The implication of the Bank of England’s new position on money is that we need credit controls

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The  Bank of England's new Quarterly Report publication on money, to which I have already referred, has profound implications for economic policy.  Despite the fact that the Bank has admitted that much of conventional economic teaching on money is wrong, and  that most economist's understanding  of the way in which money is created is fundamentally flawed  there is no sign that the Bank has accepted the consequence of this for its own policy-making.  As it says in the report:

Although commercial banks create money through lending, they cannot do so freely without limit. Banks are limited in how much they can lend if they are to remain profitable in a competitive banking system. Prudential regulation also acts as a constraint on banks' activities in order to maintain the resilience of the financial system. And the households and companies who receive the money created by new lending may take actions that affect the stock of money – they could quickly ‘destroy' money by using it to repay their existing debt, for instance.

Monetary policy acts as the ultimate limit on money creation. The Bank of England aims to make sure the amount of money creation in the economy is consistent with low and stable inflation. In normal times, the Bank of  England implements monetary policy by setting the interest rate on central bank reserves. This then influences a range of interest rates in the economy, including those on bank loans.

In exceptional circumstances, when interest rates are at their effective lower bound, money creation and spending in the economy may still be too low to be consistent with the central bank's monetary policy objectives. One possible response is to undertake a series of asset purchases, or quantitative easing' (QE). QE is intended to boost the amount of money in the economy directly by purchasing assets, mainly from non-bank financial companies.

The flaw in this logic is, I hope almost immediately apparent, but I have highlighted the critical text just in case.

What is revealed is a fundamental paradox in the Bank's monetary policy. What it's role actually, and very obviously, is now revealed to be is as the regulator of available credit in the economy. It is the amount of credit that is available that permits, or prevents, economic activity.  This has to be the case: it is credit that  the Bank now admits creates money, and not deposits, and so it is credit that needs to be regulated, and not interest rates.  QE has made that clear. A lack of credit had to be corrected (and was somewhat inefficiently, as it turned out) by  the creation of QE: interest rates could not do the job.

What  is now equally,  and obviously, true is that on occasions when in the past there was too much credit in the economy, and the Bank has tried to curtail this with the use of interest rates,  that policy also failed.  A tangential instrument,  which is what  controlling the interest rate has always been,  whose impact was focused on the cost of money, and not on the availability of credit, was bound to fail when  excess credit creation was the problem.

The Bank does, therefore,  now need to react to its own realisation that credit  must be at the centre of  monetary policy  by putting credit controls at the heart of its agenda. Interest rates are a proxy for credit controls, but why use a proxy when the real thing is available?

There has,  of course, been limited recognition of this by the Bank: they have already indicated that they may intervene if mortgage lending creates too large a housing price bubble,  but the policy needs to go much further. Credit  creation needs to be targeted by the Bank now.  It is very obvious that our  banks are not willing to extend the  credit that small businesses need.  It is equally obvious that they  are willing to create far too much credit for property backed lending.  Both lead to inappropriate and inefficient allocations of resources within the economy, and the interest rate is quite unable to differentiate between the two.

In that case,  I suggest,  the time  has come for a much more interventionist policy on the creation of credit with particular targets for particular economic sectors  whilst interest-rate policy has to be used as a general backstop, and not the primary tool for intervention.

Having said which,  the Bank also needs to set out its reasoning on exchange controls because these too have a significant impact upon the capacity for credit creation, and  such measures cannot now be ignored as a policy instrument.

The Bank's  new recognition of how money is created is welcome:  when it acts upon that realisation we may see the benefits.


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