I’m speaking at:

Portcullis House is, of course, part of the Houses of Parliament.

The speakers are:

Katy Clark MP

Owen Jones, author of Chavs

Anna Bird, Fawcett Society

Richard Murphy, author of The Courageous State

Prof George Irvin, economist

Ellie Mae O’Hagan, writer and UK Uncut activist

Chaired by Cat Smith, Next Generation Labour

*Space is limited so please RSVP to info@nextgenerationlabour.org if you wish to attend.

* You can help publicise by inviting your friends to the facebook event.

 

Larry Elliott is writing about gilts this morning as he (like me) is sure there will be more quantitative easing announced this week.

Let me say straight away, that like Larry, I question the need for this: we should be stimulating the economy instead, but having made that point I also then disagree with Larry.

As he notes:

The fact that the Bank is even considering a further easing of policy is testimony to the profound weakness of the UK economy. For the past three years, bank rate has been 0.5% – comfortably the lowest level on record – and despite the pain being felt by savers there is no sign of it going up any time soon. The Bank has bought up some 20% of the gilts market already in an attempt to boost the money supply. Meanwhile, the Treasury has borrowed £500bn since the economy went into recession in early 2008.

In other words, net borrowing is not £500bn, it’s £500bn less QE which may well be £350bn by the end of this week, as I have argued. So we have not got the debt crisis the government argues we have. We do have a deficit: we don’t have a debt crisis.

And that’s why Larry is wrong to say:

at some stage the Bank will need to unwind the monetary easing of the past three and a half years, selling gilts back into the financial markets. This is going to be tricky to achieve without leading to a collapse in the price of government bonds, and the more bonds the Bank has to sell the trickier it is going to be. This matters because the price of gilts goes in inverse proportion to the yield or interest rate payable on them. When the price of gilts goes down, long-term interest rates go up, so the challenge for the Bank is to unwind QE without triggering a run on gilts that would push the economy back into recession.

We’ll never sell those gilts back. The IFS says we have £280bn of new gilts to sell over the next three years to fund the deficit. There is not a hope we’ll add £350 billion of resale of gilts on top of that. The only likelihood is in fact of more QE: over that period there is no way the market can absorb £280 billion of new debt.

That means that the reality is that QE will lead to cancelled debt. Every single penny of the gilts repurchased will, I am sure, be cancelled. Nothing else is possible. It’s just a matter of time before the lightbulb gets universally switched on to that fact that the debt repurchased under QE is no longer debt at all. There’s just new cash, and given that the economy needs that cash we’re not going to cancel it now, or in five years time. So let’s get real about it.

And let’s also remember there’s nothing odd about cancelling gilts: it happens all the time. They’re time limited loans. All we’d be doing by cancelling them is declaring time early.  Let’s not overstate the fact that this is completely possible, and more than that, it’s desirable, and bar being early, totally normal. Then we can have a real economic debate.

 

I often think Nigel Lawson lives on a different planet to the rest of us. He wrote this in the FT this morning:

Capitalism works – and works far better than any other system – because the discipline of the marketplace keeps greed, folly and incompetence in check. When this is lacking, when businesses are considered too big, too important, or too interconnected to fail, this crucial discipline disappears, and disaster is almost inevitable.

Maybe he hasn’t noticed that what happens on the theoretical black board of capitalism, which is what he describes, is not the same as the capitalism we inevitably get in practice, which is a very different beast altogether. But to argue for the blackboard version of capitalism as if it would solve the problem it inevitably creates is indicative of one of two things and they’re either wanton inability to understand the real world or wanton deception to support the abuse that happens in the real world of capitalism. It’s one or the other and since I’ll assume Lawson is honourable it’s inability I have to go for.

Either way, lawson is a long way past his usefulness, if he ever had any.

 

 

The TUC has published a new report this morning called Bonus Season. The summary says:

Ending corporation tax relief for pay and bonuses worth more than 10 times average annual earnings (£26,200) could raise around £1.7bn a year if applied to the banking and financial services sector, according to a new TUC report published today (Monday).

The TUC report Bonus Season uses data from the Labour Force Survey to show that over a third (36 per cent) of employees earning more than £250,000 a year in the UK work in banking and finance.

The report then uses HMRC data to estimate that around 81,000 people have incomes of over £262,000 (10 times average annual earnings) that come primarily from employment, including 29,000 people in banking and finance.

The report finds that total pay on earnings above £262,000 in the finance sector – which the TUC believes should be disallowed as a deductible expense for corporation tax purposes – is around £6.8bn a year.

Ending corporation tax relief on earnings over £262,000 in the banking and finance sector would raise £1.7bn a year – vital revenues towards paying back the deficit created by the financial crash, says the TUC.

The report also estimates that extending the scrapping of corporation tax relief for top pay and bonuses over 10 times average earnings to all UK companies would raise around £5bn a year.

With the government effectively cancelling out its own levy on bank balance sheets by cutting the rate of corporation tax from 28 per cent to 23 per cent by 2014, the banking and finance sector is no longer making a proper contribution towards paying off the deficit it played a key role in creating, says the TUC.

A previous TUC report The Corporate Tax Gap showed that banks already pay well below the headline rate of corporation tax and that that the scale of bank losses at the height of the crash has allowed them to knock £19bn off their future tax bills, despite an £850bn bailout from taxpayers and the Bank of England.

The fact that banks are back recording big profits and handing out billions of pounds in bonuses proves they can easily afford a new tax on big bonuses, says the TUC.

The TUC believes that making earnings more than 10 times average annual earnings liable for corporation tax would not only raise revenue but also tackle growing pay inequality by encouraging companies to spread pay across the workforce, rather concentrating it on those at the very top.

As well as calling for top pay to be liable for corporation tax, the TUC believes the following changes would help tackle the growing pay divide between top executives and the rest of the workforce:

  • Bring a much-needed dose of economic reality to executive pay decisions by introducing worker representation on to remuneration committees.
  • Make executive pay more transparent by publishing the ratio between top pay and both median company workforce pay and the lowest paid members of staff.
  • Tackle the closed shop of non-executive directorships (NEDs) by forcing companies to advertise positions externally.
  • Make rates of pay increase for directors reflect those of other employees, with an explanation given in the remuneration report should this not be the case.
I think such a policy would be a valuable constraint on high pay. But I should add that I advise the TUC on such issues so my agreement is unsurprising.
The message though is a simple one: if all politicians agree high pay is a problem we should simply stop subsidising it. What’s the problem with that?

 

I posted part 1 of this yesterday.

Here’s part 2:

Thanks to The Renegade Economist.

 

This is a video just released of me talking a couple of weeks ago with Ross Ashcroft of the Renegade Economist about the state of the UK economy and how to rescue the failed discipline of economics.

 

I’m pleased to note that at least one major economist realises that public debt owned by the central bank of the government that issued that debt isn’t debt at all.

The economist is Paul Krugman. The economy he wrote about is Japan. Japan has public debt of about 220% of GDP – way, way beyond anyone else’s debt. Except as Krugman noted in 2010:

Oh, and about that debt; it’s not good — but net debt is about 100 percent of GDP, not 200, because the BOJ holds so much of it.

Precisely. When you own your own debt it’s no longer debt at all.

Now that needs to become part of the mainstream narrative.

 

Over the last week I’ve been arguing that the government gilt purchases made under the quantitative easing programme effectively cancel that debt. Being realistic, as the IFS predict, we’re running big enough potential deficits over the next few years to mean there will in practice be no capacity to resell this debt. The reality is that as money supply is falling but for quantitative easing we could not also resell the debt. So for all practical purposes it’s cancelled. That means in net terms over the last seven years from 2005 to 2011 inclusive we’ve borrowed a little under £35 billion a year in net terms, and that is less than we did in each of the years 2005, 2006 and 2007.

Do long as the banks do not lend this situation will persist. Bank lending has been the way we’ve made the money that the country needs to keep the economy going. As long as banks don’t lend, and that looks likely to be for some time to come since without an increase in one of consumer demand, business investment or net exports their lending is bound to fall, then it will fall to government to both fill the gap in the economy that they create by their inaction and at the same time create the money that’s needed to keep the economy going. So, I can pretty confidently predict that if, as the IFS suggest, the government deficit will be £120 billion next year, £99 billion the year after that and £79 billion in 2014-15 then you can be pretty sure that quantitative easing in those years will be £85 billion, £65 billion and £45 billion respectively leaving net borrowing at around £35 billion a year. Total government debt despite the deficit will, therefore, be no more than about £750 billion or so in 2015 which will be, give or take, about 50% of GDP, a figure that will be vastly lower than elsewhere in the Eurozone in particular. And we won’t have inflation as a result because, as a consequence of the actions of this government which have pushed almost 3 million people now o9nto unemployment, with that figure bound to rise over these years, wage inflation pressure will be virtually non-existent whilst the collapse of demand in the Eurozone will tkae the pressure off other prices too.

It’s pointless arguing about the opportunities that this provides to this government: it is clear  that this government only has the main of destroying the state sector and public well being. It will do this for doctrinaire reasons whatever the economics of the issue. So the question is what opprtunity does this provide to Labour?

First, it has to tell this story. Politics is about telling credible stories about how the world works. This one is such a story.

Second it has to claim credit for it. Labour created quantitative easing.

Third it then has to say the debt crisis is not an excuse for all that has happened: there has been no debt crisis. The pain we’re going through and the much greater pain to come is not and cannot be justified by the economics of this situation: they will have been imposed by Tory choice.

Fourth, we could then plan a very different economy. We could then plan to borrow for growth. After all, we’re hardly borrowing at all now. Net borrowing of just £35 billion a year by the government is not enough net borrowing to meet the demand of pension funds for UK government gilts to underpin the pensions of baby boomers now retiring in ever increasing numbers - and it is those gilts that are actually used to pay those pensions. So the government may actually need to borrow more to meet the demand for gilts.

What might it do with the extra lending? Well, it could invest in the Green New Deal for a start, making this country much less dependent upon carbon fuel and much more fuel efficient in the process. That would provide a massive rate of return on the spending incurred in the future, and help our long term exchange rate. And it could build all the hospitals, schools and other infrastructure we need without recourse to PFI. It could even build the flood defences we need – to stop the Wash and 50 miles inland flooding, for example. We could also build the social housing that is so obviously and desperately needed in the UK; housing that would pay for the interest on the borrowing with the rents received.

The point is, once we understand that our borrowing is now already under control we can then talk about what we really want to do with the economy. And because of quantitative easing, whether it was planned to achieve this outcome or not does not matter, our borrowing is now under control. And in that case we can plan for the sustainable growth in jobs we need.

Now of course as employment would rise quantitative easing may cease to be possible as the risk of inflation would then be real. I accept that. But that doesn’t matter. By the time that became an issue those then in work would be paying enough additional tax to make sure we need not need quantitative easing anyway. A virtuous circle of debt reduction would have been created.

All this is possible: we just have to realise that quantitative easing has delivered the solution to our debt problem. Why are we waiting?

 

I have noted that when my explanation of why the UK owes much less debt (see also here) than the Tories claim was posted on the Liberal Conspiracy web site some of the right wingers who inhabit that space suggested I could not consolidate accounts. As a result they claim my conclusion was wrong: they said the debt owed by the government could not be cancelled by the fact that the debt was owned by the Bank of England because I ignored the liabilities of the Bank of England to repay the cash it had used to buy the government issued gilts. Well, they are, of course wrong and let me explain why the accounting behind my claim is exactly right.

Let’s start with the government issuing a gilt for £100 million. It creates a loan (the gilt) for £100 million that is a credit in its accounts and it then has £100 million in cash (a debit balance).

In accounting terms this looks like this:


Government Accounts
Cash
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100
Government Accounts
Gilt Loans
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100

Then it spends that cash on buying an asset (or a lot of assets!). The accounting then looks like this:


Government Accounts
Cash
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100 100
Government Accounts
Fixed Assets
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100

Now there’s no cash. The £100s balance out to nothing. The accounts balance though. There’s an asset of £100 million balanced by a liability of £100 billion for the gilt. There’s just no cash left.

Now let’s suppose the Bank of England does a quantitative easing programme, as of course it has. Let’s look at the double entry of that.

First it creates the cash:


Bank of England
Cash
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100
Bank of England
Promise to repay account
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100

Remember that this is a bank making cash out of thin air. It has effectively ‘printed’ cash. So it has created £100 million in cash, which is a debit entry in its books. What’s the matching liability since you can’t have anything but double entry in the accounts? Well, it is, of course, a liability and for ease I’ve called it the ‘promise to repay account’. Why? Because that’s what it says on a bank note: the Bank of England promises to pay it. It’s that promise that represents the liability. The fact that if someone went to the Bank of England and asked for repayment of their £10 note they’d be given another one does not change the promise to pay. £10 is owing – but it’s payable with the money that’s just been printed. That’s what legal tender means: it’s cash made out of thin air. The liability will not be paid: it’s pure gain, but that’s what happens when you make cash out of thin air. This then is a very different liability from the government’s gilt. That will be repaid, in cash. And it carries interest. The Bank of England will never repay on its promise and the liability carries no interest.

Now let’s suppose that the cash that has been created is used to buy the gilts the government has issued. It’s pretty simple double entry. It looks like this:


Bank of England
Cash
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100 100
Bank of England
Promise to repay account
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100
Bank of England
Gilt asset account
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100

The cash has gone: it has been paid to the previous owners of the gilts. The two 100′s balance out to zero. That cash has now entered the economy and left the Bank of England.  That is how the cash enters the economy in a quantitative easing programme.

The net result is that now the Bank of England owns £100 million of gilts (the debit balance) matched by a liability of £100 million in the ‘promise to pay the bearer’ account which will in reality never be paid.

Now what I have then suggested is that we should consolidate the resulting accounts of the government and Bank of England since the government owns the Bank of England. Let’s look at what the accounts look like before we consolidate. The government accounts now look like this:


Government Accounts
Fixed Assets
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100
Government Accounts
Gilt Loans
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100

The government has £100 million of assets and owes £100 million in gilts.

The Bank of England accounts look like this:


Bank of England
Promise to repay account
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100
Bank of England
Gilt asset account
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100

The Bank owns £100 million of gilts and has made a promise to pay £100 million.

Now let’s be clear about what happens when you consolidate: you cancel out trading between the consolidated parties but as I have ignored interest for ease there is no trading to get rid of here. And second you cancel assets and liabilities owing between the consolidated entities, which are the government and Bank of England in this case. What is cancelled out? Well it’s the gilts: they are debt after all. The government owes £100 million to the Bank of England in this example but since the Bank of England is owned by the government then it is like owing debt to itself – or if you like, it’s like a husband owing a wife when they agree they really share all their property in common. So it can simply be cancelled out.

The net result is that the accounts really look like this. The two gilt accounts balance each other out to zero and we’re left with:


Government Accounts
Fixed Assets
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100
Bank of England
Promise to repay account
Dr £’m Cr £’m
100

So the government has now got assets paid for with a promise to pay – it’s printed the money to pay for the asset. It’s used the subterfuge of owning the Bank of England and printing money to achieve the result but let’s not deceive ourselves, this is the result. But, as I have explained, it can do that precisely because there is both no risk of inflation now because of the state of the economy and because the economy needs that cash – there is a shortage of cash at present that is threatening to close down economic activity and create deflation if this new cash were not created by the Bank of England now.

So, what’s the conclusion? First, the double entry works: the critics are simply wrong. They forgot there’s an asset. Incidentally, it doesn’t also actually matter if it was spent on the running costs of the NHS instead for double entry purposes; there would still be a debit. I use an asset to indicate it’s better that liabilities are matched by assets and that the current account be balanced if possible. That’s the logic of the Green New Deal. But I stress, either way my double entry works and my critics are guilt of doing single entry accounting – which is always a mistake.

Second, the economic logic is right: the national debt has to be stated net of quantitative easing gilt repurchases or the figure is simply mis-stated.

Third, this radically changes the whole economic narrative, completely. But that’s another blog. The point here is that technically I have to be right.

Having said which, I know the assets repurchased may not have been paid for at the price they were issued at: I accept that’s leakage in the matter but it does not change the fundamentals of the argument one iota, it just means that the banks pick up some subsidy on the way (which fact will, I suspect surprise no one). But we still have not got debt of £1 trillion. Very soon we’ll have national debt of less than £700 million and what is more we’re only borrowing about £35 million or so a year on average.

And we need to recognise that if we’re to have an honest economic debate.