Oct 312008
 

The French and Germans have suggested that new sanctions against secrecy jurisdictions are now needed since they continue to facilitate abuse of the world’s financial architecture and undermine any prospect of effective regulation of that system. They are right to do so. These places represent a ‘get of regulation free card’ for the world’s banks, in particular. Their corporate clients exploit the same benefit with the assistance of their accountants and lawyers.

Such a request does however pose a particular set of problem. The first is how can we be sure we have properly identified these places, the second is how can we assess their significance and the third is how do we give them real opportunity to reform their ways?

The first and most important thing to say, as I have been doing quite a lot of late, is that tax cannot be the be all and end all of any definition. It was not tax that brought down the banks (although the aim of tax abuse may have contributed). It was lax regulation, a lack of transparency and the distrust this created between banks due to the opacity of their disclosure that nearly brought the world to its knees. All of that was massively influenced by the existence of, the use of and abuse of secrecy jurisdictions.

This means that the criteria that need to be set should not relate to tax alone, or maybe not even to tax at all. The criteria has relate to opacity. The Tax Justice Network is ahead of the curve on this issue: we have been working to identify the relative opacity of those places generally considered to be the major secrecy jurisdictions for a while now. It is slightly unfortunate that the crisis could not have been delayed by a few months so we could have finished our work to coincide with it, but that’s the way these things work.

What is very clear to us is that there remains an enormous wall of secrecy that prevents people obtaining the information they need if they are to trade with each other on a level playing field, with the risk of being apportioned on appropriate commercial basis. It is almost impossible to identify the owners of the most secrecy jurisdiction companies. Of course, that is also true of most Delaware companies, but we expect reform in places like the USA and the UK just as much as we do in Switzerland, Singapore and Cayman. The UK continues to recognise the role of trusts in tax abuse and is preventing the inclusion of these arrangements in the EU Savings Tax Directive. Trusts should, just as much as companies should, be completely open and accountable about their transactions: they are artificial structures created only by law. To take advantage of them requires transparency as the quid pro quo due to society for the advantage they provide.

Our definition of secrecy jurisdictions is dependent upon access transparent data about ownership, management, economic performance, and prospects of by law which confer economic advantage on those using them. This access cannot be restricted to tax authorities. That would have had no impact at all on the banking crisis. This is why signing tax information exchange agreements, as recommended by the OECD, is a wholly insufficient basis for defining those locations to be subject to sanction under any new arrangement.

What we need is data on public record, openly and freely available for anyone to access, meaning that Internet availability is essential.

This access can be assessed and ranked. An acceptable level of access can be determined. If it is then sanctions can be designed depending upon the degree of access that is provided. Anywhere would then know the action a must take to avoid those sanctions. This gives them an exit route that is meaningful and provides a benefit to society, unlike that which was offered in the 1998 OECD initiative.

I am not saying that this is the only plausible answer: that would be absurd. I am however say that to reproduce the errors of 1998 would be disastrous. I sincerely hope that we can avoid that mistake and adopt something along the lines we propose because it is objective, assessable, related to benefit and provides a meaningful exit root for those places that wish to reform. That would appear to be a successful design criteria.

 

These are my links for October 30th through October 31st:

 

Accountancy Age’s editorial this week said (and I have shortened it without losing substance, I think):

Despite all the mud slinging that has come from politicians and columnists, The Financial Reporting Council’s chief executive Paul Boyle went out of his way to deliver an early view of auditors in a speech at Mansion House. ‘So far, at least, auditing has had a good crisis.’

He is, indeed, correct. The accusations that have so far come the way of auditors have been vague, amorphous and opaque. They deliver no detail, offer no particulars and appear to rest simply on the assumption that a financial crisis must have something to do with the auditors.

This really isn’t good enough.

Since disaster fell on Northern Rock unsubstantiated accusations have been made about auditors, yet no one who makes them appears to have any way of standing them up.

The profession should not be complacent. The attacks will continue and auditors should ensure they are ready to respond.

I am staggered. Gob smacked. Incredulous. I normally have some time for Accountancy Age. But this comment piece is so ridiculous it is hard to believe anyone thought it, let alone let it pass scrutiny before being published.

Have they not read what Francine McKenna has to say? Has no one at Accountancy Age read a single comment by Prem Sikka? No one can ever accuse him of not saying enough.

But let’s just deal with he glaringly obvious.Northern Rock failed. Its auditors gave no warning. Worse, they profited enormously from creating Granite: a key component in its downfall.

RBS failed, Lloyds TSB failed. HBOS failed. Bradford & Bingley failed. Alliance & Leicester darned nearly failed. Not a single hint, not one, anywhere in their audit reports that these companies were not going concerns, that they did not have the necessary liquidity to survive. But that is a basic duty an auditor has to fulfil: in each of these cases the auditors failed to note that the business could not and would not survive until the next year end came round. That is gross failure. Failure of the audits. Failure of the accounts. Systemic failure of the accounting architecture on which both were based. How can anyone, anywhere be so crass as to say auditors are having a good crisis?

And let’s get absolutely blunt: as I told PWC in Norway recently when they addressed a conference asking if accountants were part of the problem or solution in this crisis, the Big 4 are not just a part of the problem: they created the problem; they marketed the problem and they facilitated the abuse. They did all that by creating their offshore facilities that allowed banks to operate offshore, that allowed offshore securitisation (most is), that allowed the opacity of sub-prime, that facilitated hedge fund abuse, that is being used to hide private equity debt. More than most the Big 4 have enormous responsibility for this crisis.

These are not vague, amorphous and opaque accusations: they are specific, detailed and fundamental, striking at the heart of the profession’s business model.

Get real guys: you know the challenge is serious; you know the charges we have levied are backed by evidence, and you can’t avoid the charge by pretending you haven’t read the charge sheet. But if you do the public will believe you even more culpable and negligent than they do already.

I’d get ready to debate, now. Where and when, that’s all we want to know? Answers please, by email to any of those named, or me.

 

I have been asked by several journalists what sanctions could be taken against tax havens if, as the French and German have proposed, we wish to close these places down. Surely, they have said, this would be very difficult?

I entirely disagree. It would be relatively easy to close down secrecy jurisdictions. First of all, we could change our laws so that any contract written in the secrecy jurisdiction that refused to provide effective information exchange with us (about which I will write in the next day or so) would not be enforceable in our courts. That would completely undermine their banking industry.

Second, we could withhold tax on all payments made to banks in those locations unless they agreed to provide full and open access to free online Information on beneficial ownership of their companies, their management and their trading. It has been accepted that this is legal in EU context.

Third, we could deny tax relief on any payments to any company located in these places. This might be particularly effective in tackling some of the current problems the UK is having to deal with concerning controlled foreign companies. A group could, of course, relocate its activities outside the UK but we would ensure that there was a tax cost to them from doing so.

And we could, of course, extend the EU savings Tax directive and eliminate the withholding tax option.

Some might suggest these look like blunt instruments. I suggest that they are appropriate measures to tackle economic terrorism designed to undermine the effective operation of our economies and our states. In the circumstances they seem remarkably tame. And we really will not be asking for much in exchange if a country wants to avoid their imposition.

 

PricewaterhouseCoopers gave a presentation using the above title at the conference I was at in Oslo last week.

I won’t tell you most of what they said: Chatham House rules applied.

I will tell you what I told them. I said that in my opinion they weren’t part of the problem – they designed the problem, spread its contagion through the range of secrecy jurisdiction offices through which they operate (all of the significant and most of the minor ones – well over 40 in all) and continue to infect the world with the dual curse of tax abuse and regulatory degradation which has resulted in the near collapse of most of the world’s banks.

Rather oddly the senior manager the partners in Oslo sent to defend their case agreed. I think it’s fair to note that: they were there to promote their cause. I don’t think they did.

Edited 30-10-08

 

These are my links for October 29th:

 

That’s what Accountancy Age says might break out if Obama wins. And they note:

Tax campaigner Richard Murphy says there are some clear practical steps that could be taken to deal with havens, which are, after all, sovereign states and free to set up whatever tax rates they like.

‘Tax is not the issue,’ Murphy says, insisting that it is more a question of secrecy. He refers to havens rather as ‘secrecy jurisdictions’.

He says these jurisdictions have to provide better information sharing arrangements; the current ones being ineffective.

And if they don’t, larger countries could withhold tax at source.

Equally, companies who decide to situate intellectual property abroad putting a brand name in a company in the British Virgin Islands, for example, and getting UK-based companies to pay a fee to that company for the use of it could end up finding that fee is not tax deductible against their UK profits.

A better list of jurisdictions needs to be drawn up, and it is possible a UN tax committee, rather than the OECD, could take on responsibility for the issues.

Not only that, but the big countries may have to change some of their own rules to avoid charges of hypocrisy.


 

I’m writing on residence and domicile at TaxationWeb:

In my opinion, the approach you adopt to the question of residence and domicile is a bit like the proverbial Marmite question. It creates clear and unambiguous divides between those involved in the debate.

You may not be surprised to hear that I suspect I’m not on the same side as our professional institutes.

Oct 292008
 

Some might say this melodramatic:

[T]he idea that a quick recession would purge the world of past excesses is ludicrous. The danger is, instead, of a slump, as a mountain of private debt – in the US, equal to three times GDP – topples over into mass bankruptcy. The downward spiral would begin with further decay of financial systems and proceed via pervasive mistrust, the vanishing of credit, closure of vast numbers of businesses, soaring unemployment, tumbling commodity prices, cascading declines in asset prices and soaring repossessions. Globalisation would spread the catastrophe everywhere.

But that’s Martin Wolf in the Financial Times. It’s cold, calm analysis.

And the risk of that private debt falling over is enormous and if it does watch the insurance companies tumble first: they’re laden with it.

The crisis has only just begun. Which makes today’s stock market rise very strange indeed.