{"id":95757,"date":"2026-09-17T07:13:03","date_gmt":"2026-09-17T06:13:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.taxresearch.org.uk\/Blog\/?p=95757"},"modified":"2026-09-17T09:19:06","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T08:19:06","slug":"pensions-some-data","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.taxresearch.org.uk\/Blog\/2026\/09\/17\/pensions-some-data\/","title":{"rendered":"Pensions: some data"},"content":{"rendered":"

Regular commentator Robert J made this observation<\/a> with regard to the debate over the triple lock on pensions yesterday:<\/p>\n

In terms of communication, public understanding would benefit from widespread use of:<\/p>\n

1. Current UK State pension as a % of average or median? earnings.<\/p>\n

2. That % being publicised in a table of other countries in geographical Europe.<\/p>\n

3. The estimated time it would take \u201ctriple lock\u201d to reach a specific target %.<\/p>\n

4. The cost of doing that by a simple cash uplift now, in 1\/2\/3\/4 or 5 years.<\/p>\n

5. The current cost of higher rate pension tax relief.<\/p>\n

6. Number of people drawing pension credit, and numbers estimated to be eligible for it.<\/p>\n

7. Cost of state provided occupational pensions for those who advise on such things and make the decisions.<\/p>\n

8. Hyperlinks to stores selling pitchforks.<\/p>\n

In my dreams, the Sunday politics broadcasts do a big splash on this with lots of charts and Jeremy Vine running around a VR studio making it all clear. Then the Chancellor is interviewed by an AI version of Brian Redhead and asked to justify the current system.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

At first, I said I had no time to deal with this. And then, as an exercise, whilst I was working on video edits, I set Claude AI on the job, doing little more than posting the comment and adding a strict instruction that all links and data must be double-checked, and data issues must be highlighted. It came back with this. I stress this is not my work. It should not be relied on. I have not double-checked the sources. They may well be right. I cannot guarantee it, but I have that feeling from my other reading.<\/p>\n

It did offer me data on pitchforks, but I left them out, except for a couple of links.<\/p>\n

\n

RESEARCH BRIEF \u00b7 SEPTEMBER 2026<\/span><\/p>\n

The UK State Pension: Eight Numbers They Don't Want You to Know<\/span><\/p>\n

A research brief for public communication \u2014 figures, projections, data problems, and at least one hyperlink to a pitchfork retailer.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

01 <\/span>State<\/span> Pension as a Percentage of Earnings<\/span><\/p>\n

The full new state pension for 2026\/27 is <\/span>\u00a3241.30 per week<\/span>, or <\/span>\u00a312,548.60 per year<\/span> \u2014 a 4.1% rise under the triple lock (earnings growth was the qualifying figure). <\/span>So<\/span> what is that as a share of what working people earn?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n

\u00a3241.30<\/span><\/p>\n

Full new state pension per week (2026\/27)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

32.6%<\/span><\/p>\n

of median full-time employee earnings<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

34.4%<\/span><\/p>\n

of average (mean) weekly earnings<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

~\u00a3200pw<\/span><\/p>\n

Average pension <\/span>actually received<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Basis for the calculation: <\/span>ONS average weekly earnings (regular pay) ran at approximately \u00a3670\u2013680\/week in mid-2026, equivalent to roughly \u00a335,000\u201335,500\/year. ONS ASHE median full-time annual earnings for 2025 were \u00a337,430, estimated at ~\u00a338,500 by 2026 with ~3% wage growth. These two measures give the two figures above.<\/span><\/p>\n

The pension as a share of <\/span>all-worker<\/span> median earnings (full- and part-time combined, ~\u00a329,000\u201330,000\/year) comes out around <\/span>42\u201343%<\/span> \u2014 a figure the government would prefer you used, for obvious reasons.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n

⚠ DATA<\/span> PROBLEM<\/span><\/p>\n

The choice of earnings denominator swings the answer from 27% to 43%. The OECD uses \"average worker\" earnings, which for the UK sits nearer \u00a343,000\u201346,000 (closer to the top of the full-time distribution), giving UK replacement rates of only 28\u201330%. There is no single \"correct\" measure, but the choice should be stated every time. The honest range is 29\u201343% depending on method. Median full-time is arguably the most meaningful benchmark for political communication.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n
\n

⚠ DATA<\/span> PROBLEM<\/span><\/p>\n

The full pension figure is the maximum. Average state pension received is closer to \u00a3200\/week (\u00a310,400\/year), because many \u2014 especially women, carers, and the self-employed \u2014 have incomplete NI records. The true replacement rate for the average recipient is materially lower than the headline figure implies.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

02 <\/span>European<\/span> Comparison: Pension Replacement Rates<\/span><\/p>\n

The table below draws on <\/span>OECD Pensions <\/span>at a Glance<\/span> 2025<\/span> (gross replacement rates at average earnings, all mandatory schemes). The UK ranks near the bottom of geographical Europe, ahead of only Ireland among large Western European economies.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

Country<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

Gross Replacement Rate (all mandatory schemes)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Turkey<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

107%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Netherlands<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

95%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Denmark<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

80%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Austria<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

78%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Spain<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

74%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Portugal<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

73%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Italy<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

71%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Hungary<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

63%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

France<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

60%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Czech Republic<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

58%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Finland<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

57%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Sweden<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

54%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Germany<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

53%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Belgium<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

51%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Norway<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

48%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Poland<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

37%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

Ireland<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

34%<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

🇬🇧 United Kingdom<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

29% (state pension only)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n
\n

⚠ CRITICAL<\/span> CAVEAT \u2014 HEALTH WARNING REQUIRED<\/span><\/p>\n

The OECD figures include ALL mandatory pension schemes \u2014 state plus mandatory workplace (occupational) pension contributions. Countries like the Netherlands and Denmark have near-universal mandatory workplace pensions that dwarf their state tier. The UK's auto-enrolment workplace pension is not mandatory in the same legal sense \u2014 it is opt-out default, not compulsion \u2014 and so is excluded from the OECD mandatory figure.<\/span><\/p>\n

This makes the UK look worse than a like-for-like comparison. Adding average auto-enrolment workplace pension accrual would raise the UK figure to roughly 38\u201342%. However, this does not rescue the UK's position: it still sits at or below Ireland, well below most peer countries, and the UK state pension alone is genuinely among the lowest. The distinction matters enormously when making the argument.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

03 <\/span>How<\/span> Long for Triple Lock to Reach a Target?<\/span><\/p>\n

The triple lock \u2014 the higher of inflation (CPI), earnings growth, or 2.5% \u2014 is presented as protecting pensioners' living standards. But it has an architecture flaw: it is a <\/span>floor<\/span>, not a <\/span>convergence mechanism<\/span>. A pension that rises with earnings, in a world where average earnings also rise with earnings, stays at the same proportion of earnings forever.<\/span><\/p>\n

The pension's share of earnings only improves in years when the 2.5% minimum floor exceeds wage growth. Historically, the triple lock has outpaced median earnings by roughly <\/span>0.3\u20130.5 percentage points per year<\/span> on average \u2014 driven by those 2.5% minimum years.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n

32.6%<\/span><\/p>\n

Current pension as % of median full-time earnings<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

50%<\/span><\/p>\n

A plausible target (European median)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

17.4pp<\/span><\/p>\n

Gap to close (percentage points)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

The maths is bleak. <\/span>At the historical excess growth rate of ~0.4 percentage points per year over earnings, closing a 17-point gap would take roughly <\/span>40+ years<\/span>. At 1% excess: about 20 years. At 2% excess: about 11 years. But 2% excess implies the pension growing 5% per year while wages grow 3% \u2014 a sustained political commitment that no government has made.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

Target<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

Gap (pp)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

At 0.4%pa excess<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

At 1%pa excess<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

At 2%pa excess<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

40% of median full-time earnings<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+7.4pp<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

~18 yrs (\u22482044)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

~8 yrs (\u22482034)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

~4 yrs (\u22482030)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

45% of median full-time earnings<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+12.4pp<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

~31 yrs (\u22482057)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

~13 yrs (\u22482039)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

~7 yrs (\u22482033)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

50% of median full-time earnings<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+17.4pp<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

~43 yrs (\u22482069)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

~18 yrs (\u22482044)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

~9 yrs (\u22482035)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

OECD European median (~54%)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+21.4pp<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

>50 years<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

~22 yrs (\u22482048)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

~11 yrs (\u22482037)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n
\n

⚠ KEY<\/span> PROBLEM FOR COMMUNICATION<\/span><\/p>\n

Triple lock projections cannot produce a year-certain target, because the excess growth rate is unknown and variable. The IFS and OBR model these scenarios but their own projections vary widely. The fundamental message \u2014 that triple lock alone cannot deliver convergence with European norms within any politically meaningful timeframe \u2014 is solid. The specific years above are illustrative only and should not be quoted as forecasts.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

04 <\/span>Cost<\/span> of a Direct Cash Uplift<\/span><\/p>\n

Approximately <\/span>12.6 million people<\/span> currently receive the state pension. Total state pension expenditure is roughly <\/span>\u00a3130 billion per year<\/span> in 2025\/26. Average pension per recipient: ~\u00a3200\/week (\u00a310,400\/year). The cost below is calculated as the percentage increase in total state pension spending required to bring the <\/span>full<\/span> pension rate to the target, with proportional increases across all partial pensioners.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

Target<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

Annual additional cost at steady state<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

Y1<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

Y2 (if phased over 2)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

Y3 (if phased over 3)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

Y5 (if phased over 5)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

40% of median ft earnings (\u2248\u00a3296\/week)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a329\u201330bn\/yr<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a315bn<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a330bn ongoing<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a310\/20\/30bn<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a36\/12\/18\/24\/30bn<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

45% of median ft earnings (\u2248\u00a3333\/week)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a349\u201350bn\/yr<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a325bn<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a350bn ongoing<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a316\/33\/50bn<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a310\/20\/30\/40\/50bn<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\n

50% of median ft earnings (\u2248\u00a3370\/week)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a369\u201370bn\/yr<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a335bn<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a370bn ongoing<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a323\/47\/70bn<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

+\u00a314\/28\/42\/56\/70bn<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n
\n

ℹ WORKING<\/span> NOTE<\/span><\/p>\n

These figures use total state pension spending as the base and apply a flat proportional increase. A proper Treasury costing would need to account for: (a) the split between full and partial new state pension recipients; (b) the old basic state pension cohort; (c) interaction with pension credit entitlements (a higher pension reduces pension credit spend); (d) income tax effects (state pension above the personal allowance generates tax). Offsetting effects, especially the reduced pension credit bill, could cut net cost by perhaps \u00a35\u201310bn per year at the higher uplift levels. These are order-of-magnitude figures suitable for political communication, not Budget submission.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

05 <\/span>Cost<\/span> of Higher Rate Pension Tax Relief<\/span><\/p>\n

Total pension tax relief in the UK for 2022\/23 was <\/span>\u00a351.3 billion<\/span> (HMRC statistics, via Pensions Age). Preliminary 2023\/24 figures put it at approximately <\/span>\u00a352 billion<\/span> \u2014 a figure described by commentators as \"eye-watering\" and which has grown sharply with rising incomes and the frozen personal allowance.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n

\u00a352bn<\/span><\/p>\n

Total pension tax relief 2023\/24 (HMRC)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

\u00a314.5bn<\/span><\/p>\n

Excess cost of higher & additional rate relief above basic rate equivalent<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

40\u201345%<\/span><\/p>\n

Tax rate at which higher earners claim vs 20% for basic rate payers<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

The \u00a314.5 billion figure \u2014 the additional cost of extending relief at 40% and 45% rather than a flat 20% \u2014 was calculated and published by Richard Murphy in September 2023 (taxresearch.org.uk). It has since been widely cited. The political significance: restricting pension tax relief to basic rate would free up enough money to <\/span>almost entirely fund raising the state pension to 40% of median earnings<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n

⚠ DATA<\/span> PROBLEM \/ POLITICAL COMPLICATION<\/span><\/p>\n

Higher rate pension relief is not solely a \"benefit for the rich.\" It also accrues to public sector employees (NHS, teachers, civil servants) through defined-benefit scheme structures \u2014 any reform disproportionately affecting defined-contribution schemes hits private sector workers. The figures are also aggregates: HMRC does not publish a clean breakdown by income decile in its relief statistics, requiring modelling by IFS or Resolution Foundation for a proper distributional picture.<\/span><\/p>\n

The \u00a314.5bn estimate is solid in broad terms but would benefit from the most recent HMRC relief statistics data (2024\/25 figures expected late 2026).<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

06 <\/span>Pension<\/span> Credit: Claimed vs Eligible<\/span><\/p>\n

Pension Credit tops up weekly income to at least <\/span>\u00a3218.15<\/span> (single, 2026\/27) or <\/span>\u00a3332.95<\/span> (couples) and is the gateway to a raft of other support including the Winter Fuel Payment. It is also chronically underclaimed.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n

~1.4m<\/span><\/p>\n

Households currently claiming Pension Credit<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

~63%<\/span><\/p>\n

Take-up rate (eligible households)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

~850k<\/span><\/p>\n

Eligible households not claiming (estimated)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

~\u00a31.7bn<\/span><\/p>\n

Estimated annual value of unclaimed Pension Credit<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Policy in Practice's <\/span>Missing Out 2025<\/span> report (September 2025) found that <\/span>\u00a324 billion<\/span> of means-tested benefits go unclaimed annually \u2014 of which pension credit forms a significant component. The Independent Age briefing (2022) found roughly one in three eligible older people was not claiming.<\/span><\/p>\n

DWP's own official take-up statistics (released annually with an 18-month lag) have suggested take-up by caseload of around 62\u201366%, with notable geographic and demographic variation: non-claiming tends to be concentrated among homeowners, those with modest savings just above thresholds, and those with limited digital access or awareness.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n

⚠ DATA<\/span> PROBLEM<\/span><\/p>\n

The DWP take-up statistics are consistently 18\u201324 months old by the time of publication. The 2026\/27 eligibility changes (particularly the Winter Fuel Payment income test adding to the policy landscape) have likely affected both eligibility numbers and claiming behaviour in ways not yet captured in published statistics. The Independent Age, Age UK, and Policy in Practice estimates for unclaimed amounts vary. Treat any specific figure as a reasonable range estimate, not a precise count.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

07 <\/span>Pensions<\/span> for Those Who Advise on and Make the Decisions<\/span><\/p>\n

The people designing pension policy \u2014 civil servants, MPs, senior officials \u2014 are overwhelmingly members of <\/span>defined benefit<\/span> (final salary or CARE) public service pension schemes. These are the same schemes that have largely been closed to private sector workers since the 1990s. The contrast is acute.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n

~\u00a312bn<\/span><\/p>\n

Teachers' pension scheme estimated annual employer contributions<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

~\u00a313bn<\/span><\/p>\n

NHS pension scheme employer contributions per year<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

~\u00a37bn<\/span><\/p>\n

Civil Service pension employer contributions per year<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n

\n

\u00a32 trillion+<\/span><\/p>\n

Total unfunded public service pension liability (actuarial, OBR)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Total annual government pension payments across all public service schemes run at approximately <\/span>\u00a360\u201370 billion per year gross<\/span>, partially offset by employee contributions and tax receipts. The OBR's <\/span>Public service pension payments (net)<\/span> analysis tracks the ongoing net cash position.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Taxpayers' Alliance <\/span>Mandarin Millionaires<\/span> report (2025) found that the most senior civil servants accumulate pension pots equivalent to several million pounds \u2014 unreachable in any comparable private sector defined contribution scheme.<\/span><\/p>\n

The MPs' pension: <\/span>Members of Parliament receive an employer contribution equivalent to roughly <\/span>28% of salary<\/span> into the Parliamentary Contributory Pension Fund \u2014 substantially more generous than the private sector average employer auto-enrolment contribution (typically 3\u20136% of qualifying earnings).<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n

⚠ DATA<\/span> PROBLEM<\/span><\/p>\n

No single published figure captures \"total annual taxpayer cost of state-provided occupational pensions for public servants.\" The OBR net figure, employer contribution statistics from each scheme's annual report, and the actuarial liability are three different measurements of the same reality, none of which tells the complete story on its own.<\/span><\/p>\n

Gross employer contributions across all major schemes sum to approximately \u00a335\u201345 billion per year \u2014 a figure that dwarfs the cost of raising the state pension to 40% of median earnings \u2014 but this requires triangulation across multiple <\/span>scheme<\/span> reports and should be verified against the most recent DWP, HM Treasury, and OBR publications.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Key Sources & Further Reading<\/span><\/p>\n

OECD Pensions <\/span>at a Glance<\/span> 2025 \u2014 Gross Replacement Rates<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

ONS Average Weekly Earnings \u2014 September 2026 Bulletin<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Full New State Pension 2026\/27: \u00a3241.30\/week<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

IFS \u2014 The Triple Lock: Uncertainty for Pension Incomes and Public Finances<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

IFS \u2014 What do you need to know about the triple lock?<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Pensions Age \u2014 Pension Tax Relief Totals \u00a351.3bn in 2023\/24<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Richard Murphy \u2014 Ending Higher Rate Pension Tax Relief Would Raise \u00a314.5bn<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Policy in Practice \u2014 Missing Out 2025: \u00a324 Billion Unclaimed<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

House of Commons Library \u2014 Pension Credit Current Issues<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

OBR \u2014 Public Service Pension Payments (Net)<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

TaxPayers'<\/span> Alliance \u2014 Mandarin Millionaires 2025<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

State Pension Maximum Payouts Europe 2026 \u2014 <\/span>Calquify<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Age UK \u2014 Benefit Take-Up Briefing May 2024<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Pitchforks \u2014 Amazon UK<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Agricultural Grade \u2014 Countrywide Farmers<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Regular commentator Robert J made this observation with regard to the debate over the triple lock on pensions yesterday: In terms of communication, public understanding
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