As the Economic Times of India notes:

Will renegotiating the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Switzerland help the country get a grip on the menace of black money? Unlikely!

The reality is that for all their public posturing, no political party is serious about getting to the root of the problem.

Reason? The close nexus between unaccounted money and politics in our electoral system.

Yet, as the Global Financial Integrity Report released in December 2008 shows, the numbers at stake are now too huge to be brushed under the carpet. The Report estimates that anywhere between $22-27 billion left the country every year illegally during the period 2002-06, giving us the dubious distinction of being the fifth largest source for illegal flows in the developing world.

In a country where close to a quarter of the population live below the poverty line this is simply unacceptable. But no government has shown the determination needed to address the problem.

Contrast this with the stern action taken by some OECD countries [and] the G20 [which] has demanded greater co-operation to tackle the shadow financial system. The problem is, the onus is on requesting nations to prove the information sought is ‚Äòforeseeably relevant’ to suspected crime or tax evasion. So tax authorities need hard evidence. In the Indian context this is just not forthcoming, partly because it has got politicised.

This issue must be depoliticised and political parties must come together in a bipartisan manner to bring back Indian wealth kept abroad.

This is an extraordinarily accurate assessment of the current impediments to progress. The political will to make progress is mot always present. When it exists the technical obstacles to progress for developing countries are at pre3sent far too high for any realistic recovery to occur.

The need is for automatic information exchange of income and gains of all sorts credited to individuals and to the entities  they either own, control or benefit from (companies, trusts, foundations, partnerships and more) in one country when the individual is resident in another.

This is not hard. The individual can be identified by their passport number. It is the universal money laundering identification document. The data to be exchange need not be complex:

  1. Name
  2. Person making payment (bank name. etc.,)
  3. Type of income paid (dividend, interest, royalty, etc.,)
  4. Account paid to
  5. Relationship between account paid to and the party for whom information exchanged (in own name, in name of an owned and identified entity, beneficiary of named trust, etc)
  6. Amount paid
  7. Currency paid in
  8. Date of payment
  9. Any tax deducted.

Of course this may not be enough on all occasions to ensure complete data to ensure tax is correctly paid is available in the country receiving the data.

And of course, on occasion data will be sent which does not refer to a taxable event in the recipient state.

So what? If no tax is due what is the problem?

The point is this: if data is exchanged in this way the data required to create the ‚Äòsmoking gun’ to ensure an effective enquiry can be raised under a double tax agreement or Tax Information Exchange Agreement would be available in the country of the recipients residence if it wanted to use it.

There is no way on earth the supply of this data would overburden the recipient states. It is electronic data. It is very unlikely that all the information to be supplied by the Cayman Islands to India in a year would need more than one CD to be remitted. In its most basic format it could be supplied on an Excel spreadsheet (suitably encrypted).

There is no way that this imposes a burden on the recipient state: if they chose not to use the data that is up to them.

But the evidence is unambiguous from research done in the USA: when data is automatically supplied to tax authorities tax compliance rates increase dramatically. Domestically this increases from around 50% to 80% or more in the USA. Internationally and from tax havens I suspect the compliance rate is much lower than 50% to start with, and would probably reach the same 80% or more if information was exchanged. The gain is obvious, even if no data that is exchanged is ever used.

And with this data the G20 commitment to Tax Information Exchange Agreements makes sense because the data to trigger their use would be available.  Otherwise it is not.

This is the way forward. This is what we need. It is clear some in India know that. It’s time we delivered on the promise. Nothing else will do.

 

Reuters report:

Italy plans to take action against firms that invest funds in tax havens and is considering drawing up its own blacklist of such countries, Economy Minister Giulio Tremonti said on Tuesday.

Excellent!

The realisation that tax havens can only cause harm is growing.

But there’s another message in this – which is that the longer that the likes of Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg and maybe Austria hold out against sensible reform in Europe the more likely it is they will be subject to sanctions.

Which is more good news.

May 012009
 

This comes from the TJN blog, but I reproduce it with permissions:

The OECD has now responded to Raymond Baker’s excellent comment article in the Financial Times, with a swaggering letter seeming to add little to the debate other than to question his impertinence (though not his data). As the OECD letter said:

"Influential non-governmental organisations such as Global Financial Integrity can help developing countries most by pressuring for delivery, rather than risking an unravelling of what has been achieved through calls to reopen debates."

In other words: ‘we (the OECD) call the shots here – support our agenda, don’t try and challenge us.’ But that is not the end to its haughty myopia. The letter, written by the OECD’s director of public affairs Anthony Gooch, continued, referring to the OECD’s appalling mechanism of information exchange by request:

"While they enjoy universal endorsement, the challenge now lies in their swift and effective implementation."

Universal endorsement? Really? Has the OECD heard of theEuropean Union Savings Tax Directive? Has the OECD heard of, ahem, what the OECD might consider to be a small irritant: an irritant called civil society? Has it looked at TJN’s draft briefing paper? TJN has just sent this letter out to a very large number of people at the G20 process on this – the OECD would do well to take note.

A little background research on whether or not there is "universal endorsement" of the OECD’s policies would be in order before firing off letters like this to the newspapers. At a well-attended meeting at the London School of Economics yesterday, delegates almost unanimously excoriated the OECD for being seemingly incapable of taking a responsible lead on this most crucial issue.

Sadly, some people still seem to agree with the OECD. One influential voice at the meeting yesterday (whose name or affiliation we can’t reveal under the Chatham House Rule) said that TJN’s preferred model of automatic information exchange could not work because developing nations cannot handle it.

Really? First, this argument suggests that if it is so difficult, there must be a huge volume of information to flow south, confirming TJN’s case. Second, it is extraordinarily patronising to these countries to tell them that they don’t have the capacity. As Richard Murphy has pointed out, automatic information exchange requires an Excel spreadsheet, and not much more. Third, it shows political cowardice.

Last year John Christensen flew to Zambia. This is how he described his arrival.

"On entry, the Zambian police took my passport, scanned it through USAID computers, and in seconds they could get my police records anywhere in the world. Ditto in Kenya, and every place in the South in the past three years."

So next time you cross a border and show your passport, remember that here you have a global, multilateral system for information exchange, ably implemented by developing countries, with technical support. There is a unique personal number involved (you will find it at the bottom of the picture page on your passport if you’ve got one of the newer ones), and information can be shared very quickly and efficiently. This system follows the 9/11 attacks in the United States, and demonstrates that where there is the political will and the technology, it is quite possible and workable to create PINs, and also to agree on protocols on what information shared, and how it is shared.

The OECD has failed to create, or even push for, a framework for PINs for taxpayers, failed to agree protocols, and now is arguing that nobody should challenge it on its approach of allowing almost no information on tax to flow across borders.

We have already heaped opprobrium on the OECD for its approach on its fatally flawed black/white/grey list, and now we are confronted with this folly. Mr Gooch and those who directed him to write this letter should be thoroughly ashamed.

I would add this: for an organisation supposedly committed to tackling tax abuse the OECD’s failure is staggering to note. The 1998 initiative failed – and it was partly the OECD’s fault. The current G20 initiative has been widely undermined by the OECD’s petty internal politics that means there is a refusal within the organisation to countenance the automatic information exchange the EU is pioneering simply because ‚Äòit was not made here’ – an attitude that suggests the OECD is not suited to the responsibility it has been given. That failure has been compounded by the absurd white list criteria of just 12 Tax Information Exchange Agreements – chosen to appease the Isle of Man.

If they’re serious about tax evasion they need radical reform. They’re acting right now like a monolith form a bygone age. It’s not an appealing sight.

 

Hansard reported a debate that took place last Thursday on the British Overseas Territories. The following is an edited selection from that debate:

Sir John Stanley (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con): [T]his is the first time for well in excess of 15 years that the Foreign Affairs Committee has carried out an inquiry into the overseas territories en bloc, although we have dealt with them in a considerable number of other reports. ‚Ķ The present report was, however, a major undertaking, and I am glad that hon. Members have an opportunity to debate it and the Government’s response.

For reasons that will become apparent, I shall focus much of what I want to say on the Turks and Caicos Islands. Before I do, however, I want to cover two other issues. I start with an important comment that the Chancellor of the Exchequer made in his statement following the G20 summit, when he said:

    “We will also take action to protect the world’s financial system‚Äîand, therefore, our public finances‚Äîby cracking down on tax havens, and we note that the OECD has today published a list of countries assessed by the global forum against the international standard for exchange of tax information.”

In his subsequent contribution, the Liberal Democrat Front-Bench Treasury spokesman, the hon. Member for Twickenham (Dr. Cable), asked a very precise and pertinent question of the Chancellor:

    “Can the Chancellor say how many of the countries listed today by the OECD as non-compliant are British dependent territories?”‚Äî[Official Report, 2 April 2009; Vol. 490, c. 1137-43.]

‚Ķ‚ĶThe answer to the question asked by the hon. Member for Twickenham as to how many overseas territories are on the OECD’s “name and shame” tax haven list is seven. ‚Ķ The fact is‚Äîthis is a matter of considerable concern‚Äîthat more than half of our British overseas territories are on the OECD’s “name and shame” list for tax havens. ‚Ķ [T]he ultimate responsibility for ensuring that all seven of the British overseas territories that I mentioned are removed from the OECD’s “name and shame” list still lies with the British Government. ‚Ķ‚Ķ

I want to discuss the Turks and Caicos Islands. I was grateful to the hon. Member for Hyndburn (Mr. Pope) for his generous personal comment at the outset of the debate. I was very glad that the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch) were in our trio of Committee members; they both made the most incisive and persistent contributions to unravelling what was going on in the Turks and Caicos, during our visit and subsequently.

All members of the Committee would agree that when we started our inquiry into the overseas territories we did not have any very clear idea—because we were waiting to see what evidence we would receive—which of them we would be able to visit. We were not going to be able to visit them all. They are spread, as the House knows, from the Pacific ocean through the Indian ocean to the Mediterranean, across the Atlantic and into the Caribbean: we would clearly have to pick carefully, given the time available to us, the territories that we would go to, even when we were splitting into three separate groups. It was apparent to us within a matter of weeks of issuing our press notice and calling for memorandums of evidence that a visit to the Turks and Caicos Islands would be among the highest priorities for the Committee in the course of the inquiry.

The memorandums that we received were unprecedented, in my experience on the Committee, with respect to their volume and, sinisterly, in the degree of fear that lay behind them, for those submitting them. Considerable numbers were sent anonymously because people were not prepared to divulge their names. A significant number came from people who were prepared to give their name, but who submitted the memorandum on the basis that it should be entirely private and confidential and would not be published, and that they would not be identified. Only a very few were put to the Committee on the basis that both the terms of the memorandum and the name of the sender could be published. Those appear in our report.

Mr. Pope: One of the things that I found most shocking on Turks and Caicos was that citizens of a British overseas territory were afraid to be seen in public with Members of this House, afraid to give evidence and afraid even to be seen at a reception talking to us. The only other places I have been to on overseas visits where people were in fear of talking to me as a Member of Parliament are places such as the People’s Republic of China. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that that was a shocking thing?

Sir John Stanley: . The written evidence clearly demonstrated that there was a climate of fear. When we arrived there, that was wholly confirmed. We had to arrange meetings with individuals who were prepared to see us only on condition that the place, date and time of the meeting remained absolutely a secret. Some were not prepared to see us at all, under any circumstances, because they feared that it would result in reprisals against them.

My experience was exactly the same as that described by the hon. Member for Hyndburn. The only other occasion on which I as a member of the Committee have had to meet people in such circumstances was on visits that the Committee made to the People’s Republic of China, when we had to take steps to meet political or religious dissidents in certain circumstances. That is the only other time when meetings had to be conducted in such a way, and it was truly shocking to us that such a situation was prevalent in a British overseas territory.

The Committee recommended that a commission of inquiry should be set up. The Foreign Office, to its credit, accepted the recommendation and announced the setting up of a commission of inquiry within days of our recommending it. The interim report of Sir Robin Auld has wholly vindicated our recommendation and the decision of the FCO to accept it. I shall give the House just a few sentences from Sir Robin Auld’s interim report. He stated that the Government of the territory

    “is at a near stand-still. The Cabinet is divided and unstable…The Territory’s finances are in dire straits and poorly controlled. There is a settled pattern of recourse to disposals of Crown land to fund recurrent public expenditure, for want of governmental revenue from other more fiscally conventional sources. I should have added that the financial position is so bad that the Government cannot pay many of its bills as they fall due. Governmental and other audit recommendations lie ignored and unattended. In short, there are wide-spread fears on the part of the people of the Territory that they are leaderless and that their heritage is at risk of continuing to drain away…I am also satisfied on the information before me under Part (a) of the Commission’s Terms of Reference of a high probability of systemic corruption and/or other serious dishonesty involving past and present elected Members of the House of Assembly and others in recent years.”

Andrew Mackinlay: Does not what the right hon. Gentleman has read out from the report of the independent inquiry appointed by the FCO say something about the stewardship of the Foreign Office over many years? Its man was there—I am not referring to any particular individual but to governor after governor. There is something wrong in London as well as in the territory on the stewardship issue.

Sir John Stanley: I am not totally surprised that such a situation could arise in an overseas territory, as they have some considerable vulnerabilities. In this overseas territory there is a very small electorate of some 12,000 people, which is about the size of a single county council ward in my constituency. That is the totality of the electorate. Combine that with the fact that we found, extraordinarily, that while people were Ministers they were able to make pots of money for themselves, for members of their family and for their political cronies, and frankly, a corruption and bad governance disaster is waiting to happen, and that is precisely the situation in the Turks and Caicos.

What surprised me more than that actually occurring on the Turks and Caicos Islands was that the Foreign Office seemed to be so oblivious for so long as to what was happening. I can only take the Foreign Office’s position at face value on the basis of the memorandum that it submitted to our Committee at the start of our inquiry. I give the House the opening sentence, which states what the memorandum was meant to be about:

    “This memorandum is provided in response to an invitation from the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs to provide information on the exercise by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of its responsibilities in relation to the Overseas Territories and the FCO’s achievements against Strategic Priority No 10, the security and good governance of the Overseas Territories.”

That is what the memorandum was all about. I reread it, and there is not one whiff of a reference to corruption, or to anxiety or even worry about what was happening on the Turks and Caicos Islands.

The Committee was in an extraordinary position: we received a lavender-scented memorandum from the Foreign Office at the same time as we were being bombarded with distinctly malodorous memorandums from the Turks and Caicos Islands across the Atlantic.

Only one of two conclusions can be drawn from such a situation. If one were cynical‚ÄîI am not‚Äîone could say that the Foreign Office was out to pull the wool over the Committee’s eyes, to mislead the Committee. I do not believe that that is the way in which present Ministers or their officials would wish to conduct themselves before the Foreign Affairs Committee. If one takes the view that the Foreign Office was not trying to pull the wool, I am afraid that only one other conclusion can be drawn: the Foreign Office was asleep on the job, or most certainly half asleep, and it simply had not woken up to what was happening on the Turks and Caicos Islands.  ‚Ķ..

Andrew Mackinlay (Thurrock) (Lab): I will not detain the House long, because my two colleagues have covered a lot of territory, in more ways than one, and very effectively, but I want to pick up one or two points. What disturbed me—I think you will share my view, Mr. Bercow—is the uncertainty of our assumption that the House is ultimately the Parliament for all the overseas territories. They may have delegated legislatures, but if the House decides to go to war, those territories go to war. They do not have an op-out. This is their Parliament, and the UK Government can rescind and vary their constitutions as and when they wish.

We cannot escape our responsibility, but when we embarked on the inquiry, we discovered that there was uncertainty about whether Westminster parliamentary privilege extended to the overseas territories. I have no doubt that it does, and I was deeply disappointed that there was doubt about that. That raises important constitutional issues, and when the House considers privilege in relation to other matters, there should be no doubt that, if the writ of this place has any meaning whatever, parliamentary privilege must extend to every overseas territory. I hope that that can be addressed with dispatch, not by the Government—it may suit them if parliamentary privilege is not recognised as extending to overseas territories—but by the House. ….

The issue underlines the wholly inadequate arrangements for oversight by the House of our legal and moral responsibilities for people in the overseas territories peppered around the world. It is a disgrace that, when we call ourselves a democracy, some people are denied access to this place. I regret that I could not persuade my colleagues to incorporate a robust recommendation in the report, but I invite them and the House to reflect on the matter. It is unacceptable that the overseas territories have no representation in or access to this place. As I said‚ÄîI am not being flip‚Äîif we go to war, they go to war, yet they are denied that access. That is almost unique for overseas territories. 

The right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir John Stanley) indicated that for years the House had assumed that the Governor of the British Virgin Islands—I am not referring to a specific individual—was competent, but that is now a serious issue. It has become clear that Governors have been incompetent, because there was no reporting back or flagging up of anxieties and there was poor governance. There was acquiescence through silence to a thoroughly unacceptable situation. We have no way of knowing whether those people are good, bad or indifferent. ……

I intervened rather testily on the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling, who was outlining things very well, but I just find it amazing that British Ministers have the audacity to get up at the Dispatch Box in the House of Commons and refer to the OECD list of jurisdictions that are deficient in terms of compliance on taxation, disclosure and so on when among them is at least one territory where the person in charge of all those things is appointed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—by the Foreign Secretary. Frankly, if there is a deficiency, the people to blame are the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Probably their officials in Whitehall have not told them the naked truth. I am telling them this afternoon: they are both the same and they are both to blame. I hope that some of the financial papers pick up on this and the Finance Ministers in the other countries will note that they cannot pretend that it is a remote problem that they are trying to get their hands on. This very afternoon, I am telling them that they are to blame. That should be addressed with some dispatch.

I think the debate remarkable:

1) It shows the corruption that is possible in a small state over-run by the finance industry;

2) It evidences the small return that industry pays to those places;

3) It evidences the fear of those who live in these places in opposing what is happening to the place they rightly think of as their home;

4) It loudly and clearly says this is a UK responsibility – and we can do what we like to resolve it;

5) It says exactly the same of the issue of OECD compliance;

6) It suggests these problems are at least in part of London’s making.

And note this is a cross-party committee of the House of Commons. Not a Tax Justice Network delegation.

I think the evidence is unambiguous. Turks & Caicos is the worst, maybe, but the rot has to be stopped throughout the overseas territories and in the Crown Dependencies as well.

There is a need for action, now. Anyone writing to Michael Foot might like to refer to this debate.

 

ePolitix.com reports on yesterdays debate at Westminster on the British Overseas Territories:

During a debate on the foreign affairs committee’s report on overseas territories, Andrew MacKinlay (Lab, Thurrock) accused the government of attempting to distance itself from its responsibilities.

“Ministers can’t pretend it’s a remote problem they are trying to get their hands on, they are to blame,” he said.

whilst, pleasingly a Tory joined in:

John Stanley (Con, Tonbridge and Malling), questioned why the chancellor had dodged the question when asked directly about the number by Liberal Democrat Treasury spokesman Vince Cable.

The Conservative member of the foreign affairs committee suggested that perhaps this was because the chancellor judged the answer might be an embarrassment to the Foreign Office.

“It is somewhere towards shocking that we have half the overseas territories on the name and shame list,” he added.

and the Lib Dems too:

Noting that the UK is directly responsible for financial regulation in many of the territories, Jo Swinson (Lib Dem, East Dunbartonshire) said there should be therefore “no barrier” to reform.

The Liberal Democrat foreign affairs spokesperson said help needed to be given to the territories to re-adjust their economies.

“We do need to recognise that the revenue they receive for financial services form a large part of their economy,” she said.

“Support will need to be given to develop other economic avenues that are less shady or internationally embarrassing.”

That is right: it will be necessary.

In response the governemnt said it had written to the Territories in question. True, it has. But it’s not clear what the Foot Commission is doing. The government has a lot of work to do.

 

‘How real are the figures on black money abroad?’ .

The day secret banking is outlawed is not far off. But India needs more. Richard Murphy, a chartered accountant in the UK who fights against tax havens, says that developing countries (read India) need a better model to break the secrecy than the OECD one — under which the country seeking information needs to give the name and account numbers of the suspected looter. India needs to fight for a better regime.

India must be a leader in this global crusade.

I’m delighted to play a tiny part.

I warmly welcome Indian commitment to lead a global crusade. If it materialises the impact would be very significant.

 

The Shanghai Daily has a good article (in English)m on tax havens today. It begins:

THE wealth management industry has reacted in measured terms after the bien pensant of the world economic community put its collective weight behind steps to deal a fatal blow to the world’s tax havens, those morally contentious financial hideaways that shield even the largest sums from the harsh and fastidious glare of the local taxman.

These conduits of financial chicanery which offer secrecy, feather-light regulation and potentially colossal tax advantages to the rich, both corporate and individual alike, have long been eyed with deep suspicion by certain members of the global economic community, and with the world financial sector still in a tail spin they have seized their moment.

And it continues with a good analysis of the problems that TIEAs pose. As it concludes:

In essence, the agreements only deal with cases where there is evidence of tax evasion, not tax avoidance. This is all very well and good, but it means that requesting authorities should at least show a prima facia case backed up with evidence, and it is not hard to imagine situations in which the necessary evidence is contained within the offshore accounts themselves.

The good news is that there is awareness in China of the limitations of this process. That may be a basis for taking further developments forward.

 

Dow Jones has reported:

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development said Friday Bermuda has signed new tax information exchange agreements with eight national tax jurisdictions.

The move comes as pressure mounts on tax havens to increase their transparency and clamp down on tax evasion at a time when the finances of many countries around the world are under strain due to the financial crisis.

Bermuda has signed agreements with Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, the Faroe Islands, which is a self-governing region of Denmark, and New Zealand, the OECD said in a release.

Now let’s consider the population of these states (in millions, deatil added for Faroes and Greenland as they’re so small):

Denmark 5.5
Sweden 9.1
Finland 5.3
Norway 4.7
Greenland 0.1 57,600
Iceland 0.3
Faroes 0 48,856
New Zealand 4.2
Total 29.2
World 6,790
Proportion 0.43%

Source: CIA Factbook

So, by signing agreements with governments representing 0.43% of the world’s population Bermuda gets 66% of the way to international acceptability on tax.

Which shows just how badly wrong the OECD got its tax haven listing.

Update:

By 4pm (2 hours after writing the above) Reusters had this out:

“By signing agreements with governments representing 0.43 percent of the world’s population, Bermuda gets 66 percent of the way to international acceptability on tax,” Richard Murphy, a chartered accountant and a campaigner against tax evasion, said on his Tax Research blog. “Which shows just how badly wrong the OECD got its tax haven listing.”

As they say – Greenland is a very popular place right now.

 

Whilst looking at the ICAEW budget submission I noted its G20 submission.

Guess what? Not a mention of tax havens. Or offshore. Not one.

But there was this:

If regulation of systemic risks is to be effective, it must relate to the whole system. With global capital markets, the tools for managing systemic risk also need to be global in nature. This does not necessitate the creation of a new international regulator, but does require better methods of monitoring and coordinating the regulation of systemic risk across borders.

My emphasis.

In other words, let’s ignore the problems and carry on as we were. It’s a recipe for disaster.

And further indication of the abuse that the professions wish to perpetuate.