These are my links for March 20th through March 26th:

 

Dennis Howlett has written a first rate blog summarising progressive reaction to Tim Geithner’s bail out plan for the USA.

As he notes, Joe Stiglitz calls this ‚Äòrobbery’ from the US taxpayer.

I admit my concern about what is happening increases almost daily. The bankers clearly mean to keep control. The consequences could be disastrous.

I am seriously hoping this won’t end in tears – but can’t see how when Brown and Obama have basically now handed over control of the UK and US economies to the very people who created the current crisis how any other outcome is likely.

In the meantime Dennis asks the very reasonable question of why accountants aren’t protesting. I wonder the same about tax havens – which simply impose a tax burden on the client’s of most of them.

 

Der Spiegel has a good article with the above title in English, on line here.

Good to note they highlight the role of Malta – one who gets away with too much to often from within the EU.

 

As the FT has noted:

It’s normal practice in Parliamentary debates to declare any interests which could be relevant. During a debate on tax avoidance yesterday, Baroness Hooper – a Tory peer – made sure she mentioned her interest as vice-chairman of the Overseas Territories All-Party Parliamentary Group.

What she didn’t mention is that she is also paid by Barclays (as chair of the advisory committee for Barclays European Infrastructure Fund).

This happened during the same debate that Lord Oakeshott used to disclose the whereabouts of leaked Barclays documents.

Baroness Hooper, undeterred by her lack of disclosure, waded in to defend tax havens, saying (amongst more besides):

There is no doubt that successive governments have encouraged the overseas territories to be self-sufficient. A number of them have developed highly efficient and successful financial services, based on international best practice…

Today I am trying to redress the balance [in this debate]. I will refer to the British Virgin Islands as a case study.

The financial services sector of the British Virgin Islands is founded on five pillars: robust regulation, intergovernmental collaboration, effective enforcement, transparency and high levels of expertise…

I emphasise in addition that there are no secrecy laws. The industry has developed and diversified, particularly over the past 20 years, to include specialist sectors such as mutual funds, insurance—both risk and captive—professional services provided by fiduciary and insolvency practitioners, and legal and accountancy services provided by globally recognised firms established in the jurisdiction

As a result, financial services now account for more than half the GDP of the BVI, immeasurably raising the standard of living for all inhabitants…

Reputation is everything in financial services. The BVI has long recognised this and I maintain that the same goes for most of the overseas territories…

The United Kingdom needs to remember that it gets a great deal of value and advantage out of jurisdictions such as the BVI. Funds and business flow from the UK here, they flow from here back to the UK…

I believe that there is a real danger in targeting a specific group of countries…Apart from anything else, it would drive the business to other, possibly less well regulated and open centres. ..

It would be very wrong if, in a knee-jerk reaction to the current financial crisis, those overseas territories that operate financial services were to be deprived of the independence that they have now earned.

The poor peer is sadly deluded or misinformed. Alternatively she is suffering from the MEGO principle so commonly found amongst offshore apologists – ‚ÄòMy Eyes Glaze Over’ in the the face of the facts.

Let’s face facts. It was in 2007 that the BVI boasted more than 800,000 registered companies. Now it’s just over 400,000. You’d think that was amazing – a massive reduction in business or an enormous tightening up of abuse. It’s neither. As BVI officials admitted to me last year – they had lost control of their register and had no idea how many companies were really on it. All they’ve done is purge it of the ones they can no longer contact.

So much for Baroness Hooper’s “robust regulation”. These people can’t even collect the regulation fees due to them from BVI companies, let alone regulate them.

And this does not mean the companies have gone – it just means they can’t find them.

Every other claim collapses after this one – it is perfectly apparent that the BVI is badit country – quite unable to regulate and quite unable to cooperate with any other government to information exchange.

No wonder it is so extensively used by the Chinese for what is called round tripping – the process of repackaging illicit Chinese money offshore for inward investment back into China to secure illegal tax reliefs. And I really can’t see the BVI acting in serious cooperation with the Chinese to stop this.

Sorry Baroness Hooper – you’re just plain straight forward wrong – and the simplest of enquiries on your aprt would have shown that. But you have shown us where the Tories are on this issue – which is on the wrong side.

 

In a recent editorial the Financial Times said:

Every first-year economics student learns the conditions for an unregulated market, in theory, to function efficiently. The most important are full information, enforceable property rights and contracts, and the absence of “externalities” – effects of economic transactions on third parties.

When these conditions are absent, markets malfunction; the way they do so is one of the great topics of economic theory. It tells those who care to listen that when a market is too opaque, or when the effects of market transactions are too inter-dependent, the pursuit of self-interest can make everyone worse off, or unfairly land some with the losses caused by others, or – in extremis – make markets disappear altogether.

Anyone who believes that markets have a role in the economy (and I do) will find it difficult to argue with this. What it makes clear is that efficient markets are dependent upon the availability of information: the better the quality of the information and the more open the access to that information is then the better will be the efficiency of the allocation of resources by the market.

Tax haven activity is entirely dependent upon secrecy. That secrecy is an entirely deliberate and artificial market distortion. It is only available to some businesses and people and not others: a premium is placed upon access to this ability to hide one’s affairs.

One premium is imposed by cost: it is not cheap to set up offshore structures. As a result they are only available to larger businesses and wealthier individuals. As a result the wealth gap increases.

Another premium is imposed by age: those able to create structures before they are declared illegal are usually allowed to retain them after use by new market entrants is banned. This means older people, and most especially older companies have opportunities not available to new businesses that cannot legally access these centres. This has created a bias against new enterprise.

Thirdly, there is a premium imposed by legality. Some will choose to act illegally and take the risk of doing so. Others will not. If insufficient resource is allocated to tackling the illegality there will be a positive, and predictable return from that illegal behaviour which imposes a premium on those who choose to be law abiding.

Lastly there is a premium on those who work nationally: they cannot access offshore in a way those who work internationally can. They suffer as a result.

But in each and every case the answer is not to open the market to all: for a start that is not possible. Second, it would only make the problem worse: there would be even less data available to markets than now, and as the FT notes, the result might be no markets at all.

The answer is to create a level playing field. This is what efficient markets require. That means all should place their data on public record; all should have their data exchanged with their domestic tax authorities; all should provide it to those who need it to appraise the risk of trading with them if they are a limited liability entity.

Then we remove a market distortion. That market distortion does at present:

  • support monopoly power,
  • support the power of those already wealthy,
  • support the power of the large company over the small company, and
  • support the power of the existing market player over the new market entrant.

These all result in the misallocation of economic resources because

There is no benefit from this for society as a whole. Far from it. Wealth and resources are misallocated. Because of the secrecy implicit in offshore the cost of capital goes up (one reason why the bank bail out has been so expensive). Because of the activities of offshore agents a cost of tackling abuse is imposed on society at large.

None of these things need happen. Those who argue against tackling offshore argue for inefficient markets. Those who argue for tackling it argue for efficient markets where resources are as optimally allocated as possible, where risk is mitigated and capital has the lowest possible cost.  Getting rid of tax havens would help achieve that.

Then we’d have proper globalisation for the benefit of all, not globalisation to reinforce monopoly profit which is the tax haven inspired variety that we have now.

 

Many in tax havens / secrecy jurisdictions argue that the current world economic crisis started ‚Äòonshore’. By that they mean in the UK, USA and so on. There are those who agree. Lord Turner in his recent report on the future of regulation in the UK’s financial services sector said:

[I]t is important to recognise that the role of offshore financial centers was not central in the origins of the current crisis. Some SIVs were registered in offshore locations; but regulation of banks could have required these to be brought on-balance sheet and captured within the ambit of group capital adequacy requirements. And many of the problems arose from the inadequate regulation of the trading activities of banks operating through onshore legal entities in major financial centres such as London or New York.

That argument is hard to sustain. First of all, as those in the more conventionally recognised tax havens / secrecy jurisdictions often note, London and New York are amongst the most significant tax havens.

Second, the argument is only logical if it is recognised that in reality nothing really happens in tax havens / secrecy jurisdictions. This needs some explanation.

Remember that secrecy jurisdictions are places that intentionally create regulation for the primary benefit and use of those not resident in their geographical domain that is  designed to undermine the legislation or regulation of another jurisdiction and that, in addition, create a deliberate, legally backed veil of secrecy that ensures that those from outside the jurisdiction making use of its regulation cannot be identified to be doing so. There are therefore three components:

  1. The place that creates the abusive regulation / legislation – let’s cal it the tax haven for ease.
  2. The people who sell this abusive regulation – let’s call them the offshore finance centre (OFC) for ease. This is populated by accountants, lawyers and bankers in the main.
  3. The clients of the OFC – who by definition will not be located in the place that creates the regulation or where the lawyers, accountants and bankers are.

As a result of course it can be argued that tax havens did not create the financial crisis. By definition secrecy jurisdictions serve a population that is not resident where they are. That means by definition what they do is ‚Äòelsewhere’. And that means that whatever tax havens facilitate does not happen within them – so of course the financial crisis was not created offshore.

Except that’s not the whole story. The financial crisis might have happened ‚Äòelsewhere’ as far as the tax havens are concerned – but they did their very best to make sure that whatever did happen ‚Äòelsewhere’ was a lot more serious by the time they had finished it. They did this in a number of very deliberate ways.

First, they offered what has been called a "get out of regulation free" card to businesses that use them. Whenever banks (in particular) were threatened by onshore regulation that might have reduce the impact (or even prevented) the speculative bubble that has created our current world recession their response was that they would move offshore. They didn’t need to: they just needed it and its lax regulation (and yes, it is lax regulation) to be there to ensure no-one properly regulated them. There is no doubt that this massively contributed to our current crisis.

Second, competition on regulation between tax havens, and between them and other jurisdictions has undoubtedly led to a steady degradation in regulation, over the last decade.  This has been especially true in regulation in areas such as trust law, the need to place data on public record and on hedge funds.

Third, the tax incentives and opportunities created by tax havens undoubtedly accelerated the build-up in debt and leverage across the global financial system. This is especially true in activities like private equity and hedge funds – where tax relief on their enormous borrowings was given onshore but their profits flowed tax free offshore – meaning that in effect they got a double benefit, which encouraged them to borrow more and more – and we all know that the rest is history.

Fourth, “satellite” tax havens like some Caribbean islands or Britain’s Crown Dependencies have acted as conduits for illicit and other financial flows, often from developing countries into the wealthy financial centres like London, New York, and these flows have contributed to large-scale macroeconomic imbalances. The entire mainstream economics profession has neglected to measure most of these vast flows but they did, for example, contribute to the significant over-valuation of sterling for many years which massively harmed the UK’s export capacity, helped undermine our manufacturing capacity and left us with an over reliance on financial services which all too obviously cannot now provide for our needs. 

Fifth, one of the most important features of the crisis is that the financial system has become frozen as a result of mutual mistrust and impenetrable complexity making it impossible for trading partners to understand each other’s accounts. The secrecy jurisdictions, by giving companies incentives to festoon their financial affairs across multiple jurisdictions, and by covering these affairs in a veil of secrecy, have played a major part in this. As such they were the catalyst for the crisis that emerged in August 2007.

Sixth – subprime debts may have been created onshore, but they were sliced, diced and repackaged offshore.

Seventh – hedge funds have massively undermined the stability of the world’s markets and significantly distorted rewards in them, as well as creating the idea that he long term might be less than a minute, so distorting concepts of value. Almost all are offshore – and unregulated.

Eighth – private equity is very largely offshore – meaning that many employees are much less secure than they once were. The ramifications are obvious.

I could go on. The point is clear. The deliberate opacity that offshore creates might hide no real economic activity – but it also makes it impossible to tell what is happening elsewhere. The consequence has been a massive loss of trust – and much of the blame for that can be appropriately laid at the door of tax havens. As such they probably contributed more to the current financial crisis than anything else.

Hat tip to Tax Justice Network for some elements of this blog.

Other articles in this series are:

What tax havens do

What tax havens do – 1 – they handle stolen property

What tax havens do – 2 – they redistribute wealth from the poor to the rich

What tax havens do – 3 – they facilitate corruption

 

This series on what tax havens will have, on occasion, to state the obvious. It is obvious to 99% of the world’s population that tax havens facilitate corruption. As John Kay said in the Financial Times:

If you operate in the penumbra of legality, as havens do, it is easy to slip outside the bonds of legality altogether. Where there is legal avoidance of tax and regulation, illegal avoidance of tax and regulation is rarely far behind, and often hard to distinguish: where there is secrecy the motive is frequently impropriety; where there is impropriety, criminality is rarely far behind, and hard to distinguish. To turn a blind eye to avoidance of the law is to undermine all law.

This is what happens in tax havens.

The abuse is obvious, whether it be of the sort Enron did, the sort perpetrated by those in power in so many countries in the world, or tax evasion.

Global Financial Integrity estimates the illicit financial flow out of developing countries, almost all through tax havens / secrecy jurisdictions, is not less than $800 billion a year. That’s enough to relieve world poverty 16 times over. And this number excludes the corruption in the developed world which uses these places.

Of that sum the same organisation estimates 3 – 5% is corruption by elected officials and the like, 30% is criminality such as drug trafficking and the balance – some 65% is by commercial organisations, most relating to tax related issues. But all of it is corrupt, and all of it, as John Kay notes, relies upon the secrecy that tax havens provide.

They know this.

They knowingly facilitate this corruption. They cannot deny it. They could choose to end the secrecy that permits the abuse. They don’t. As such they are responsible for that abuse. And the consequences of it.

Remember that: the next one says ‚Äòdevelopment doesn’t work because of corruption’ remind them that’s wrong. ‚Äò

‚ÄòDevelopment is harmed tax havens’ is nearer the truth – because it’s tax havens that permit the corruption that’s being referred to.

Other articles in this series are:

What tax havens do

What tax havens do – 1 – they handle stolen property

What tax havens do – 2 – they redistribute wealth from the poor to the rich

 

It’s a busy morning for publishing. Christian Aid has a new report out today that reveals in detail by country and trade sector, how much non-EU countries are loosing to the EU, US, UK, and Ireland as a result of trade mispricing.

In Death and Taxes: the true toll of tax dodging (May 2008) Christian Aid showed the importance of tax to development, and the international obstacles caused by a lack of transparency in corporate accounting and secrecy jurisdictions (tax havens).

In The Morning After the Night Before (November 2008), Christian Aid showed how the same lack of financial transparency underpinned the crisis, and how that was hitting developing countries hardest.

Now in False Profits: robbing the poor to keep the rich tax free, Christian Aid uses the most robust, peer-reviewed academic methodology and the most comprehensive trade dataset to show just how much developing countries are losing to tax abuse. What this shows is that the developing country members of the G20 lose billions on their trade with the other members.

As the report says:

In this report, we quantify for the first time the damage done to individual countries by trade mispricing. It’s massive.

We commissioned international trade pricing expert Simon Pak, president of the Trade Research Institute and associate professor at Penn State University in the US, to analyse EU and US trade data and estimate the amount of capital shifted from non-EU countries into the EU, the US, the UK and Ireland through bilateral trade mispricing.

Professor Pak, who has advised US Congress on this issue, analysed bilateral trade in every product between 2005 and 2007, calculated the parameters of the normal price range for products traded between countries, and estimated the amount of capital shifted by trades that are outside that normal price range.

The totals he arrived at included prices that had either been artificially depressed or artificially inflated for tax purposes. Some of the prices, he warns, would primarily have been doctored for money-laundering or capital flight purposes, but even in those cases, there would have been a tax consequence. His findings are also based on the assumption that the data analysed was free from reporting error.

In spite of the enormous sums Professor Pak’s research exposes, they are just the tip of the iceberg. For he could only analyse publicly available trading data. Information held by tax havens, whose stock in trade is banking secrecy, would, if known, reveal a far more serious picture. Such jurisdictions are favoured by many multinational corporations.

And what is that enormous figure?

Between 2005 and 2007, the total amount of capital flow from bilateral trade mispricing into the EU and the US alone from non-EU countries is estimated conservatively at more than £581.4bn (€850.1bn, US$1.1tn). It breaks down specifically to £229.7bn (€335.8bn, US$441.2bn) into the EU countries and £351.7bn (€514.3bn, US$673.6bn) into the US. All conversion rates in this report are calculated at the average inter-bank rate for the year in question ‚Äî the most accurate measure available.

If tax was levied on this capital at current rates, non-EU countries could have raised £190.8bn in revenue (€279.0bn, US$365.4bn) between 2005-2007, or £63.6bn (€93.0bn, US$121.8bn) per year.

Among the low-income countries, the biggest tax losses between 2005 and 2007 lay in Nigeria (£502m), Pakistan (£305m), Vietnam (£251m) and Bangladesh (£186m).

The cost is, of course, much more than the funds required to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. What do they recommend to deal with this?:

 

• The introduction of a requirement that businesses operating transnationally must reveal publicly how much profit they make, how many people they employ and what they pay in tax in every country where they do business. That way abuses can be identified quickly. Such country-by-country reporting would show if a company was declaring unexpectedly high or low profits in different jurisdictions, including recognised tax havens. This would enable developing-country tax authorities to prioritise which financial flows need further investigation.
• Strong global rules to enable developing countries to determine whether they have been paid the right amount of tax, in the right place, at the right time. The rules would require all states to exchange automatically the information they hold from companies and individuals. Compliance would be evaluated objectively, with sanctions against states that refuse to part with the information.

Country by country reporting can transform the well-being of the world’s poor. The argument is beyond dispute.

So why isn’t the profession calling for it? Tell me someone from KPMG, PWC, E&Y, Deloittes because in the meantime I’m saying those deaths are at least partly your responsibility.

 

Tax havens / secrecy jurisdictions* deliberately, knowingly and successfully redistribute wealth from the poorest in society to the richest. They do this in many ways.

The facility they offer to those who want to avoid and evade their tax liabilities is only available to those who can afford the services of the offshore financial community who work within them – and they do not come cheap. This ensures that it is only the wealthiest people and the largest companies, in turn owned by those wealthiest people, who can have access to them – especially if they wish to use these places with any degree of legitimacy. The consequence is simple: the richest people and largest companies often pay a lower proportion of their income in tax than the poorest in society.

The evidence is clear. In the TUC’s the Missing Billions published in 2008 based on 2008 data it was reported that the largest companies in the UK paid tax in the UK at an average rate of about 22% – with the rate having fallen by 0.5% a year over the previous seven years. That means by now the average rate would be about 21% except for the fact that the headline rate of tax has fallen by 2% as well. Large companies now probably pay tax at an average rate of 19%.

Small companies now pay tax at 21%. They will soon be taxed at 22% in the UK. Their effective rates are higher in almost all cases. The use of tax havens has unambiguously shifted the burden of corporate tax onto small companies.

The same is true of individuals where in the UK the lowest decile have a much higher effective tax rate than the top decile – and many in the top 1% of ‚Äòincome’ earners pay little or no tax.

But that is just the domestic effect. Internationally it is worse. Tax havens facilitate the flow of $800 billion of illicit funds a a year from developing countries to the developed world.

Transfer mispricing that they facilitate costs developing countries $160 billion a year.

Tax evasion they facilitate denies governments at least $250 billion a year in tax revenues from high net worth individuals.

You can argue about the numbers. They are always massively bigger than the total aid budget of $100 billion – and of course they massively undermine the effectiveness of that by providing the services that ensures that corruption can occur.

Systemically tax havens / secrecy jurisdictions are designed to achieve this goal. And they do achieve it.

No wonder more than a billion people – a sixth of the world’s population live in poverty.

And directly as a result of what tax havens do 1,000 children die every day.

That’s what tax havens do.

 

* There is no agreed definition of a tax haven. Secrecy jurisdictions are ion the other hand precisely defined. Secrecy jurisdictions are places that intentionally create regulation for the primary benefit and use of those not resident in their geographical domain that is designed to undermine the legislation or regulation of another jurisdiction and that, in addition, create a deliberate, legally backed veil of secrecy that ensures that those from outside the jurisdiction making use of its regulation cannot be identified to be doing so.

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