{"id":88778,"date":"2025-12-31T07:34:28","date_gmt":"2025-12-31T07:34:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.taxresearch.org.uk\/Blog\/?p=88778"},"modified":"2025-12-31T07:34:28","modified_gmt":"2025-12-31T07:34:28","slug":"economic-questions-the-richard-feynman-question","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.taxresearch.org.uk\/Blog\/2025\/12\/31\/economic-questions-the-richard-feynman-question\/","title":{"rendered":"Economic questions: the Richard Feynman question"},"content":{"rendered":"

This is one of a series of posts that will ask what the most pertinent question raised by a prominent influencer of\u00a0political economy<\/a>\u00a0might have been, and what the relevance of that question might be today. There is a list of all posts in the series at the end of each entry. The\u00a0origin of this series is noted here.<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n

After the first two posts in this series, the topics have been chosen by me, and this is one of those. This series has been produced using what I describe as directed AI searches to establish positions with which I agree, followed by final editing before publication.<\/em><\/p>\n

Why have I included Richard Feynman<\/a>? Probably because he was the subject of discussion in the Murphy household last night, and that was not because he was a Nobel laureate in physics, although he was. <\/em>Instead, it was because of his <\/em>pedagogy<\/em><\/a>, or approach to teaching, which is much commented upon, not least on YouTube.<\/em><\/span>\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n

The logic within this<\/a> is straightforward and yet immensely powerful. His suggestion was that any teacher should write an explanation of what they are seeking to explain in a way that a child might understand. If the writer then finds an area they are unable to explain in this way, they must go back and re-read or research the topic until they can. <\/em><\/p>\n

In my opinion, the teaching of economics is so far removed from this methodology that his pedagogy provides a devastating technique with which to critique the discipline and all that flows from it.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n

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Richard Feynman was not merely a great physicist; he was one of the most relentless critics of fake knowledge ever to stand inside an academic discipline. His lectures, essays and public interventions were animated by a single principle: you do not understand something unless you can explain it simply and show that it works in the real world<\/span>.<\/p>\n

Feynman distrusted jargon, reverence and credentialism. He had little patience for explanations that substituted formal technique for comprehension, and none at all for disciplines that mistook mathematical elegance for truth. His pedagogy was an act of intellectual honesty: a refusal to pretend to know what was not known, and a refusal to protect theories from failure by hiding behind technical sophistication.<\/p>\n

Applied to modern economics, Feynman\u2019s standards are devastating.<\/p>\n

Hence, t<\/span>he Richard Feynman question: <\/b>If understanding only exists when ideas can be clearly explained, tested against reality and shown to work, why does modern economics so often reward technical knowledge and mathematical technique in place of genuine understanding?<\/i><\/i><\/p>\n

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Knowing the technique versus understanding the phenomenon<\/b><\/p>\n

Feynman drew a sharp distinction between knowing how to manipulate symbols<\/span> and knowing what those symbols mean<\/span>. He repeatedly warned that technical competence can mask conceptual emptiness. One can solve equations, apply methods, and reproduce formal results without understanding the system those methods are supposed to describe.<\/p>\n

Modern economics often privileges exactly this kind of knowledge. Students are trained in optimisation, equilibrium analysis and econometric techniques, yet are rarely asked whether the underlying assumptions describe real human behaviour, real institutions, or real power relations. Mastery of method replaces comprehension of reality.<\/p>\n

Feynman would have recognised this instantly: technique mistaken for understanding<\/span>.<\/p>\n

Pedagogy as a test of truth<\/b><\/p>\n

Feynman believed teaching was not a performance but was diagnostic. The act of explanation exposes whether an idea is understood or merely memorised. That is why he insisted on teaching fundamentals: foundations, in his opinion, revealed weakness.<\/p>\n

In economics, pedagogy often conceals rather than reveals. Introductory courses present mathematical models as settled knowledge, while debates, failures and empirical contradictions are postponed or omitted altogether. Students are taught how to solve problems before they are taught whether the problems are meaningful or how they fit into economic history and philosophy.<\/p>\n

This is not neutral. It trains compliance with technique rather than engagement with truth.<\/p>\n

Mathematics as language, not authority<\/b><\/p>\n

Feynman loved mathematics, but he never treated it as an authority. For him, mathematics was a language for describing reality, not a substitute for it. When equations failed to capture the behaviour of the world, the equations were wrong, not reality.<\/p>\n

Economics frequently reverses this relationship. When markets behave unpredictably, when crises occur, when policies fail, models are rarely abandoned. Instead, they are adjusted, extended or reinterpreted so that the formal structure survives intact. Mathematical consistency is preserved even as explanatory power evaporates.<\/p>\n

Feynman had a name for this: self-deception protected by technique.<\/p>\n

The moral duty not to confuse precision with truth<\/b><\/p>\n

One of Feynman\u2019s most important pedagogical principles was ethical. He argued that the scientist\u2019s first responsibility is not to fool themselves. Precision, he warned, is dangerous when it creates unjustified confidence. Numbers with decimal points can give the illusion of knowledge where none exists.<\/p>\n

Modern economics often produces precisely this illusion. Highly technical models generate precise-looking outputs that disguise deep uncertainty, contested assumptions and political choices. These outputs then acquire authority in policymaking, not because they are true, but because they look scientific.<\/p>\n

For Feynman, this was not an innocent error. It was a moral failure.<\/p>\n

Jargon and technique as shields against accountability<\/b><\/p>\n

Feynman was suspicious of complexity that served no explanatory purpose. He understood how easily technical language becomes a shield, protecting ideas from challenge and their authors from responsibility.<\/p>\n

Much of modern economics is inaccessible not because the world is that complex, but because opacity has become a professional defence. Technical mastery becomes a gatekeeping mechanism. Those who question assumptions are dismissed as unsophisticated. Democratic debate is sidelined as a result of appeals to expertise.<\/p>\n

Feynman would have recognised this as epistemic authority replacing intellectual honesty.<\/p>\n

Education for thinkers, not technicians<\/b><\/p>\n

Feynman believed education should produce thinkers capable of questioning premises, testing ideas, and admitting ignorance. Technique was a tool, not a destination.<\/p>\n

Economics education, by contrast, often produces technicians who are skilled at operating within models whilst discouraging them from interrogating their foundations. The result is a discipline rich in method but poor in wisdom; powerful in influence but fragile in understanding.<\/p>\n

This is not accidental. A discipline that rewards technique over understanding reproduces itself without ever confronting its failures.<\/p>\n

What answering the Richard Feynman Question would require<\/b><\/p>\n

To apply Feynman\u2019s pedagogical ethic to economics would require rebalancing the discipline away from technique-as-credential and back toward understanding-as-purpose. That would mean:<\/p>\n