in April this year following the discovery of the accounting errors.

Last month Cattles said in a statement that the balance sheet at the end of December 2008 would have been likely to show a deficiency of shareholders’ funds of £197m ($320m) with loans and advances to customers of £2.5bn and gross external borrowings of £2.7bn. Its numbers are unaudited.

Shareholders have been called to an extraordinary meeting today so that Cattles can explain the “serious loss of capital” caused by the higher than expected impairment provisions.

PwC, the company’s auditors, resigned earlier this month .

On Tuesday David Greene, head of litigation at Edwin Coe, said the law firm had hired barristers and forensic accountants and was examining whether legal action could be taken against former directors or against PwC as former auditors.

The Accountancy and Actuarial Discipline Board, the independent investigative and disciplinary body for accountants and actuaries in the UK, said in July that it had launched an investigation into the conduct of members at Cattles and of PwC as auditors to Cattles.

PwC would not comment.

Well of course it wouldn’t.

But prima facie the accounts were wrong. And it was not a one off. And the question has to arise about how long cut price audit can last when this sort of problem recurs time and again.

Audit risk is meant to be born by auditors. It is being externalised to shareholders and society at large. Is that sustainable?

I doubt it.

Richard Murphy Auditing, Big 4, PWC

So a Big Four is set to fail?

December 13th, 2009

So a Big Four is set to fail?.

Thank goodness I’m not the only one concerned about this. As Dennis Howlett notes:

As … I have been warning for well over two years now, one if not all of the Big Four will collapse. No amount of posturing by regulatory bodies will prevent aggrieved stakeholders from pursuing legal remedies in light of some of the more egregious cases such as Satyam or what’s fallen out of the banking crisis. It is the weight of litigation that will trigger a collapse. Satyam alone could do that in regard to PWC. The question comes – what next? That’s where FRC and others’ focus should be placed.

Precisely.

But there’s no evidence it’s happening.

Richard Murphy Big 4

Planning for the Big 4 to fail

December 10th, 2009

Haddrill: we don’t need a Big Five - Accountancy Age.

Stephen Hadrill is the new head of the UK’s Financial Reporting Council. Accountancy Age have interviewed him and report:

The new head of the UK’s accounting watchdog said there was little evidence to justify a fifth big player in the concentrated audit market, and will instead plough his efforts into planning in case of a Big Four collapse.

He believes the FRC should concentrate on maintaining high standards among the larger firms while simultaneously provisioning for a collapse.

I think that’s not ‘in case’ but ‘when’.

His failure to plan for their succession already looks like a guarantee of the end of private sector auditing to me.

Not a man to have confidence in. He believes in Armageddon and his solution seems to be to issue tin hats.

Richard Murphy Accounting, Auditing, Big 4

You mean the Big 4 aren’t transparent?

December 3rd, 2009

Clients blind on audit quality - Accountancy Age.

The UK ’s largest auditors fail to provide enough information to compare one firm’s quality against another.

This is the verdict of the regulators, who want audit firms to produce hard facts to back up claims about audit quality amid criticism from investors that it is near impossible to compare one auditor against another.

The Professional Oversight Board (POB), which sits within the UK’s reporting regulator the Financial Reporting Council, believes the audit industry should produce more quantitative data to better equip investors and companies with the tools needed to scrutinise their auditors.

So let’s get this clear. First we’d like to know who the Big 4 are. Not nearly as easy as you’d think - just look at PWC’s wriggling out of liability on Satyam.

Second, you might like to know where they are - again, and as I’ll show soon - not nearly as easy as you might think it should be.

Third - you might like to know how financially durable they are - but look at the absence of contingent liability notes in their accounts and you’ll see how hard that is to determine.

Fourth - you might want them to say how good they are at compliance - but none as far as I can see advertise the penalties they pick up, pretty often unless we’re talking Deloittes.

Fifth, you’d like to have meaningful price compraisons. You mean you can’t get it? Does that mean there’s a cartel?

We’ve got a long, long way to go until these guys are accountable. Which is a pretty damning indictment of the profession as a whole.

Richard Murphy Accountancy, Auditing, Big 4