I mentioned my new Briefing on the Big 4 and secrecy jurisdictions on Friday.

Perhaps the most important data to highlight is in just which secrecy jurisdictions the Big 4 operate. The following table was researched in the summer of 2009 and is based on a variety of sources from the Big 4 including their annual reports and various web sites they run (Deloitte India was very useful, for example!), necessitated by the fact that by no means all the sources agree (an interesting point in its own right):

 

I was asked to undertake some research on secrecy jurisdictions by the World Bank last year, and presented some of my findings at a conference in Washington last September. The paper basically concerned the offshore secrecy space – the nature of which I note below.

The World Bank promised to publish the paper in a book – but it looks that may not happen this year now (amazingly) and if it does a part of the paper – on the role of the Big 4 in this process – will perforce have to be omitted due to pressure on space. Rather than let a good paper go to waste I have now turned the relevant part that has been excised from the final work into a separate paper – called Wherefore Art Thou – which I have now published as a Tax Research Briefing.

I’m going to feature some of the papers findings over the next few days, but by way of introduction this is the summary of the paper:

This paper considers the role of the Big 4 firms of accountants – PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Deloitte, Ernst & Young (E&Y) and KPMG – in the creation of the offshore secrecy space.

Part 1 of the paper shows that secrecy jurisdictions deliberately create opacity with regard to financial data and that multinational corporations appear to exploit this opportunity to create opacity in their financial reporting. As a consequence it is clear that there are far too many companies incorporated in these places than local need or normal commercial opportunities could possibly justify. The conclusion drawn is that these places do, as the definition of them used in this paper (page 3) suggests likely, exist to provide services to persons who are not resident within them and who do not actually undertake trade there, but who wish to avail themselves of the veil of secrecy these locations facilitate for those making use of their services.

In the second part of the paper the concept of the ‚Äòsecrecy space’ which combines the opacity of secrecy jurisdictions with the opacity found inside group consolidated accounts of multinational corporations is developed. It is suggesting that this secrecy space might facilitate transfer mispricing.

In the third part of the paper the role of the Big 4 firms of accountants in this process is questioned. It is shown that they act as auditors and advisers to almost all multinational corporations. It is shown that they have prevalence in secrecy jurisdictions that cannot be explained by local commercial need. It is shown that those places in which they are present have much higher incomes per head of population than is to be found in those where they are not present. It is suggested that this is not the result of local characteristics of the places in which they are located but is the result of income being transferred into these locations for accounting purposes, a process which their presence would assist whether directly or indirectly.

So what might be concluded from this? Causal links cannot, of course, be proven by mere association. Nothing noted here alters that fact. However, the associations noted in this paper are so abundantly clear it is suggested that they are not mere chance. Nor does it matter which caused what first: over many years the association between opacity, secrecy jurisdictions, transfer mispricing and other commercial tax abuse by multinational corporations and the existence of the Big 4 as auditors of those corporations and suppliers of services to them in secrecy jurisdictions in which those Big 4 firms are also major economic participants and without whose presence many of those secrecy jurisdiction could not supply such services, have become a tangled and connect web which imposes on the world those costs noted in the introduction to this paper.

And as that introduction notes, until such time as this situation changes we have the right to ask the reasonable question – wherefore art thou? (and any reasonable variation on the theme) until such time as we secure the transparency society needs so ensure that effective markets can operate, economic resources are allocated efficiently and tax compliance exists – where tax compliance is defined as seeking to pay the right amount of tax (but no more) in the right place at the right time where right means that the economic substance of the transactions undertaken coincides with the place and form in which they are reported for taxation purposes.

 

The Guardian reports:

The role of accountants in the banking crisis was thrust into the open yesterday when the Financial Services Authority said that the profession had not been sceptical enough about the financial firms it audited in the run up to the banking crisis.

The City regulator, setting out a case to have the powers to publicly censure and fine auditors, also noted that some firms appeared to be "systemically aggressive" in some of their accounting policies.

Paul Sharma, FSA director of prudential policy, said: "Our experience has indicated that, at times, auditors have focused too much on gathering and accepting evidence to support firms’ assertions, rather than exercising sufficient professional scepticism in their approach. This falls far short of what the FSA – and society at large – expects from auditors."

The FSA said its work since the banking crisis had led it to question whether auditors had been "sufficiently sceptical" when challenging the models used by management to measure their bad debts and said it was "concerned that the dispersion in valuations – both within and between firms – for similar items is higher than might be expected".

It said there had been an "inadequate level of challenge to firms’ management" from auditors about some of the crucial assumptions they make in deciding whether to take a provision for a loan that is not being repaid.

The regulator is particularly scathing about the way auditors tackled client assets – where, since Lehman’s collapse, firms must show they keep client’s money safe – saying it had found "material weakness" in some reports filed by auditors.

What can I add? Except the likes of Prem Sikka, Dennis Howlett, Francine McKenna and I can all say “we told you so”.

And “when will they listen?”

 

As the FT notes:

A British investigation has been launched into whether Ernst & Young properly audited Lehman Brothers’ accounts in the months preceding the US investment bank’s collapse in September 2008, reports the FT. The Accountancy and Actuarial Disciplinary Board has launched a probe into E&Y’s accounting treatment of controversial transactions known as “Repo 105s” and “Repo 108s”, which Lehman regularly used in its quarter-end balance sheets.

It’s inevitable the Big 4 will become 3 one day.

And that at that point the whole edifice of auditing – with its current ludicrous state of claimed independence – will collapse with it.

The odds must be on E & Y being the one to create the tipping point now. How many more audit fiascos can it be involved in?

 

A commentator on the blog this morning said, in response to a piece on country-by-country reporting:

Could you outline how you expect the information to be used? As an auditor of SME international groups I am sick of the amount of disclosure that we have to deal with under International Financial Reporting Standards.

Answer: we only expect this to apply to quotes companies. That’s not to say there is no abuse elsewhere – there is. But right now we have to pick the prime targets where the yield will be greatest and the benefit to society at alge highest, and that fundamentally means quoted companies.

The commentator continued, perhaps more tellingly, so say:

As you doubtless know, some jurisdictions such as the USA already require filing of monitoring returns for overseas subs anyway.

The sad reality is that HMRC do not have the staff to read and digest the reporting, and enquire where appropriate. If you want to tackle transfer pricing abuse, I believe we need a new cohort of chartered accountants (perhaps 5,000) trained by HMRC, untainted by the big 4, ready to pick groups apart within weeks of filing their tax returns. That would be a real investment in closing the tax gap. Nothing less will work.

Yes, yes, yes, is my response.

But have no doubt about it: country-by-country reporting would, if available, be the most amazing risk assessment tool to allow those accountants (whose contribution to HMRC would massively outweigh their cost) to decide which were the best cases to pick for investigation.

That’s one of country-by-country reporting’s many benefits.

 

FT Alphaville » KPMG, PwC eye rating move.

KPMG and PwC have considered entering the credit rating business, in a move that would pitch two top accountancy firms against the current top three agencies, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, reports the FT.

It should suit them down to the ground.

High fees for acting in the client’s interest whilst pretending what you say is objective information for public use with almost no chnace of a claim arising for getting things wrong.

The Big 4 would be on familiar territory.

Anyone recognise the audit in that description?

 

It’s been a hectic couple of days – hence low volume blogging.

That’s been an opportunity missed regarding Ernst & Young (E&Y) and Lehman. It’s also been an opportunity for reflection.

The reality is that there is nothing surprising about what E & Y have done. It seems that a senior partner from an audit form joined a client, devised an off-balance sheet accounting ruse, cleared it with his former colleagues, who then signed it off for audit purposes, and it was used thereafter without further question arising to deliberately misrepresent the true nature of the balance sheet of the entity.

That sounds shocking expect for one thing – this is what happens day in, day out, the whole world over.

This is what securitisation was about.

This is what a lot of offshore is about.

Derivative trading is often intended to achieve such goals – and most finance directors have no clue what they’re doing when engaging in them, and nor do their auditors.

In issues as straightforward as deferred taxation the balance sheet is knowingly and deliberately misstated by companies and auditors with the connivance of auditing and accounting regulators – in this case to overstate a liability that will in most cases never be settled – all to achieve a political objective of conning the world into believing that more tax is being paid than is ever settled..

In the case of fair value accounting myths were created that there were markets in assets for which there was no effective trading.

The E & Y / Lehman case is not an isolated incident. It is indicative of a pandemic of abuse by the accounting profession.

It’s an abuse that starts at the very top. The International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation – the body ultimately responsible for ensuring that accounts showing a true and fair view are prepared says in its constitution that its main objective is

to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable and enforceable global accounting standards that require high quality, transparency and comparable information in financial statements and other financial reporting to help participants in the world’s capital markets and other users make economic decisions;

Note the “and other users” – something that is then blatantly ignored by the International Accounting Standards Board when it says that the main users of financial statements are “present and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions in their capacity as capital providers”. They then conclude that because investors are providers of risk capital to the entity, financial statements that meet their needs will also meet most of the general financial information needs of other users.

And despite this extraordinary claim, and attention on one small group of users alone, the Big 4 have also engineered that they have almost no liability to providers of capital in the exercise of their duties.

The consequence was always going to be a disaster: it’s a disaster that is unfolding.

Treating that disaster as specific would however compound the error: the problem is systemic. It has to be tackled that way.

The key issues are, I suggest, in no particular order:

1. Why we gave up control of accounting disclosure to the accounting profession

2. Why we gave up control of auditing regulation to the auditing profession

3. Why we allowed the definition of an audit to be limited to confirmation of compliance with an accounting framework and abandoned the true and fair override

4. Why we allowed the users of financial statements to be considered the providers of capital alone

5. Why we don’t demand financial statements that meet the needs of other major user groups including:

   a. Employees

   b. Suppliers

   c. Customers

   d. Regulators

   e. Tax authorities

   f. Civil society groups

   g. People at large

6. Why we limited auditor liability so much

7. Why we allowed the concept of limited liability to be porous when it comes to failure and yet so restrictive when it comes to sharing information and reward

8. Why we allow limited liability within limited liability i.e. subsidiaries have limited liability distinct from parent companies

9. Why we consider group accounts the only useful perspective on corporate activity

10. Why we allow off balance sheet accounting

11. Why we still allow auditors to undertake other commercial activities

12. Why we don’t increase company registration fees to ensure auditors can always be fairly remunerated from a communally managed purse

13. Why we allow companies to not file accounts on public record

14. Why we accept a lack of transparency on group structures

15. Why we don’t demand full accounts on public record from all entities created under law wherever they are in the world, whether they be companies, partnerships, all variations on these, trusts, charities, foundations and other such entities. Such information to include full information on ownership, entitlement to assets, establishment, constitutions, management and accounts.

16. Why we allow companies to be struck off public registers without questions being asked and substantial fees being paid in lieu of accounts.

17. Why fit and proper tests aren’t conducted for all persons incorporating and owning companies.

Of course the list goes on, and on. So it should.

Now is the time for the most fundamental review of what the limited liability entity is, why we allow it, what its rights and obligations are and how we regulate it.

Surely this time we appreciate the need to do this?

Don’t we?

 

FT.com / Companies / Financial Services – Lehman report casts auditors in poor light.

As the FT notes:

Claims about Ernst & Young’s part in the collapse of Lehman Brothers look set to open a wider debate on what has until now been one of the least dissected aspects of the financial crisis – the role played by auditors.

Anton Valukas’s report on the biggest bankruptcy in US history has sent shockwaves through the accounting fraternity in its heavy criticism of Lehman’s auditor E&Y, one of the Big Four firms.

It goes on to say:

The claims against E&Y, although exceptional, give grist to a growing lobby questioning the purpose of auditors in providing investors with a true picture of the financial health of a company.

This is where I part company with the report. What’s exceptional about E & Y’s performance. They:

- alloweed window dressing

- put fornm over substance

- ignore the true and fair over-ride

- box ticked to confirm compliance with an accounting framework they helped create and which is itself misleading

That’s what auditors do. There’s nothing exceptional about this. The only odd thing is no one has appreciated it – bar the likes of Prem Sikka, Dennis Howlett, Francine McKenna and me.

This is not chance. This has been the collective turning of a blind eye.

Of course that could carry on. But society will pay the price.

 

There’s much discussion today about whether the alleged professional negligence by Ernst & Young with regard to the audit of Lehman Brothers – where it appears they turned a blind eye to the rigging of the balance sheet – might be their Enron and lead to the demise of the firm.

I’m on record as saying I think the end of at least one of the Big 4 is nigh – and with it the whole audit market.

But let’s be clear – Ernst & Youngs’ defence – that their audit complied with US GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles – pronounced ‘gap’) may be true. But that’s not the point. The point is US GAAP is crap and the Big 4 engineered that their audits do not need to report either truth or fairness.

As the rules of the IAASB (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board), which sets auditing standards says, an audit is:

The purpose of an audit is to enhance the degree of confidence of intended users in the financial statements. This is achieved by the expression of an opinion by the auditor on whether the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an applicable financial reporting framework. In the case of most general purpose frameworks, that opinion is on whether the financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, or give a true and fair view in accordance with the framework. An audit conducted in accordance with ISAs and relevant ethical requirements enables the auditor to form that opinion.

The wording is not a chance: the emphasis is on compliance with the financial reporting framework first; the consequence of being true and fair is assumed to follow, but is consequential, not the goal.

So, E & Y influence the International Accounting Standards Board that sets the framework.

And they influence the IAASB which limits the scope of the audit to the point it’s useless.

And although financial statements are meant to be produced for the benefit of the providers of capital to a business (in itself far too narrow a requirement) the auditors in the UK (by reason of the Caparo decision) and in the US under Delaware law basically can’t be sued by those providers of capital.

In other words the auditors charge a lot for doing a job badly for which they know they have almost no liability. It’s not surprising they don’t really care.

It’s not E & Y who have erred here – it’s all those who let this situation develop that have erred. The accounting structures we use are rotten to the core and so is auditing. Unless both are reformed we are heading for collapse after collapse after collapse as the prevailing mood of society to promote expedient short term greed will destroy entity after entity without any check or balance in place to stop it happening.

This can be tackled.

It needs to be tackled.

Without the political will to tackle it just watch society collapse like a pack of dominos as big business begins to fail all round us.

And I think I’m underselling the melodrama in saying that.