Thee IMF has issued a new report on flat tax. Entitled ‘The “Flat Tax(es)”: Principles and Evidence‘ he report has been written by Mick Keen, Kevin Kim and Ricardo Varsano at the IMF.

I’m immensely pleased to see this report come out. There is probably no one better to lead write it than Mick Keen, a former professor at Essex University and a leading thinker in this area. The report says:

Discussion of these quite radical reforms has been marked, however, more by assertion and rhetoric than by analysis and evidence.

It continues:

Several lessons emerge:

- there is no sign of Laffer-type behavioral responses generating revenue increases from the tax cut elements of these reforms;

- their impact on compliance is theoretically ambiguous, but there is evidence for Russia that compliance did improve [although] there is no firm evidence that it was due to parametric tax reform rather than to changes in enforcement occurring around the same time;

- the distributional effects of the flat taxes are not unambiguously regressive, and in some cases they may have increased progressivity, including through the impact on compliance;

- adoption of the flat tax has not resolved common challenges in taxing capital income;

- and it may have strengthened, not weakened, the automatic stabilizers.

It’s also important to note that the report found no clear evidence that flat taxes simplified tax systems, which supports my own findings earlier this year. And it concludes:

Looking forward, the question is not so much whether more countries will adopt a flat tax as whether those that have will move away from it.

I think this correct.

I’m also pleased to note a particular comment. On page 16 the authors note that for some people:

If government can somehow be restricted to using only a single marginal tax rate, then this will limit the amount of revenue it can raise; and hence the amount of damage that government can do. While this argument is rarely made explicit, opponents perceive this point keenly: Murphy (2006), for instance, argues on these grounds that the flat tax “‚Ķis in effect an attack on the whole structure of the society we live in.”

Yes, that Murphy is me. I am pretty confident that the authors share my view.

 

There was a fascinating story in the Kyiv Post yesterday (and yes, it always surprise me quite what it’s possible to find on the Internet). The Ukraine is, of course, one of the so-called ‘flat tax’ states. It’s had a 13% flat tax since 2004. But all is not well.

First of all, the rate is going up to 15% in 2007. Second, and more importantly, as the paper says:

As a result of Ukraine’s still complicated and cumbersome tax system – often cited as a major reason why foreign investors avoid the country – specialists say that employers continue to declare lower official salaries to the authorities for tax purposes while paying their employees higher salaries under the table.

Which somewhat shatters two myths. The first is that flat taxes simplify things, and the second is that they end tax avoidance. Far from it, it seems. The explanation is obvious:

According to Ukraine’s tax legislation, employers currently pay 36 percent of their employees’ salaries to a social fund used for pensions, workers compensation, etc. In addition, employers contribute to a social insurance fund, the rate of which varies from 0.67 percent to 2.5 percent.

As a result, employers currently pay up to 51 percent of their employees’ salaries [in direct taxes], and starting in January, that rate will be as high as 53 percent, according to Ksenya Lyapina, the head of the Council of Entrepreneurs under the Cabinet of Ministers.

“Therefore, they [employers] prefer to pay low salaries officially, and market-based salaries in envelopes,” she said, adding that the 2 percent tax increase is unlikely to affect what people are paid in the workplace.

“It’s well known that people really have incomes double those that are declared,” she said.

So, no flat tax miracle there then. Which is exactly as I predicted in my report on flat taxes for the ACCA.

 

The World Economic Forum has reported that Switzerland, Sweden and Finland are the most competitive economies in the world. According to a report on Tax News.Com:


The Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007, released Tuesday, said that Switzerland and the Nordic countries topped this year’s global ranking due to their sound institutions, competent macroeconomic management, world-class education systems, and focus on technology and innovation.

These factors, according to Augusto Lopez-Claros, Chief Economist and Director of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Network, combine to form a “successful strategy for boosting competitiveness in an increasingly complex global economy”.

“Business activity in these countries benefits from a well-developed institutional framework, characterized by the rule of law, an efficient judicial system and high levels of transparency and accountability within public institutions. Excellent infrastructure is an additional positive feature of the business environment,” Lopez-Claros said.

Hmmm. You’ll note that all those things require strong government, high taxes and a willingness to use public revenues for the well being of society as a whole.

Forbes has noticed this too. It places Sweden 4th and Finland 14th in its tax misery index, and Switzerland is by no means a low tax state for those who live there. Now it has to be said that the Forbes tax misery index is just about the most spurious statistical survey ever produced, but yet again the myth that high tax means low competitiveness and low levels of enterprise is shattered. As if evidence were needed, Ireland – the supposed ‘Celtic Tiger’ – came in at 21st on the WEF index whilst the East European flat tax states did even worse.

Enough said, I think.


Sep 122006
 

Someone asked me to write a brief piece on why flat taxes would not work, so I did. And I thought I’d share it. This is what I wrote:

The flat tax debate in the UK is a non-starter for five reasons. Firstly, flat tax is not simple. Apart from simplifying the calculation of the actual tax due no other complication in the UK tax system would be removed by the introduction of flat tax, whatever people say. For example, accounts would still have to be prepared.

Secondly, flat tax does not ease the admin burden of tax. 84% of people in Estonia have to submit tax returns. Only 16% do in the UK.

Thirdly, flat taxes would only help the poor by a tiny amount (maybe £200 a year). But given that national insurance rates of 30% are common in flat tax countries even that may be an illusion. In fact, in reality only the rich would benefit from a flat tax in the UK. Middle England would suffer badly and that would be electoral suicide.

Fourthly, because of inevitable increased national insurance rates there would be no additional incentives to employ people or to work. In which case there is no chance of the economic boom flat taxers promise. And logically why should that happen when at least 90% of people would be worse off and so have less to spend under a flat tax?

Finally, there’s no way a government could balance its books if a flat tax were to be introduced at any reasonable rate. But that exposes what this is all about. It’s not about tax at all. It’s simply about seeking to undermine the role of the state. And as the people of Britain show at election after election, they want state education, health, transport and all the other things which flat tax would deny them.

Which is why flat tax is a non-starter.

 

I’ve been in discussion with several people about my post on the Joseph Rowntree’s flat tax report, and have been challenged to say what I would have done if them. That is relatively easy to do.

Their work recognises something I, and all serious researchers in this area know – which is that the highest marginal rates of tax in the UK fall on the poorest in our society. What is more, they pay very high overall levels of tax. This is because of the unjust combination of direct, indirect and council taxes and the withdrawal of tax credits and other benefits as income increases. This problem needs to be tackled. But their report does not, I think, suggest the right way to go about it.

First of all, combining the tax and national insurance systems looks attractive, but in that case serious attention has to be given to the additional tax burden this would create for the elderly who are not liable to pay national insurance. Unless this is tackled any combination is politically and socially unacceptable.

Secondly, if tax credits are, in effect, to be included in the tax system then it has to be ensured that this is done in such a way that those they are meant to benefit win from that change. That is unlikely to be the case if the ‘tax wedge’ for those who are poorly paid and at the margins of employment is as high as 37%. This ‘tax wedge’ is quite acceptable in the UK for those on high pay; indeed, it is lower than the liability currently due for most higher paid employees, and as surveys have shown, such rates are no disincentive to work or tax compliance. The answer in that case is obvious. Any simplification, if it is desirable has to be on the basis of progressive rates of tax.

And let me be quite clear, progressive rates of tax are not a complication in the tax system. Calculating tax due is simple arithmetic. Calculating taxable income is the hard bit. The Joseph Rowntree Foundation are seeking to tackle the hard bit; their error is in thinking that somehow fixed marginal rates of tax are a part of this process. They are not.

More work is needed to develop their thinking, which might be well worth doing. But that thinking would need to look at the impact of using variable rates of tax to ensure that the benefits of change went to those who really need them, who are the poor, or as the related IFS report shows (and which fact was ignored by all those who have reported the issue), the rich will be the only sure winners. That cannot be allowed.

 

The Joseph Rowntree Foundation have brought out a report on flat tax. The right wing of British politics are rubbing their hands with glee. And I’m not surprised. Despite some input from the Institute of Fiscal Studies this is a pretty poor piece of work.

Just three references are cited other than the IFS data on which the conclusions are based, and one of those is from a postgraduate student who claimed he was an Oxford academic whilst doing a period of study there, in the meantime producing an undergraduate quality (i.e. naive and simplistic) paper for the Adam Smith Institute. Anyone who buys that as authoritative is, I am afraid to say, ill informed on this subject.

But worse than that, this paper is also naive. Why? because the paper recognises that no one could introduce a flat tax at 37% in the UK, but does none the less seriously discuss its impact and suggests it would be good for the poor.

Well, on the criteria it uses so it might be. But, I stress the point about the criteria used. These can only really be found by looking at the associated Institute for Fiscal Studies report, which has received almost no attention. This tested four options, which I paraphrase as follows, all of which are meant to be revenue neutral:

1. Flat-rate income tax of 24%. The tax-free personal allowance is kept at its current level of £5,035 per year.

2. Flat-rate income tax and NICs including increasing the rate that applies above the current upper earnings limit (UEL) from 1% to the full rate on all income. The extra revenue generated by abolishing the UEL allows the flat income tax rate to fall to 22%, coincidentally the same as the current basic rate. In this option, income tax and NICs in combination produce a flat marginal rate of 33%.

3. Flat-rate income tax with universal tax credits. This option takes seriously the idea that tax credits are part of the income tax system, and flattens their combined rate structure. Instead of the current system, we flatten tax credits into a single tax/withdrawal rate. Thus each family is allocated a tax credit that is equal to their maximum eligibility under the current system. The personal allowance is raised slightly from the current level of £5,035 to £5,220, the point at which tax credits currently start to be withdrawn, to avoid creating losers among the working poor, and we estimate the flat tax rate at 37%.

4. Flat-rate income tax and NICs with universal tax credits. This combines options 2 and 3: the tax credit means test is integrated into the income tax rate, and the NICs rate schedule is also flattened, allowing the flat tax rate to fall to 35%.Thus there is a flat combined marginal rate of income tax, tax credits and NICs of 46% for contracted-in employees, whereas under option 3 the rate is 48% below the UEL and 38% above it.

The claimed benefits for the poor only happen in options 3 and 4. Before that they find exactly as I did on my survey of flat taxes for the ACCA. Under options 1 and 2 everyone bar the top 10% of income earners lose from a flat tax. The rich benefit enormously. And let’s be clear, no one is taking flat taxes of 37%, let alone 46% seriously. Especially on income of just over £5,000 per annum, as proposed here.

So this study proves that flat taxes always benefit the rich and that the tax system cannot be used in this way to benefit the poor. But the Joseph Rowntree Foundation have allowed their name to be used to promote flat taxes, when their survey shows they will do harm if they were to be introduced at any rate that is politically feasible.

As I said, I’m afraid I think that naive on their part. I hope they work hard to rectify the damage they have done.

 

Many accountants are attracted to the idea of a flat tax. The most common form of that tax, and the one most often referred to in the press is that created by Alvin Rabuska and Robert Hall. However, to understand flat tax it is necessary to explain four myths that lead to one truth – which is that it is anything but simple because it is nothing like what it claims to be.

The first myth is that Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka created a viable tax system when they published their books on flat tax. They did not. It is not even clear that they sought to achieve that aim. What they did do was propose a flat tax that would replace all income taxes, corporation taxes, capital gains taxes and inheritance taxes. That flat tax would be charged on just two things. The first was income from employment in the country where the tax was to be charged. No deductions bar a personal allowance would be allowed against that taxable income from domestic employment. The second chargeable source of income would be the cash flow surplus of businesses arising within the country in which the tax was to be charged but with no relief being provided for interest paid; this supposedly (but not actually) resulting in a tax charge at source on interest received by individuals.

The result is an extraordinarily narrow tax base, especially when a low rate of tax is to be used. Hall & Rabushka proposed 19%. It is narrower still when it is appreciated that no tax of any sort would be applied to investment income, private pensions and all income from overseas, all of which would be exempt from tax.

The last point is the most significant. This is because tax planners seek to do two things. The first is to take an income stream out of tax. The second is to offset as many expenses against income as possible if the first option proves impossible to achieve. Hall and Rabushka might claim that their tax abolishes tax reliefs, which when combined with low taxes would, they claim, bring an end to almost tax planning, but that is obviously untrue. Their logic is only applicable to the second type of tax planning. Their flat tax does in fact openly encourage the first type of planning, which all accountants prefer. It does this by allowing any employee who wished to set themselves up as an offshore company to supply their services to immediately create a totally tax free environment for themselves. In addition, companies who could shift their income recognition outside the country where the flat tax might be applied could do the same. With numerous tax havens now offering zero percent tax rates it is clear that the Hall & Rabushka tax scheme was either designed by people who knew little about tax or how tax planning works and the consequent need for anti-avoidance measures to prevent abuse of tax systems, or their intent was to facilitate these practices and to encourage the resulting loss of income to governments. I assume Hall & Rabushka understand tax. The second objective is consistent with Rabushka’s stated aims, and therefore seems likely.

This fact has been appreciated by those countries that have adopted what have been called ‚Äòflat taxes’, which leads us to the second myth. This myth is that these countries do in fact have flat taxes. The simple fact is that not one of those countries has a tax system that comes close to the Hall & Rabushka model of a flat tax. In a recent survey of flat taxes in Eastern Europe I found that none of those countries taxed business on a cash flow basis, and none offered 100% allowances for capital expenditure in the year in which investment took place. In addition, all charged the worldwide income of companies registered in their territory to tax, as they did their resident citizens. Several, including Russiadid not even have a single income tax rate. Only two (Slovakia and Romania) had the same income and corporation tax rates, although Rabushka thinks this essential to a proper flat tax system, whilst all also had extensive systems of allowances and reliefs for individuals and rules on tax accounting that made many currently in use in the UK loom positively simple in comparison. Some, such as Estonia had extensive controlled foreign company rules for individuals and all had complex rules for taxing benefits in kind, an issue all flat tax proponents have failed to address appropriately. Because of the complexity of their tax system 84% of Estonians submit tax returns. Just 16% do in the UK.

Put simply, the evidence that these countries have flat taxes does not exist. At best it might be said that some of them have single rate income tax systems, but that is far removed from being the flat tax system Hall & Rabushka propose. None the less, Rabushka and his supporters, such as former USpresidential candidate Steve Forbes, claim that these states have seen massive benefits accrue from the adoption of their single rate income tax systems. This is the third myth of flat taxes, because this claim is not supported by the available evidence.

It is true that some countries have increased their tax revenues since introducing flat taxes. However, as the most authoritative study on this whole subject by Ivanova, Keen and Klemm has shown, in the case of Russia this increase in revenue was almost certainly attributable to economic growth, better tax collection and enhanced tax compliance by those least affected by the introduction of the 13% income tax rate in that country. It did not result from enhanced output by those who obtained the benefit of the tax cuts, contrary to the claimed supply side growth stimulus that those who support flat taxes suggest results from its introduction. Other countries, such as Slovakia and Romania have also seen revenue increases, but in indirect taxes such as VAT and not from the direct taxes which the reforms affected, again suggesting enhanced tax collection regimes gave rise to the increased revenues. Any reasonable review makes such a conclusion seem likely. Indeed, the CIA Factbook said of Georgiabefore it introduced a flat tax that it “suffered from a chronic failure to collect tax revenues, however, the new government is making progress in reforming the tax code, enforcing taxes, and cracking down on corruption.” This was commonplace in most of the so-called flat tax states, and since (thankfully) tax evasion on this scale is not commonplace in Western Europe it is highly unlikely that the trend can be reproduced in those countries.

This brings us to the final myth, which is that most tax payers will benefit from a flat tax, but the rich will hardly do so at all. This is not true. I have shown that data used by Richard Teather to support this claim in the UK in his work for the Adam Smith Institute was inappropriate for the purpose for which it was used and as such all conclusions drawn from it were misleading. In fact, in the UK a flat tax would always make middle income earners in the range from £25,000 to about £70,000 of earnings per annum worse off. Those earning lower sums might benefit by a small amount. Those earning above that range would benefit substantially; those in the top decile of income earners being likely to benefit by more than £8,000 per annum. The same pattern has been found in surveys in the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark. It is also a feature of flat taxes in Eastern Europe where those who have to work to earn a living suffer the effects of national insurance rates much higher than those found in Western Europe, including a top rate of 48.6% in Slovakia. Put simply, flat taxes shift income from middle income earners to the best off in society.

In summary, the evidence is clear. Hall and Rabushka’s flat tax is not credible as a tax system, and no one has used it. Those who claim to have flat taxes have not in practice got anything like the system described by that name, and the economic benefits they have claimed from the use of the systems they have introduced are overstated with the cause being wrongly attributed. And a flat tax system in the UK would be wholly unworkable because most middle income earners would be substantially worse off.

Having shattered the myths about flat tax, what is the truth? That is simpler to explain and is that the flat tax system is not intended to be a credible tax system. It has two purposes. The first is to undermine the role of government in society by denying it the revenue it needs to undertake those tasks we are accustomed to it fulfilling. As Alvin Rabushka told me when interviewed for my research:

“We should get rid of welfare programmes, we need to have purely private pensions and get rid of state sponsored pensions. We need private schools and private hospitals and private roads and private mail delivery and private transportation and private everything else. You know government shouldn’t be doing any of that stuff.”

The second task that flat taxes are designed to do is shift the tax burden from capital to labour. This it would do, very effectively. By providing ample opportunities for avoidance almost all corporate income and that of many higher paid employees who could shift their earnings overseas will join all investment income, capital gains and gifts in the tax free category of income. This leaves the intention of this tax clear as an unambiguous attempt to shift the burden of tax onto lower paid labour whilst denying that group in society the benefits it has customarily enjoyed from centre-ground governments.

 

There’s some fascinating comments on the performance of HM Revenue & Customs over at Accountingweb.

Take this one:

HMRC’s attitude and approach has been planned and approved at the highest level, it will continue until the Accounting/Tax bodies get off their backside and organise a response which will force HMRC to collapse or get its act together. This could be done in two months.

The author of that claims to have typical small practitioner attitudes. And you never knew accountants wanted to force the mechanisms of the State into collapse, did you?

Or take this:

If this country is to survive we need to take an axe and not a bacon slicer to the whole of government – starting with the complexity of law / compliance / nanny state generated by those at the very, very top! and then those self-perpetuating / generating bureaucrats where they add little value.

I’m sure it is heartfelt – but it really makes very little sense.

Both opinions however do appear to be in accord with the views of Alvin Rabushka, the inventor of flat tax. When I interviewed him earlier this year he said:

I think we should be facing the issue of the optimal size of government. Government is too big. I think we should debate the minimum size of government, not the optimal size of government.

I think we should go back to first principles and causes and ask what government should be doing and the answer is “not a whole lot”. It certainly does way too much and we could certainly get rid of a lot of it. We shouldn’t give people free money. You know, we should get rid of welfare programmes, we need to have purely private pensions and get rid of state sponsored pensions. We need private schools and private hospitals and private roads and private mail delivery and private transportation and private everything else. You know government shouldn’t be doing any of that stuff. And if it didn’t do any of that stuff it wouldn’t need all of that tax money so that’s the fundamental position and as long as you’re going to have government do all that stuff you’re going to have all those high taxes.

Well I find this sort of thing fascinating, and I’d really like to know some answers from those who think this way (as those on Accountingweb who write this stuff say most small practitioners do). Answers to questions like these:

  1. Who does own and build roads?
  2. How are the tolls collected?
  3. How is health paid for?
  4. What does happen to those who cannot afford insurance?
  5. What do the sick, the elderly, the dying, those who are redundant through no fault of their own and have not the resources to move, and so on who make up the vast majority of those whom the state supports supposed to do to raise an income? Where is the demand in the market economy for their labour if it does not exist now?
  6. How will education be paid for? What will we do for those who receive little or none as a result of inability to pay?
  7. Where is the capacity in the economy to absorb the savings required to pay all those private pensions? As it is precious little productive use is made of pension money, most of which is used for gambling on the value of second hand pieces of paper called shares;
  8. What will happen to all those companies that are now entirely dependent for their well being on state contracts, such as drug companies, many building contractors, no small part of the service industry, all the health suppliers, and so on when their market collapses in the turmoil that would follow the withdrawal of state support for these activities?
  9. How would we collect refuse?
  10. Who would ensure that property rights are enforced?

I could go on ad infinitum. I won’t, but I bet no coherent answers will arrive either. There aren’t any; that’s why. The modern state is complex. Much of what it does is to provide services in a more efficient way then the market ever could. It has to do that for one simple reason. Markets are only efficient when they can create excess capacity so that competition can take place. But you can’t create excess capacity in roads, pensions, health care, welfare systems, the law, education of in a thousand of the other services supplied by the state. To do so would be prohibitively expensive, as rail privatisation has so convincingly proved. In which case to slash the state is to create inefficiency or ensure demand is not met – either of which are much less optimal than what we have now.

The state is not a perfect supplier. But then nor is the market. But for much of what it does it is the best supplier we could have. In which case it’s time to stop this absurd rhetoric that only the private sector creates wealth,. to which even Labour subscribes. The state sector creates 40% of GDP in this country. It created most of what I value most – my education, the rule of law, a democracy that has protected my freedom, a health care system that ensured the safe delivery of both my sons into this world and ensured the survival of one when his life was in danger, and more. Nothing I have ever bought matches these in value.

And I doubt I could ever have afforded them without the state being available to supply them – even from the privileged position I know I have as an accountant able to command an above average income in our economy.

So I suggest small practitioners think hard, stop opening themselves to ridicule, and instead engage in meaningful debate if they really want someone to listen to them. I wonder if they will?

 

The Taxpayer’s Alliance and others have called for the Treasury to develop a dynamic model of taxation at the weekend. But as is so often the case when the self interested talk about tax there are a number of serious flaws in their logic.

Firstly, they are a little na?Øve to assume that the Treasury do not take the consequences of their decisions on the tax code into account when undertaking their economic forecasting. To the best of my knowledge they do, and in a dynamic fashion. What they might not do, however, is assume that any cuts in tax rates automatically lead to growth, which is the assumption that the Taxpayer’s Alliance are asking be built into the Treasury’s work. The absence of any sophisticated analysis suggesting that this assumption is true might explain the reluctance of the Treasury to adopt it and the very limited resources the US is willing to dedicate to investigating it.

Secondly, it is disingenuous to ask for a model dedicated to modelling dynamic impacts of taxation decision making that would only be asked to consider the possibility that tax cuts do lead to growth. Such a narrow focus is clearly inappropriate. The consequences of changes in the tax code are much wider than any implication they have for growth. Dynamic modelling should also consider questions relating to:

1. the distribution of the tax burden within our society;
2. the impact on different types of business and the long term implications of that with regard to attracting sustainable inward investment to the UK rather than transient profit flows;
3. foreign relations if the intent of any change is to undermine the income stream of other nation states as Ireland has done,
4. whether taxation will, if inappropriately used as an incentive result in the misallocation of resources by some sectors in society resulting in an overall reduction in welfare in the UK and internationally.

I would welcome dynamic modelling that addresses these issues, but that of the type requested by the Taxpayer’s Alliance appears to be a policy prescription blinkered by a failure to consider the wider implications of taxation policy, and that can be of no benefit to the Treasury, the UK or the world at large. As such, it is not a serious policy suggestion but is instead, rather like the same organisations proposals for a flat tax, a simple bit of wishful thinking.