The current debate on paying civil servnats through limited companies is about fairness, about applying tax law, about the corruption of the civil service culture and about the undermining of belief in the principle of government itself.

It is also about justice and equality.

And at a practical level it should be about collecting tax due.

As my research has shown, up to 500,000 such companies disappear a year without trace.

And in 2009-10 at least 700,000 companies sent corporation tax returns did not return them. I estimate £16 billion of tax was lost as a result.

This is also about the risk of fraud.

Which makes the case for systemic reform, including better tax regulation, company regulation and civil service regulation stronger still.

 

Small company taxation in the UK is unfair.

It provides unreasonable advantages on occasion.

It is open to abuse as recent experience shows.

It is too commonly used to shift income to people who have not earned the earnings attributed to them.

I tried to deal with all these issues in a paper I wrote in 2007. The issue has not gone away, and the ideas remain as relevant as ever.

That paper is linked to here. For those wanting real tax reform to address the economic needs of the twenty first century this is one to read.

 

According to Fox News:

Gene Sperling, director of the White House’s national economic council, said today at an official meeting that “we need a global minimum tax”:

“We need a global minimum tax so that people have the assurance that nobody is escaping doing their fair share as part of a race to the bottom or having our tax code actually subsidized and facilitate people moving their funds to tax havens,” Sperling said.

I wrote a mechanism to deliver such a tax about five years ago but the time did not seem right.

I’ll drag it out and dust it down again soon.

 

This weeks ‘scandal’ at the Student Loan Company, where a director who appears to be an employee has been paid through a personal service company has excited lots of attention. I know there will be more similar stories: I have been called about them.

But I’m not interested in the stories of the people involved; I am more interested in the systemic issues. There are two of these. The first is the problem that small business tax is too complicated and fails to reflect the economic reality of the way in which many small businesses work. The second is that the government through H M Revenue & Customs and Companies House is simply failing to collect the tax due from small companies.

I deal with the first here. I wrote the following in 2007 when H M Revenue & Customs had lost its last major anti-avoidance case against the use of a small limited company to both receive the income of what was claimed to be a disguised employment and which then split that benefit between a husband and wife. I wrote then:

The Arctic Systems case has been widely reported, but much of the comment made upon it has been high on emotion, but low on analytical content.

I wrote on this case, and as a result was challenged to produce a suitable response. That I have now done. The full paper is available here. The summary says:

This paper analyses the way in which the owners of many small limited companies reward themselves and members of their families out of the income that their labour generates for those companies. This is particularly relevant in the light of the recent House of Lords ruling in what is known as the ‘Arctic Systems’ case. The paper shows that many of these arrangements do constitute tax avoidance because the rewards paid do not much the underlying economic substance of the transactions that are taking place.

In the interests of promoting tax justice for all taxpayers HM Revenue & Customs have a consequent duty to promote new arrangements that will encourage tax compliant behaviour in this sector. Tax compliance is defined as paying the right amount of tax (but no more) in the right place at the right time where ‘right’ means that the economic substance of the transaction accords with the declaration made for taxation purposes.

The paper does then show that this problem is almost insoluble whilst these businesses are operated through the medium of small limited companies which were not designed for and are unsuitable for the type of activity they undertake.

As a result this paper proposes that:

1. A change in company law to allow the re-registration of small limited companies as LLPs. An LLP is tax transparent: its income is taxed as if it belongs to its members even though it is a legal entity that is separate from them for contractual purposes;

2. The introduction of new capital requirements for the incorporation of limited companies undertaking trades, and over time forced re-registration of those that do not meet that standard as LLPs;

3. The introduction of a new investment income surcharge at rates broadly equivalent to national insurance charges that would have the benefit of reducing the incentive to split income, restore the taxation balance between income earned from all sources and allow a reduction in the base rate of income tax without adding substantially to the burden of administration for taxpayers since those liable will, in the vast majority of cases, already be submitting tax returns;

4. Create new, economically justifiable and verifiable standards for splitting income in LLPs so that the risk of legal challenge to such arrangements will be substantially reduced whilst recognising the significant role that the partners of those who supply their services through owner managed corporate entities play in the undertaking of that activity.

If this were done then:

a. The administrative burdens for many small businesses would be reduced;

b. The certainty of the arrangements under which they can operate would be increased;

c. The rewards that they rightly seek to pay to those who contribute to the management of these companies from within domestic relationships will be rewarded, but within appropriate constraints;

d. The attraction of freelance status in tax terms would be retained;

e. The current injustice that sees income from labour more heavily taxed in the UK than income from capital would be eliminated in large part without prejudicing the required favoured status of pensioners;

f. The incentives for tax planning would be reduced, so simplifying tax administration;

g. The tax yield might either rise, or a reduction in the tax rate might result.

The challenge in creating such a system is significant because it requires cooperation across government departments, but far from insurmountable. It is part of the challenge of creating an enterprise culture that meets the needs of the UK in the 21st century, and that is a challenge that any government needs to meet.

As I note at the end of the paper, suggestions and comments are welcome. But please do read the paper first and not just the summary.

That invitation still stands: the problem remains. I remain sure I have offered a viable alternative. I know it was well read and discussed in the Treasury at the time. Is this the time for change?

 

I’d love to say the following idea was mine, but it wasn’t, so I’m going to give credit for where it came from, in a letter to the Guardian today:

Shareholders in a limited company that goes bad are liable for no more than the money they have already paid for their shares – the company’s creditors stand the loss, not the owners of the company, the shareholders or the directors. This is not a right, but a privilege we grant so that people will be ready to invest in new enterprises without fear of taking on unlimited liabilities.

We don’t have to privilege all companies, directors and shareholders over their creditors in this way – there’s no human right to it. We could instead say that liability is only limited if the highest-paid executive’s remuneration does not exceed, say, 30 times the median employee’s salary. It would be a brave shareholder, individual or institutional, that permitted any executive’s remuneration package to approach the point where they, the shareholders and directors, might be found personally liable if things go wrong.
David Harington
Worcester

I have long argued that the right to limited liability is a privilege that carries obligations, including the duty to pay tax and to file accounts. I haven’t argued often, and certainly not in the case of public companies, that the privilege of liability should be withdrawn as a sanction.

I think that’s been an omission on my part. We should be much more straightforward in saying that limited liability is a privilege to be used for the benefit of society, and with care, and that if obligations to society are not respect then it should simply be withdrawn with the shareholders and not society at large then having the duty to remedy the defect. When should that happen? Let me suggest the following occasions for a start:

1) When excess pay is allowed, as noted above.

2) When accounts are not filed on time, for any reason.

3) When corporation tax returns are not filed, for any reason. Of course these are not public documents now: they soon would be if this was the case.

4) Three months after any set of accounts is filed showing the company to be insolvent unless action to remedy the defect has been taken in the meantime.

That will concentrate minds I think.

Now which MP would like to propose it as a private member’s bill?

 

There are occasions when even Guardian economists can prove just how closely wedded to the blackboard and how out of touch with reality they are. Phillip Inman did so this afternoon when writing about corporation tax. He said this afternoon:

Soon there will be no such thing as corporation tax. Among the first items on the shopping list of reforms outlined by Spain’s new prime minister Mariano Rajoy on Monday is a cut in the main business tax.

He said more firms would enjoy a 20% rate as a central plank of his mission to make Spain more business friendly.

And from this Phillip moved on to argue:

The TUC and tax campaigner Richard Murphy’s groundbreaking 2008 report The Missing Billions: The UK Tax Gap (pdf), found a £12.5bn difference between what companies should have paid in corporation tax annually and what they really paid.

Some on the left argue, as the TUC did, that government’s should play hardball with companies and make them pay the full charge.

But not only is that a forlorn task against the run of play (when governments across Europe are reducing corporation tax rates), it is wrong headed.

We need to generate taxes to fund social welfare and for that we need to redraw the tax map. I subscribe to the OECD’s recipe for reform. Despite the Paris think tank’s reputation for rightwing, pro-capitalist reforms, in this case it is pretty even-handed.

It would reduce all taxes on income and increase taxes on spending and wealth.

As he continues:

Unfortunately, the proposal leaves most leftists gasping for air. What do you say when a proposal slays the sacred cows you hold dear, but also slays those of the opposition.

The left loses a tax on businesses, and must suffer the regressive nature of high consumption taxes. On the other hand, workers pay less tax and crucially, the owners of wealth, be they rich individuals or corporations, must pay a new tax on their holdings.

The OECD, like most economists I speak to across Europe, subscribes to a tax on land as the simplest and fairest tax on wealth.

He tries to justify his position:

The shift has many positive benefits. They key must be to unlock a desire for work by cutting taxes on incomes. At the moment we lock families into static or falling living standards, partly through the interaction to income tax, tax credits and benefits.

Consumption taxes rise, but there is evidence that skewing VAT away from food to luxuries makes it much less regressive. Land taxes would discourage the wealthy from hoarding land without doing something with it (planning rules permitting). If they want to live in expensive areas of the country or base their businesses in the south-east, then there would be a significant tax charge for doing so, and one they cannot dodge with elaborate schemes or offshore trusts.

Rajoy is, like most rightwing politicians, only tacking one side of the equation. The left should argue the logic of the right’s position on income taxes with demands for taxes on wealth.

We do argue for a wealth tax Phillip, we do. But we do so based on our understanding of the real world, which is what Inman’s suggestion so clearly lacks.

Let’s just address one very obvious problem. About 700 companies pay more than half of all corporation tax in the UK. Details of the £42 billion paid in 2010/11 are here. But this misses the fact that maybe £12 billion is paid by small business - who should also, as I have shown, be liable for much more if only this tax were not so heavily evaded. Inman says we should have no corporation tax but a tax on wealth instead. How is he going to address the taxation of 1 million or probably more small businesses as a result? And how will he stop everyone forming companies to avoid tax henceforth? The naivety of suggesting the abolition of corporation tax to create this potential tax chaos is staggering. The back hole in government finances would be enormous.

Let’s take a second issue. We would lose £42 billion from corporation tax. Inman suggests we recover this from VAT or wealth taxes. First, Inman suggests we skew VAT from food to luxuries. We already zero rate food. That shows how much he knows about that: precisely nothing by the look of it. Secondly, perhaps he does not realise there is no EU provision right now for a luxury wealth rate of VAT – although I would prefer one. So, to recover his VAT we’d need not a VAT rate of at least 28% based on this year’s forecast yield of £100 billion. That’s going to help inflation, isn’t it Phillip? And boost the economy a lot, isn’t it? Whilst of course creating no labour market distortions, at all. Nor will it create any benefits re-rating issues whatsoever, of course. And let’s ignore for a moment the impact on those on pay freezes. The proposal should make every right thinking person shrink in horror. How come Inman thought of none of these issues?

And can we just ignore the suggestion that income tax rates will fall? How does cutting a whole tax raising £42 billion mean income tax rates fall? That’s just fantasy. Making up the deficit will be enough of a challenge. Other cuts is just a ludicrous claim.

As is the argument for a wealth tax. I agree with these. Fundamentally. Completely. I want them. But there are some conditions. Like securing the data to assess them. And whilst we have tax havens that let anyone hide their wealth in offshore companies – which are tax free entities that no authority asks questions about – the chance of collecting wealth taxes is about zero percent. Of course I want to shatter that secrecy but suggesting a wealth tax without mentioning that pre-condition is plain absurd.

As for taxing land. Yes, I agree: that has to be done too. But there’s an issue Phillip. It’s called cash flow in the first instance. Is it reasonable to charge tax when there is no means to pay it? This is the perennial argument with taxing land. How are you going to overcome it? No mention is made? And then there are other problems you ignore. Like finding the owner. Not all land is registered, and much is registered offshore. How do you overcome that? And last, but by no means least – land (despite the Georgists’s claim) is not the sole source of wealth. Cash generating assets are as well, very much so, but it seems Inman wants to ignore them.

I could go on, but won’t. I want radical reform of taxation. But I also want a tax system that works. I find those like Phillip Inman who’re still wedded to the old theories of economics and who have had no real encounter with the real world of tax where the problem of extracting payment is the number one priority putting forward ideas that are barking mad on a blackboard and economic insanity in the real world profoundly annoying. Even if they do work for the Guardian. Especially when they can only increase the wealth gap in society and the opprtunities for tax evasion that corrode social justice.

Inman owes the Guardian and its readers an apology.

 

Once upon a time the postman on Sark was the symbol of offshore farce: rumour had it he held more than 2,000 directorships and quite clearly knew little or nothing about any of them, each being held as a pure nominee to supposedly locate the company of which he was a director for tax purposes on that once idyllic and now rather troubled Channel Island.

Then the ‘Sark lark’ was brought to an end, the postman went back to the day job and examples of such farce, where nominees were so blatant that the sheer lack of likelihood that they really undertook the task supposedly entrusted to them was harder (not not impossible) to find.

Today the FT reveals the practice of nominee directors holding far more positions than they can possibly manage is alive and well and riddles the Cayman hedge fund industry, which claims to be resident in those islands even though it is very obviously likely that real decisions must be made elsewhere. As they report:

A small group of Cayman Islands “jumbo directors” are sitting on the boards of hundreds of hedge funds as demand for independent directors booms in the Caribbean tax haven.

At least four individuals hold more than 100 non-executive directorships each, and 14 have more than 70 – each worth as much as $30,000 a year.

One has been listed as on the boards of 567 Cayman entities, almost all of which were hedge funds.

The revelation of the figures, in a Financial Times investigation, comes amid calls from some of the world’s leading hedge fund investors for greater transparency in the Caymans as part of a global effort to improve fund governance.

This practice suggests three things. First of all, as I have often argued, the supposed centre of decision making that suggests these funds are located where their directors are is little more than a charade in many cases.

Secondly, any directors who can believe in this charade must have suspended their judgement: if you can believe in these structures it is highly likely that sound governance has flown out of the window.

Thirdly, and as I have again argued, often, the time for a change in the rules regarding the determination of residence on the basis of where the directors of an entity supposedly meet is more than overdue for reform. As is likely in these cases, real decisions are almost certainly taken in places like London and New York but ta x is not paid there as a result of playing games in Cayman. That has to stop. Pretending we can determine residence on rules written for the era of the steam ship and telegram when we live in the age of the internet is just madness, and is giving companies the most massive loophole to abuse the tax rules and revenues of major democratic states. The objections of business have to be ignored and such schemes have to be looked through now wherever possible.

Is this a case for the proposed GAAR? I think it should be, but I fear the hurdle has set been too high for it to be used in such cases. If so then specific legislation is needed. Either way, reform is possible and overdue.

 

I made this video a while away (I don’t even recall those glasses!) but since I’ve been asked about transfer pricing and this seems to do the job I thought I’d put it up again:

 

The reason why places like Jersey became tax havens was to raise tax revenue from third parties. The tax revenues raised were, in effect, export earnings that kept their economies afloat.

Deputy Geoff Southern in Jersey has tabled an amendment to the current Jersey budget that shatters the myth that this is still the case. As his amendment says:

Geoff is right to acknowledge there is a race to the bottom in Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man. Promoted by the pinstripe infrastructure of lawyers, accountants and bankers through such coordinating bodies as the Society for Trust and Estate Practitioners (who have their single biggest branch in Jersey but who are active in all three locations) the pernicious influence of these groups has driven these three jurisdictions on a destructive path towards shattering their tax base by eliminating corporate taxes for their clients.

The result is all too apparent. The tax burden has shifted dramatically from businesses using Jersey as a tax haven to the local population who are now paying for the privilege of hosting the tax abuse industry whilst at the same time their economy is facing ruin as local politicians realise they have no idea how to plug the continuing deficits they face and are now suggesting plundering the rainy day fund – a sure sign they are on the slippery slope to running out of money, as I have long predicted.

Geoff Southern has in this case study provided the evidence of what I and the Tax Justice Network have long argued – that the ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate taxes is simply an excuse to shift the tax burden from those able to pay tax (let’s call them the 1%) on to those less able or unable to afford them (again, for simplicity, let’s call them the 99%).

This is happening everywhere but Jersey’s clearly leading the way.

This is what the Tax Justice Network is about.

This is what #occupy is about.

Beating this pernicious process is what re-engagement in democracy should be about for many who feel disenchanted by it.

And this is what beating the exploitative activities of the City of London – the most undemocratic local authority in the UK – has to be about.